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Perhaps it would not be an exaggeration to say that there is no system of
thought more intimately bound up with one fundamental principle than
is the system of Hegel. Even a cursory reading of his works is sufficient
to convince one that the doctrine of the Notion, whatever it may be, is
basic to the system; and a more detailed study only forces the conviction
home. In the Phenomenology, in the Encyclopaedia, in the History of
Philosophy, in the Philosophy of Religion, everywhere it is this doctrine
of the Notion upon which emphasis is laid. Indeed, if one were to say
that the entire system is just the explication of this doctrine, its elabora-
tion by definition and application, one would be well within the bounds
of justification. A correct interpretation of the system, consequently,
depends upon a thorough comprehension of the doctrine of the Notion;
if this doctrine is neglected, the system must remain a sealed book. The
aim of the present monograph is to set forth this doctrine of the Notion,
to emphasize its importance for a theory of knowledge, and, in the light
of it, to give some insight into Hegel’s conception of ultimate reality.
The first chapter of this study was read in part before the meeting of
the American Philosophical Association at Cornell University in De-
cember, 1907. Subsequently it was published in an expanded form in
The Philosophical Review (Vol. XVII, pp. 619–642), under the title
“The Significance of the Hegelian Conception of Absolute Knowledge.”
My thanks are due to the editor of the Review for his permission to
reprint it here substantially as it appeared there.
My very great indebtedness to various books and authors is suffi-
ciently testified to by the footnotes. The references to the larger Logic
are to the edition of 1841, published by Duncker and Humblot. The
translations of Hegel’s works, to which I have referred for assistance6/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
and from which I have freely quoted, are: W. Wallace, The Logic of
Hegel (second edition, 1892); W. Wallace, Philosophy of Mind (1894);
S. W. Dyde, Philosophy of Right (1896); E. B. Speirs and J. B.
Sanderson, Philosophy of Religion (three volumes, 1895); E. S. Haldane
and F. H. Simson, History of Philosophy (three volumes, 1894); J. Sibree,
Philosophy of History (reprint of 1902). I have not followed the trans-
lations verbatim in every case; but what few changes have been made
are, I trust, not less faithful to the original.
To the members of the Sage School of Philosophy I am deeply in-
debted for many suggestions both consciously and unconsciously given.
Professor G. H. Sabine, of Leland Stanford Jr. University, has read a
portion of the study in manuscript and has aided me in the not very
pleasant task of proof-reading. My heaviest debt of gratitude is to Pro-
fessor J. E. Creighton, of Cornell University, at whose suggestion the
study was first undertaken and under whose guidance and encourage-
ment it has been brought to completion. The study would be much more
imperfect than it now appears, were there not incorporated in it Profes-
sor Creighton’s many valuable suggestions and criticisms. For the con-






Thought as Objective and Universal.
Perhaps no part of Hegel’s system has been more persistently over-
looked or misunderstood than has his doctrine of the nature of thought.
Certainly no part of his system deserves to be more carefully studied.
For this is the doctrine that is absolutely fundamental to his system; and
it must be understood before any fair appreciation of his system can be
arrived at or any just criticism of his contentions be advanced. To give
an exposition of the Hegelian doctrine of thought, and to do this as
much as is practicable in the author’s own words, is the aim of this
chapter.
Almost universally it is taken for granted that the Logic contains all
that Hegel thought it worth while to say about the nature of thought. His
epistemology is criticized and defended against criticism exclusively on
the basis of the dialectical development of the categories, the assump-
tion of both critic and champion being that here we find Hegel’s last
word concerning the nature of knowledge. That such an assumption is
erroneous and leads to positive error in interpreting the Hegelian episte-
mology will, I trust, appear in what is to follow. The Logic does, indeed,
purport to give an account of the essentially organic nature of thought,
by showing how one category necessarily loses itself in its negative,
which proves to be, not an abstract negative, but a negative that dialec-
tically leads on to a more concrete synthesis of the two opposed catego-
ries. The Logic leads progressively from the abstract categories of Be-
ing, through the more concrete categories of Essence, to the still more
concrete categories of the Notion; and finally to the most concrete cat-
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egory of all, that category in which all the lower categories find their
‘truth,’ namely, the Absolute Idea. This the Logic does; but this is all
that it does. It tells us nothing direct about the empirical significance of
the categories themselves. Except by frequent hints — which indeed are
quite emphatic and significant — the Logic gives us no insight into that
fundamental problem of epistemology, namely, the significance of the
subject-object relation. On the contrary, as Hegel himself declares, the
very purpose of the Logic is to deal with the categories in the pure ether
of thought and in abstraction from their empirical setting.1 So in the
Logic we search in vain for an exposition of this most important aspect
of our knowing experience; the implications of the objective reference
of thought are not explicitly touched upon there. For such an exposition
we must look elsewhere.
The exposition for which we seek is to be found in the Phenomenol-
ogy of Spirit. Perhaps this will appear beyond dispute from a consider-
ation of some of Hegel’s own statements on the point. In the preface to
the Phenomenology he says: “The task which I have set myself is to
elaborate the fact that philosophy approaches the form of science —
approaches the point where it lays aside the name of love for knowl-
edge, and becomes real knowledge.”2 Again, later in the same preface
we read: “The process of science in general, or of knowledge, is set
forth in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Knowledge as it is at first, or the
immediate spirit, is spiritless or sensuous consciousness. In order to
become real knowledge, to reach the element of science which is its pure
notion itself, this sensuous consciousness has to work itself through a
long way.”3 This way is, of course, that traced by the Phenomenology.
A little later in the same work we are told that the problem of the Phe-
nomenology is simply “an investigation and proof of the reality of knowl-
edge.”4 This same point Hegel is emphasizing when he urges that the
Phenomenology is the science of experience; for experience, he tells us,
is only the “dialectical process (Bewegung) which perfects conscious-
ness in itself, both in its knowledge and in its object.”5 In other words,
since experience is essentially a subject-object relation, its truth is to be
found in the determination of the real import and significance of that
relation. Thus it seems that the problem of Phenomenology is pretty
clearly defined: it is simply the progressive definition and exposition of
the significance of this duality within experience. It is not merely to
trace an organic development from one to another stage of conscious-
ness, as Professor Baillie would seem to suggest.6 Rather is it to dis-Thought and Reality in Hegel’s System/9
close the important change that takes place between subject and object
as the knowing experience is traced through the various attitudes of
consciousness. As Lasson aptly remarks in the introduction to his re-
cent edition of the Phenomenology, the point of interest in the work is
the transition “from one relation of consciousness to the entire world of
being, to another such relation.”7 Hegel’s purpose in this novel Intro-
duction to Philosophy is not like Kant’s in the first of the Critiques,
namely, to investigate the possibility and limitations of knowledge. He
accepts knowledge and the knowing experience very much as it is ac-
cepted by common-sense, and then proceeds to develop its implications.
Passing dialectically from sensuous consciousness through self-con-
sciousness, reason, spirit, and religion, he finally arrives at what seems
to him to be the true attitude of consciousness, the truth of the knowing
experience. This final result of the Phenomenology, which Hegel calls
Absolute Knowledge (das absolute Wissen), is thus his definition of the
real nature of knowledge; it is his final statement of the significance of
the subject-object relation within concrete experience.
It is very important to notice at the outset, and to keep constantly in
mind, the fact that Hegel bases this conception of absolute knowledge
directly and unequivocally upon our common knowing experience. This
point is so fundamental, and is so generally neglected by the critics, that
it needs emphasis even at the risk of digression. If there is wanted more
evidence than has already been adduced, it is not far to seek. In the
Preface to the Phenomenology itself, we find an explicit statement to
the effect that there is no break between consciousness as it appears in
sensuous perception and in absolute knowing; and this very fact, Hegel
argues, makes possible the transition from the lower to the higher stage.
“The beginning of philosophy,” he says, “makes the presupposition or
demand that consciousness be in this element” (i.e., as the context indi-
cates, in the ‘element’ of ‘absolute science,’ which is simply the point of
view of absolute knowledge). “But this element receives its completion
and clearness only through the process of its development.... On its side,
science demands of self-consciousness that it raise itself into this ether....
On the other hand, the individual has a right to ask that science at least
let down to him the ladder to this standpoint, that is, show him the stand-
point within himself.”8 Furthermore, in the Introduction to the larger
Logic we read: “Absolute knowledge is the truth of all modes or atti-
tudes of consciousness.”9 Finally, there is a passage in the smaller Logic
which runs thus: “In my Phenomenology of Spirit... the method adopted10/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
was to begin with the first and simplest phase of mind, immediate con-
sciousness, and to show how that stage gradually of necessity worked
onward to the philosophical point of view, the necessity of that view
being proved by the process.”10 Now it would seem that the import of
such passages as these is unmistakable. The Phenomenology begins
with the most naive attitude of consciousness, where the matter of intu-
ition is looked upon as a mere datum; its progress, as Professor
McGilvary suggests,11 consists just in showing that this sensuous con-
sciousness is an essential element in absolute knowing. In other words,
the standpoint of absolute knowing is involved in every, even the sim-
plest, phase of consciousness; it is implied in every act of knowledge, in
every subject-object relation, — which is tantamount to saying that it is
conterminous with experience itself.
Near the end of his discussion of the Phenomenology, Haym, look-
ing back over the course of its development, remarks: “This whole phe-
nomenological genesis of absolute knowledge was nothing other than
the presence of the Absolute, which unfolded itself before our very eyes
in the methodical manner peculiar to its spiritual nature. It was the self-
development of the Absolute as it has mirrored itself in consciousness
and in history.”12 One is led to believe that the critic means by this, as he
says later, that the ego “is at the beginning of the Phenomenology ex-
actly where it ought to be at the end, — not in itself, but in the Abso-
lute.”13 The suggestion of such a point of view as this, however, seems
to me to be at best misleading. Whatever may be said concerning the
relation of the result of the Phenomenology to the standpoint of an Ab-
solute Intelligence,14 there is certainly no reason for maintaining that
Hegel would ask us to assume such a standpoint at the beginning of the
Phenomenology. He asks us merely to place ourselves at the point of
view of sensuous consciousness, and to try to discover its logical impli-
cations. It is, indeed, true that in the attitude of sensuous consciousness
Hegel sees the standpoint of absolute knowing, which thus finds its ba-
sis in the actual knowing experiences of finite individuals; and it is also
true that these experiences are never left out of consideration by him.
But this means nothing more than that absolute knowledge is logically
involved in every knowing experience, and that investigation can prove
that it is so involved. Hegel himself has very clearly put the matter in
another context: “It may be said that the Absolute is involved in every
beginning, just as every advance is simply an exposition of it.... But
because it is at first only implicit, it is really not the Absolute.... TheThought and Reality in Hegel’s System/11
advance, therefore, is not a sort of overflow, as it would be were the
beginning truly the Absolute; rather the development consists in the fact
that the universal determines itself.... Only in its completion is it the
Absolute.”15 Even granting, then, for the sake of the argument, that
Hegel finally identifies absolute knowledge with the point of view of an
omniscient Intelligence (which assumption is by no means self-evident,
— indeed, it is difficult to prove that Hegel’s Absolute is such an Intel-
ligence), we are certainly not justified in saying that he emerges from
the Phenomenology with nothing more than the assumption with which
he began his investigation. The standpoint of absolute knowledge is not
assumed at the beginning; it is arrived at only at the end. And to accuse
Hegel of having begun with the point of view of the Absolute is an
indication that his actual procedure has been misconstrued. Absolute
knowledge does not, as Haym asserts, find its justification in the fact
that “the Weltgeist has completed itself in history,” but, as we shall see
later, in the fact that it is the necessary presupposition of all concrete
individual experience.
Lotze, too, has brought practically the same accusation against Hegel.
“It was not after Hegel’s mind,” he tells us, “to begin by determining the
subjective forms of thought, under which alone we can apprehend the
concrete nature of this ground of the Universe, — a nature perhaps to us
inaccessible. From the outset he looked on the motion of our thought in
its effort to gain a clear idea of this still obscure goal of our aspiration
as the proper inward development of the Absolute itself, which only
needed to be pursued consistently in order gradually to bring into con-
sciousness all that the universe contains.”16 Now I submit that such an
accusation entirely overlooks the procedure of the Phenomenology in
establishing the category of absolute knowledge. The very purpose of
this effort was ‘to determine the subjective forms of thought’ as they
appear in the knowing experience of the individual. It is true that Hegel
did not enter into psychological discussion of individual minds; his aim
was epistemological and not psychological.17 It is also true that he ended
his investigation by exhibiting the essential objectivity of these so-called
‘subjective forms’ of thought. But the fact still remains that he took his
stand on actual human experience and began his inquiry with common
everyday consciousness. In the case of the Logic (provided one forgets
the fact that the result of the Phenomenology is its presupposition) it
may be argued with some show of plausibility that from the outset the
author regards thought as the “proper inward development of the Abso-12/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
lute itself.” But there can be no doubt whatever concerning the
baselessness of the charge when made with reference to the Phenom-
enology of Spirit. The category of absolute knowledge is not a first
principle shot out of a pistol at us, as it were, but a conclusion labori-
ously reached; and it is attained only by a careful and painstaking ex-
amination of all stages of consciousness from the sensuous to the scien-
tific and religious. Wherever there is a subject-object relation, there the
characteristics of absolute knowledge are disclosed.
Absolute knowledge being, then, Hegel’s interpretation of the es-
sential characteristics of thought as it appears in every actual knowing
experience, the question arises concerning the details of the conception.
What are the fundamental characteristics of thought as defined in this
Hegelian category? It is to an attempt to answer this question, partially
at least, that we now address ourselves.
In the first place, Hegel claims that his conception of absolute knowl-
edge gives thought release from the subjectivity in which it was bound
by both the Kantian and Fichtean systems. Kant, he admits, does indeed
give to thought a quasi-objectivity, namely, universal validity. “Kant
gave the title objective to the intellectual factor, to the universal and
necessary; and he was quite justified in so doing.”18 That is to say, for
Kant objectivity means the universally valid in contradistinction to the
particularity and relativity of sense-perception; and this is a step in the
right direction towards true objectivity. “But after all,” Hegel continues,
“objectivity of thought, in Kant’s sense, is again to a certain extent sub-
jective. Thoughts, according to Kant, although universal and necessary
categories, are only our thoughts — separated by an impassable gulf
from the thing, as it exists apart from our knowledge.”19 In other words,
Kant’s categories cannot, by their very nature, express the real: they are
mere ideas, which can indeed tell us about the temporal and spatial
relations of objects, but which just for this reason can give us no insight
into the nature of ultimate reality. Hegel elsewhere speaks of them as
prisms through which the light of truth is so refracted and broken that it
can never be had in its purity. Such idealism, Hegel justly concludes, is
purely subjective.20 Heroic as were Fichte’s efforts to break through to
reality, they were, Hegel asserts, unavailing. “Fichte,” he says, “never
advanced beyond Kant’s conclusion, that the finite only is knowable,
while the infinite transcends the range of thought. What Kant calls the
thing-by-itself, Fichte calls the impulse from without, — that abstrac-
tion of something else than ‘I,’ not otherwise describable or definableThought and Reality in Hegel’s System/13
than as the negative or non-Ego in general.”21 To express it otherwise,
Fichte, in his search for objectivity, finds nothing more satisfactory than
an unattainable ideal, an eternal Sollen. But this vanishing ideal does
not meet the difficulty; thought, which merely ought to be objective, is
still subjective, even though an infinite time be allowed for transition to
objectivity. Consequently, Fichte’s position, like Kant’s, is in the last
analysis nothing more than subjective idealism. Now the standpoint of
absolute knowledge, Hegel maintains, transcends the dualism in which
the systems of Kant and Fichte seem hopelessly involved. It gives to
thought, not a quasi-objectivity or an objectivity that ought to be, but an
objectivity that is at once genuine and actual.
Hegel has left us in no doubt as to what he thinks such an objectiv-
ity implies. In the context of the above criticism of Kant, he says: “The
true objectivity of thinking means that the thoughts, far from being merely
ours, must at the same time be the real essence of the things, and of
whatever is an object to us.” Later in the same context he tells us that
objectivity means “the thought-apprehended essence of the existing thing,
in contradistinction from what is merely our thought, and what conse-
quently is still separated from the thing itself, as it exists in independent
essence.” From these very explicit statements it is evident that objectiv-
ity of thought means for Hegel at least two things: (a) that thought which
is truly objective is not particular and individual, but in a sense tran-
scends the individual; and (b) that truly objective thought does actually
express the essence of things. A consideration of these two points will
now occupy our attention for a time.
The first of these points, that thought is really more than an indi-
vidual affair, Hegel states very explicitly in the smaller Logic. In the
twenty-third section he asserts that thought is “no private or particular
state or act of the subject, but rather that attitude of consciousness where
the abstract self, freed from all the special limitations to which its ordi-
nary states or qualities are liable, restricts itself to that universal action
in which it is identical with all individuals.” Furthermore, he constantly
insists that the dialectic of thought is really der Gang der Sache selbst.
“It is not the outward action of subjective thought, but the personal soul
of the content, which unfolds its branches and fruit organically.”22 The
question, however, at once arises, Are not such statements meaning-
less? Is the “abstract self, freed from all the special limitations to which
its ordinary states or qualities are liable,” anything more than an hy-
postatized entity? Do we know anything about the ‘universal action’ of14/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
thought apart from an individual experience? Is the finite knower merely
a passive observer of the ‘march of the object,’ or of the organically
unfolding ‘soul of the content’? To meet the objection implied in these
questions, a preliminary consideration is necessary.
Every act of thought may be looked at from two points of view. It
may be regarded as a process in time, that is, as a mere psychological
event, or as a meaning. As a process in time, it is a state of conscious-
ness among other such states to which it is related and by reference to
which it may be explained. As a meaning, it is the expression of the
relation of subject to object, the expression of which relation gives it its
significance as an act of knowledge. Neither of these aspects of thought
can, of course, be neglected; a timeless act of thought is as much a non-
entity as a meaningless act of thought. But, on the other hand, the two
aspects must not be confused; thought as a process in time is something
quite different from thought as a meaning. Both points of view are le-
gitimate and, indeed, necessary in dealing with concrete mental experi-
ence. If, now, these ways of viewing thought be the standpoints of psy-
chology and epistemology, respectively, we are perfectly right in saying
that, from the psychological point of view, thought is subjective and
particular, while from the standpoint of epistemology it is transsubjective.
As a psychological process, thought is subjective and particular for the
simple reason that, when so viewed, it is nothing more than an element
in a complex presentation which at a particular moment makes up the
mental life of the individual subject. Even belief in a trans-subjective
world, the psychologist treats, as Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison says,
“simply as a subjective fact; he analyzes its constituents and tells us the
complex elements of which it is built up; he tells us with great precision
what we do believe, but so far as he is a pure psychologist he does not
attempt to tell us whether our belief is true, whether we have real war-
rant for it.”23 Epistemology, on the contrary, necessarily transcends this
subjective standpoint of psychology. It deals, not with the knowing ex-
perience of any particular mind, not with knowledge as it is possessed
by any particular subject, but with knowledge as it is in itself. Episte-
mology finds its special field just in determining the validity or falsity of
the claims of our trans-subjective belief. Its business is to give us a
criterion of truth, to investigate the subject-object relation within expe-
rience and to develop its implications. In doing this it must neglect the
particular experiences, or, to use Professor Bosanquet’s phrase, it must
abstract from the abstractions of psychology, and fix its attention uponThought and Reality in Hegel’s System/15
the essential nature of knowledge qua knowledge. It does not, of course,
deny the significance of the psychological aspect of thought, nor does it
try to escape from the implications of experience when read from that
angle of vision. It simply deals with thought from its own specific stand-
point, its aim being to handle its data unencumbered as much as pos-
sible by psychological considerations.24
Now, as I understand Hegel, we can accuse him neither of confus-
ing these two points of view, nor of overlooking one in his zeal for the
other. As has been pointed out, his interest in the discussion of knowl-
edge is primarily epistemological in the sense above defined; and he
keeps consistently to this point of departure. He sees clearly that, from
this point of view, knowledge must be investigated as it is in and for
itself and freed from the prejudices and preconceptions which attach to
it in individual minds; if an adequate standard of truth is to be attained,
relativity in knowledge must be overcome. But it should be very care-
fully noted that Hegel does not, at any rate need not, forget that thought
is always a process in a knowing mind. The objectivity which he claims
for thought in the category of absolute knowledge is claimed for the
thought of every individual who knows; the truth of absolute experi-
ence, truth as it is in itself and for itself, is simply the truth of the expe-
riences that are here and now. This point I tried to emphasize at the
beginning of the discussion. Thus the ‘abstract self,’ freed from the
limitations of its ordinary states and busy in its universal mode of ac-
tion, turns out to be the finite self making an unusually strenuous effort
to be consistent. Genuinely objective thought is not the private posses-
sion of A or B; it is rather the thought activity in which, so far as they
are rational creatures, A and B participate. Even if we are fully con-
vinced that Hegel has gone too far in the identification of the finite knower
with the Absolute, still we must admit the legitimacy and necessity of
this demand of the category of absolute knowledge. For if the subjectiv-
ity in which experience is involved by the Kantian and Fichtean philoso-
phies is really to be transcended, experience must be given some form of
genuine objectivity; and if that form of objectivity is to be found in
thought, then thought must be looked upon as it is in its essential nature
and not as it appears in this or that individual mind. And this, it would
seem, is all that Hegel means when he says that truly objective thought
transcends the individual experience.
The second factor involved in the conception of true objectivity,
namely, the capacity of thought to express the essential nature of its16/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
object, Hegel shows to be the necessary presupposition of all knowing
experience. Thought must disclose the constitution of reality, he main-
tains, otherwise experience is doomed to a hopeless dualism. “The truth
as such,” he tells us, “is essentially in knowledge.”25 “Only in so far as
reflection has relation to the Absolute is it reason and its activity that of
true knowledge (Wissen).”26 Every individual who knows does, by vir-
tue of that very fact, transcend the dualism which seems to exist be-
tween subject and object; on any other assumption it is not easy to see
how experience can be brought into actual contact with ultimate reality.
To elaborate this argument is exactly what Hegel undertakes in the Phe-
nomenology. He shows there by dialectical procedure how the lowest
and most naive attitude of consciousness to its object subsumes the op-
position which prima facie seems such a barrier to the comprehension
of reality; such subsumption must be assumed, or we shall never be able
to say that experience and reality are one. One might summarily say,
without doing violence to Hegel’s own words, that the purpose of the
Phenomenology is to show, in opposition to the Kantian philosophy,
why the Ding-an-sich must be known and how it can be known. It must
be known, because this is the presupposition of experience from its ear-
liest and simplest stages; it can be known, because thought is no merely
subjective and private process going on in our heads, but in its very
essence is a significant relation to objects. Thus Hegel solves the prob-
lem of the opposition between subject and object by pointing out that
the problem is really made by our own abstract procedure in dealing
with experience. In point of fact, he tells us, there is no such opposition;
on the contrary, the very fact that we can have significant knowledge
forces us to the conclusion that thought is truly objective, and that the
object is in reality as it is in knowledge.
Hegel’s position on this point can, perhaps, be more clearly under-
stood when contrasted with Lotze’s view. In his Logic Lotze summa-
rizes his position thus: “We have convinced ourselves that this changing
world of our ideas is the sole material given us to work upon; that truth
and the knowledge of truth consist only in the laws of interconnection
which are found to obtain universally within a given set of ideas.”27
Now when we recall that these ideas are for Lotze more or less subjec-
tive, mere ‘tools’ by means of which we somehow come in contact with
reality, but through which the essence of objects can never be known,
the contrast between his position and Hegel’s is plain. According to the
one, we are shut off from reality by means of the very tools we vainlyThought and Reality in Hegel’s System/17
endeavor to work with; reality is a realm ‘whose margin fades forever
and forever’ as we move. According to the other, we are never out of
touch with reality, since to know is ipso facto to know the essential
nature of the objects of knowledge. To the former, truth is nothing more
than consistency within a given set of ideas; to the latter, truth is nothing
less than reality itself. In a word, on the theory of Lotze thought is after
all still subjective, still confined to the abstract realm of bare universals,
impotent to overtake the phantom reality it pursues: Hegel teaches, on
the contrary, that thought is essentially objective, that form and content
interpenetrate, that the process of knowledge is the process of things.
And this conception of the objectivity of thought, Hegel would urge, is a
necessary presupposition of experience, unless indeed we are willing to
abide by the consequences of an epistemological dualism.
But if thought expresses the essence of its object, then thought ipso
facto comprehends its object and so exhausts reality. This implication
of his doctrine of the objectivity of thought Hegel not only recognizes
but insists upon. “Conception is the penetration of the object, which is
then no longer opposed to me. From it I have taken its own peculiar
nature, which it had as an independent object in opposition to me. As
Adam said to Eve, ‘Thou art flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone,’ so
says the Spirit, ‘This object is spirit of my spirit, and all alienation has
disappeared.”’28 This same idea Hegel has in mind when he speaks of
thought as begreifendes Denken. “Begreifendes Denken,” says Profes-
sor McGilvary, “is grasping, clutching thought, thought that grips its
object as its own inalienable possession. Perhaps we might translate das
begreifende Denken by the phrase ‘object-appropriating thought’; for
the logical relation of such thought to its object is analogous to the legal
relation of the master to the slave; the slave had no independent status;
he stood only in his master, who engulfed him.”29 Again, the one distin-
guishing feature between what Hegel terms ‘finite’ and ‘infinite’ thought
is that the latter destroys the opposition between form and content, which
opposition the former never transcends; as Hegel puts it, ‘finite’ thought
is “subjective, arbitrary, and accidental,” while ‘infinite’ thought is what
alone “can get really in touch with the supreme and true.”30 And, of
course, it is ‘infinite’ thought with which Hegel has to do in his category
of absolute knowledge. Furthermore, in the Introduction to the larger
Logic Hegel argues that to separate the form and content of knowledge
is to presuppose an external objective world which is independent of
thought; and this, he objects, is unjustifiable.31 And later in the same18/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
Introduction, we read: “In logic we have nothing to do with thought
about something which lies independently outside of thought as the ba-
sis of it.”32 Finally, in the smaller Logic, he asserts: “In the negative
unity of the Idea, the infinite overlaps and includes the finite, thought
overlaps being, subjectivity overlaps objectivity.”33 Other passages bear-
ing on this point might be quoted, did it seem necessary; but the above
passages state very clearly Hegel’s position. In fact, the position is in-
evitably involved in his whole conception of the objectivity of knowl-
edge. Truly objective knowledge cannot have opposed to it an unac-
countable residuum of fact, which it is unable to comprehend or inter-
pret; on the contrary, it must be conterminous with reality.
The following quotation from Mr. McTaggart presents an admi-
rable antithesis to Hegel’s position here. “Thought is a process of me-
diation and relation, and implies something immediate to be related,
which cannot be found in thought. Even if a stage of thought could be
conceived as existing, in which it was self-subsistent, and in which it
had no reference to any data... at any rate this is not the ordinary thought
of common life. And as the dialectic process professes to start from a
basis common to every one,... it is certain that it will be necessary for
thought, in the dialectic process, to have some relation to data given
immediately, and independent of that thought itself.”34 It makes no dif-
ference that this statement is given by the critic as an interpretation of
Hegel; it is in truth exactly contrary to Hegel’s view of the matter.
Thought, as Hegel conceives of it, certainly has no data opposed to, and
independent of it; nor is it merely a process of mediation and relation
among phenomena external to it. It bears no relation whatever to imme-
diately given data, ‘nuclei’ of being, which lie outside of and beyond it,
for there are no such. On the contrary, it transcends this dualism, and
always finds itself ‘at home’ in its object from which every trace of
alienation has disappeared.35 Perhaps I can best bring out the contrast
between Hegel’s real position and that attributed to him by his critic by
letting him once more speak for himself: “If under the process of knowl-
edge we figure to ourselves an external operation in which it is brought
into a merely mechanical relation to an object, that is to say, remains
outside it, and is only externally applied to it, knowledge is presented in
such a relation as a particular thing for itself, so that it may well be that
its forms have nothing in common with the qualities of the object; and
thus, when it concerns itself with an object, it remains only in its own
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say, does not become real knowledge of it. In such a relation knowledge
is determined as finite, and as of the finite; in its object there remains
something essentially inner, whose notion is thus unattainable by and
foreign to knowledge, which finds here its limit and its end, and is on
that account limited and finite.” So far we have a statement of the critic’s
view with its attendant difficulties. By way of criticism and exposition
of his own position, Hegel continues: “But to take such a relation as the
only one, or as final or absolute, is a purely made-up and unjustifiable
assumption of the Understanding. Real knowledge, inasmuch as it does
not remain outside the object, but in point of fact occupies itself with it,
must be immanent in the object, the proper movement of its nature, only
expressed in the form of thought and taken up into consciousness.”36
This passage is self-explanatory, and comment on it seems superfluous.
In it Hegel has simply pointed out the inevitable dualism involved in the
position which Mr. McTaggart has attributed to him; and in opposition
to such a position he has stated his own more objective standpoint
An objection which arises just here seems prima facie unanswer-
able. If it be true that thought actually does exhaust reality, then it must
be that thought, or knowing experience, and reality coincide. But can
such a view possibly be seriously entertained? Is it not nonsense to say
that thought is co-extensive with the real, when so much of our every-
day experience, our hopes, our fears, our loves, our hates, fall outside
the thinking process? Can one be so mad as to attempt to reduce existen-
tial reality to terms of ideas? Lotze has put the objection very forcibly
thus: “Nothing is simpler than to convince ourselves that every appre-
hending intelligence can only see things as they look to it when it per-
ceives them, not as they look when no one perceives them; he who de-
mands a knowledge which should be more than a perfectly connected
and consistent system of ideas about the thing, a knowledge which should
actually exhaust the thing itself, is no longer asking for knowledge at
all, but for something entirely unintelligible.”37 Mr. Bradley, in a classic
passage, has voiced the same feeling: “Unless thought stands for some-
thing that falls beyond mere intelligence, if ‘thinking’ is not used with
some strange implication that never was part of the meaning of the word,
a lingering scruple still forbids us to believe that reality can ever be
purely rational.... The notion that existence could be the same as under-
standing strikes as cold and ghost-like as the dreariest materialism. That
the glory of this world in the end is appearance leaves the world more
glorious, if we feel it is a show of some fuller splendour; but the sensu-20/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
ous curtain is a deception and a cheat, if it hides some colourless move-
ment of atoms, some spectral woof of impalpable abstractions, or un-
earthly ballet of bloodless categories.”38 Now Hegel’s answer to this
objection is, I think, found in the second characteristic of thought as he
has defined it for us in absolute knowledge; and this we shall proceed at
once to examine.
Thought, Hegel argues, is not mere abstract cognition, but, on the
contrary, is truly universal. In answer to Mr. Bradley he would say that
thought does stand for something which falls beyond mere intelligence.
That is to say, actual concrete thought, in Professor Bosanquet’s phrase-
ology, is a process, not of selective omission, but of constructive analy-
sis; its universals are syntheses of differences.39 In Hegel’s own words:
“The Notion is generally associated in our minds with abstract general-
ity, and on that account it is often described as a general conception. We
speak, accordingly, of the notions of color, plant, animal, etc. They are
supposed to be arrived at by neglecting the particular features which
distinguish the different colors, plants, and animals from each other,
and by retaining those common to them all. This is the aspect of the
Notion which is familiar to the understanding; and feeling is in the right
when it stigmatizes such hollow and empty notions as mere phantoms
and shadows. But the universal of the Notion is not a mere sum of
features common to several things, confronted by a particular which
enjoys an existence of its own. It is, on the contrary, self-particularizing
or self-specifying, and with undimmed clearness finds itself at home in
its antithesis. For the sake both of cognition and of our practical con-
duct, it is of the utmost importance that the real universal should not be
confused with what is merely held in common. All those charges which
the devotees of feeling make against thought, and especially against
philosophic thought, and the reiterated statement that it is dangerous to
carry thought to what they call too great lengths, originate in the confu-
sion of these two things.”40 In other words, universality may mean two
very different things. On the one hand, it may indicate nothing but ab-
stract generality which is arrived at by neglecting the marks peculiar to
particular objects. On the other hand, it may mean the synthetic analysis
of the particulars, and so include within itself the essential characteris-
tics of them. If one only remembers this distinction, and remembers that
the true universal of thought is the subsumption, not the annihilation, of
the particular, then, Hegel would say, there should be no objection raised
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For, in this meaning of thought, experience and thinking experience are
synonymous terms.
There are various passages in which Hegel emphasizes this aspect
of thought by insisting that thought is not one mental faculty among
others coordinate with it, but that it is the principle of universality in
mind and includes within itself the other so-called mental faculties as
essential elements. In his lectures on the History of Philosophy occurs a
criticism of Kant which is very suggestive in this connection: “With
Kant the thinking understanding and sensuousness are both something
particular, and they are merely united in an external, superficial way,
just as a piece of wood and a leg might be bound together with a cord.”41
Against any such atomistic conception of the mind Hegel would insist:
“Even our sense of the mind’s living unity naturally protests against any
attempt to break it up into different faculties, forces, or, what comes to
the same thing, activities, conceived as independent of each other.”42
But he would go further than this. Not only does he maintain that thought
is not one element in an aggregate of disparate parts; he also urges that
thought is rather the very life of the one organic whole which we call
mind, “its very unadulterated self.”43 For example, in the smaller Logic
he asserts that thought is present in every perception and in every men-
tal activity.44 “We simply cannot escape from thought,” he elsewhere
says, “it is present in sensation, in cognition, and knowledge, in the
instincts, and in volition, in so far as these are attributes of a human
mind.”45 In the Philosophy of Right we read: “Spirit in general is thought,
and by thought man is distinguished from the animal. But we must not
imagine that man is on one side thinking and on another side willing, as
though he had will in one pocket and thought in another. Such an idea is
vain. The distinction between thought and will is only that between a
theoretical and a practical relation. They are not two separate faculties.
The will is a special way of thinking; it is thought translating itself into
reality; it is the impulse of thought to give itself reality.”46 The conclu-
sion of the whole matter is, that “in the human being there in only one
reason, in feeling, volition, and thought.”47
Overlooking this conception of universality in Hegel’s doctrine of
thought, Mr. McTaggart criticizes him for holding “that the highest ac-
tivity of Spirit, in which all others are transcended and swallowed up, is
that of pure thought.”48 Such a contention, we are informed, ignores a
fact which Lotze has emphasized in many parts of his system. And that
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volition and feeling — which are as important as thought, and which
cannot be deduced from it, nor explained by it.”49 Now this criticism
assumes that Hegel actually tried to reduce the contents of mind to terms
of abstract cognition. But, as we have just seen, such an assumption is
entirely groundless. Hegel never thought of reducing will and feeling to
knowledge, meaning by knowledge what his critic means by it, namely,
one of several coordinate elements within the life of mind. What Hegel
means by thought, when he asserts that it is conterminous with experi-
ence, is simply that principle by virtue of which experience is an organic
and unitary whole. It is that life of mind itself, which includes within
itself feeling, will, and cognition, and which finds its very being in the
expression of this living unity of the mind’s activity.50 For Hegel, there
is “only one reason, in feeling, volition, and thought.”
After all, the difference between Hegel and his critics on this point
is not so great as might at first appear. Mr. McTaggart is perfectly
willing to admit that it is not impossible that these elements of mind
“might be found to be aspects of a unity which embraces and transcends
them all”; but he is unwilling to call this unity thought.51 Mr. Bradley,
likewise, demands an ultimate synthesis; but it must fall beyond the
category of rationality.52 Though Lotze states it as his conviction “that
the nature of things does not consist in thoughts, and that thinking is not
able to grasp it,” yet he goes so far as to say that “perhaps the whole
mind experiences in other forms of its action and passion the essential
meaning of all being and action.”53 Thus it would seem that the real
quarrel between Hegel and the critics is concerning the real nature of the
synthesis. What the critics vaguely term an ultimate unity, Hegel prefers
to call thought, reason, or Spirit. The former try to find a synthesis of
elements which they have defined as practically exclusive and indepen-
dent, though, of course, not ontologically separable from each other;
and they seek this synthetic principle in feeling or intuition, — some-
thing ultra-rational. Hegel, on the other hand, insists that mind is an
organic unity, and that it is such only by virtue of its own most charac-
teristic activity; it is a one reason. Every concrete act of knowledge, he
argues, is an activity of the whole mind; and this unitary, synthetic ac-
tivity can be made intelligible and given true objectivity, not, as the
critics seem to maintain, in terms of intuition or feeling, but only in
terms of rationality. And reflection on the point will, I think, convince
us that Hegel is in the right.54
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misconception of Hegel’s doctrine of universality. The misconception
concerns Hegel’s supposed identification of thought and being, and is,
perhaps, one of the most prolific sources of adverse criticism of the
Hegelian philosophy. I refer to the prevalent view, implied in the above
quotations from Mr. Bradley and Lotze, which Professor Seth Pringle-
Pattison expresses thus: “The result of Hegel’s procedure would really
be to sweep ‘existential reality’ off the board altogether, under the per-
suasion, apparently, that a full statement of all the thought-relations
that constitute our knowledge of the thing is equivalent to the existent
thing itself. On the contrary, it may be confidently asserted that there is
no more identity of Knowing and Being with an infinity of such rela-
tions than there was with one.”55
Now this idea that Hegel tried to reduce things to pure thought about
things, or that he for a moment maintained that thought could possibly
be the existent thing, seems to me a monstrous misinterpretation of his
real meaning. It is inconsistent with the presupposition of his whole
philosophy, namely, that reality is essentially a subject-object relation.
It is also inconsistent with the explicit statements quoted above concern-
ing the universality of the Notion, which always involves particularity.
And, as we shall see in the next chapter, he emphatically repudiates
such a view in his account of mediation and the function of the negative
in thought. But, apart from these facts, it seems that we might credit
Hegel with sufficient acumen to see the inherent absurdity of such a
position. Surely he saw the contradiction involved in an attempt to at-
tain by thought an ideal which would result in the annihilation of thought
itself. Indeed, was it not Hegel who first impressed upon us the fact that
knowledge always requires an object, and that, if that object be taken
away, knowledge itself ceases to be? As Professor Jones has said: “It is
inconsistent with the possibility of knowledge that it should be the real-
ity it represents: knowledge is incompatible alike with sinking the real in
the ideal, and the ideal in the real.”56 And I think we are safe in saying
that Hegel was well aware of this truth; his essential disagreement with
Spinoza is that in the Spinozistic philosophy object is reduced to and
identified with subject.
Hegel seems to have taken special pains that he should not be mis-
understood on this point. The passages already quoted might be paral-
leled with others just as positive. I shall content myself, however, with
adding only two which show, as plainly as words can show, that the
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of these is to be found in the eighty-second section of the smaller Logic:
“If we say that the absolute is the unity of subjective and objective, we
are undoubtedly in the right, but so far one-sided, as we enunciate the
unity only and lay the accent upon it, forgetting that in reality the sub-
jective and objective are not merely identical but also distinct.” In the
Philosophy of Mind is found the other passage, which so well forestalls
the above criticism and so forcefully emphasizes the necessity of distin-
guishing between merely formal identity and concrete unity that I may
be pardoned for quoting it at length: “The close of philosophy is not the
place, even in a general exoteric discussion, to waste a word on what a
‘Notion’ means. But as the view taken of this relation is closely con-
nected with the view taken of philosophy generally and with all imputa-
tions against it, we may still add the remark that though philosophy
certainly has to do with unity in general, it is not however with abstract
unity, mere identity, and the empty absolute, but with concrete unity (the
Notion), and that in its whole course it has to do with nothing else; that
each step in its advance is a peculiar term or phase of this concrete
unity, and that the deepest and last expression of unity is the unity of
absolute mind itself. Would-be judges and critics of philosophy might
be recommended to familiarize themselves with these phases of unity
and to take the trouble to get acquainted with them.... But they show so
little acquaintance with them... that, when they of unity — and relation
ipso facto implies unity — they rather stick fast at quite abstract inde-
terminate unity, and lose sight of the chief point of interest — the spe-
cial mode in which the unity is qualified. Hence all they can say about
philosophy is that dry identity is its principle and result, and that it is the
system of Identity. Sticking fast to the undigested thought of identity,
they have laid hands on, not the concrete unity, the notion and content of
philosophy, but rather its reverse.”57 If in these passages Hegel does not
deny any attempt to arrive at the blank identification of thought and
being, of subject and object, and if in them he does not criticize such a
goal as an essentially mistaken ideal of philosophical inquiry, then so
far as I am concerned the import of the passages is lost. Surely by con-
crete unity he means something quite different from abstract identity, —
and concrete unity is that with which philosophy, as he conceives it, has
to do.
It seems only fair to insist that such considerations as the preceding
be taken into account before Hegel is accused of attempting that which
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‘choir of heaven’ and the multifarious passions of the human soul to a
‘ballet of bloodless categories.’ Such an attempt would have seemed to
Hegel as nonsensical as it seems to his critics. When he speaks of the
unity of thought and being, he always means identity in difference, and
never the undifferentiated identity of Schelling’s system. And when he
asserts that subject comprehends object, he does not mean to reduce
experience to abstract subject, as did Spinoza. He does indeed insist
upon unity, but it is always upon concrete unity, the unity of the ‘No-
tion’; and this unity does not annihilate or even harm its differences. In
a word, Hegel transcends dualism, and yet, at the same time, does jus-
tice to the duality within and essential to experience. He neither denies
nor attempts to explain away the factual side of experience; he simply
denies that an inexplicable datum has any part or lot within experience.
Not immediacy, but abstract immediacy, immediacy apart from inter-
pretation, is unreal.
This chapter may be brought to an end by an attempt to state in one
paragraph its essential points. Hegel’s doctrine of thought, philosophic
thought, is given in the category of absolute knowledge, which is ar-
rived at through the procedure of the Phenomenology of Spirit. The
conception is thus based directly upon our actual knowing experience,
and claims to give us an account of thought as it essentially is. Thought,
as here defined, is genuinely objective, transcending the relativity of
individual experiences and being the determination of things as they are
in themselves. But this is not to say that reality is identical with abstract
cognition. For thought finds its capacity to express the real in the fact
that its universals are always the syntheses of differences, and not the
blank universals of purely formal logic. Actual living thought includes
within itself the data of so-called intuitive perception, of feeling, of voli-
tion, of cognition, and it is adequately conceived of only as this unifying
principle of experience; it is the living unity of mind, the one reason
which appears in every mental activity. Therefore, when Hegel teaches
that thought is conterminous with the real, he is simply stating the doc-
trine that experience and reality are one.26/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
Chapter II
The Process of Thought: Mediation and
Negation.
In criticism of Hegel’s position that the science of Philosophy can ad-
equately express the nature of the ultimately real, Mr. McTaggart says:
“Philosophy itself is knowledge, it is neither action nor feeling. And
there seems nothing in Hegel’s account of it to induce us to change the
meaning of the word in this respect.”58 I quote this criticism because it
contains an assumption which I wish to challenge, and thus sets the
problem for the present chapter. The assumption is that philosophical
thought, as Hegel defines it, is bare cognition to which the other aspects
of the mental life bear only an external relation, that it is simply one
among other elements coordinate with it, and that, consequently, it can
at most be only a mediating activity among these other elements of ex-
perience which forever lie beyond and external to it. It is the justice of
this assumption which the following pages will call in question. We
have already seen, in the preceding chapter, that such a position is for-
eign to Hegel’s system, and that philosophy for him is action and feeling
as well as cognition. But it may be well to emphasize the fact from
another point of view. So we now address ourselves to the task of estab-
lishing the thesis that Hegel’s account of philosophy does force us to
give to the word a meaning essentially different from that which the
above criticism attaches to it. We shall support this thesis with an expo-
sition of the process of philosophical knowledge as it is presented in
Hegel’s doctrine of mediation and negation.
In the preface to the Phenomenology of Sprit,59 Hegel has been at
pains to point out that, if we are to appreciate what he means by phi-
losophy and the standpoint which it assumes, we must make an effort to
understand what he means by absolute knowledge and by mediation. In
the preceding chapter we investigated the nature and significance of
absolute knowledge. And that investigation showed us that absolute
knowledge is simply Hegel’s definition of the essential nature of thought
as he uses the term, and that thought as thus defined is more than ab-
stract cognition since it is both genuinely objective and truly universal.
In the present chapter it is our aim to investigate the nature of media-
tion, to learn if we can what Hegel has to say about the activity of
thought and about its function as a mediating process. The discussion
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which we have already reached, by showing how philosophical knowl-
edge, in the Hegelian system, is more than a mere mediating activity
among phenomena external to it.
It may be helpful at the beginning to state in a general way the order
of the discussion before us. No detailed account of the dialectical pro-
cess, nor any defense of the dialectical method with reference to the
development of the categories in the Logic will be attempted here. Our
present purpose is a less ambitious one. We shall simply state, as best
we may, what Hegel means by thought as a process of mediation, and
what is his real contention when he says that negation is the vital and
potent element in this process. In accordance with this purpose, there-
fore, we shall begin our study with a consideration of immediacy and
mediation; and this will lead us on to a discussion of negation, which we
shall be forced to defend against certain misconceptions that have given
rise to some unjustifiable criticisms of Hegel. Our general conclusion
will be that thought, as the Hegelian system defines it from this point of
view, is a process of mediation which, because of the negative element
involved in it, makes it possible for us to say that reality is compre-
hended in thought; for its universals assume the form, not of abstract
indeterminate immediacy, but of concrete determinate immediacy, that
is, individuality.
Before passing directly to a consideration of Hegel’s conception of
mediation and immediacy, steps should be taken to avoid a possible
error of interpretation. And this precaution will also serve us as a point
of departure in our discussion. Absolutely pure immediacy, immediacy
exclusive of mediation, is meaningless for Hegel. This, of course, fol-
lows at once from what was said in the preceding chapter concerning
the objectivity of thought: these is no indeterminate given. A few quota-
tions, however’ will settle the matter. “We must reject the opposition
between an independent immediacy in the contents or facts of conscious-
ness and an equally independent mediation, supposed incompatible with
the former. The incompatibility is a mere assumption, an arbitrary as-
sertion.”60 Again, we read: “There is nothing, nothing in heaven, in
nature, in spirit, or anywhere else which does not contain both imme-
diacy and mediation.”61 The whole of the second part of the Logic, we
are told, is “a discussion of the intrinsic and self-affirming unity of
immediacy and mediation.”62 Only the abstract understanding separates
the two, and then it finds itself utterly helpless to reconcile them.63 It is
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such arbitrary procedure, and to bring to consciousness the fact of the
essential inseparability of that which is immediate and that which is
mediated.64 “Even if we take up an empirical, an external attitude, it
will be found that there is nothing at all that is immediate, that there is
nothing to which only the quality of immediacy belongs to the exclusion
of that of mediation, but that what is immediate is likewise mediated,
and that immediacy itself is essentially mediated.”65 From these explicit
statements it is unmistakably clear that, whatever Hegel may mean by
immediacy and mediation, they are indissolubly associated with each
other.
The conclusion to which we are thus led is that immediacy is the
result of at least partial mediation, or, as Hegel prefers to say, that “im-
mediacy itself is essentially mediated.” The degree of truth to which the
various stages of immediacy can lay claim depends upon the amount, or
rather the exhaustiveness, of the mediation involved. That is to say,
imperfect mediation results in an immediacy which is only partially true;
immediacy becomes entirely true only when it is exhaustively mediated.
This fact might be illustrated by any category of the Logic. Being, for
example, is really viewed in its truth only when it is seen in the light of
the Absolute Idea; and the same is true of all other lower forms of imme-
diacy. The Absolute Idea itself is the ultimately true immediate solely
because it is the perfectly mediated. The nature of true immediacy will
thus appear as we determine the essential nature of the process of me-
diation of which it is the result.
A point which will be of great importance to us when we come to
inquire concerning Hegel’s doctrine of the ultimately real emerges here.
We have just said that the completely mediated is for Hegel the ulti-
mately true. Now when we remember that he identifies the ultimately
true and the ultimately real, we are led at once to the important conclu-
sion that the real is the result of this process of mediation. As Hegel
views the matter, the various stages of immediacy are more or less con-
crete according as the mediation involved in each is more nor less ex-
haustive; the completely mediated immediacy is nothing more nor less
than the concreteness of reality itself. The Absolute Idea is an imme-
diacy which is completely mediated; it is therefore the ultimately real
category, the very expression of reality itself. Reality thus is a matter of
mediation. This point will serve as the basis of our discussion of Hegel’s
doctrine of the nature of reality. But for the present we are interested to
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If we turn to the preface of the Phenomenology of Spirit, we find
there Hegel’s formal definition of the process of mediation. Mediation,
he there tells us, is “nothing other than self-uniformity
(Sichselbstgleichheit) developing itself; or it is reflection into itself, the
moment of the Ego which exists for itself (des fürsichseienden Ich),
pure negativity, or, degraded from its pure abstraction, simple becom-
ing.”66 A page or two preceding this passage he asserts that, according
to his view, the whole matter reduces to this: “Truth is to be conceived
of and expressed, not as Substance, but as Subject. At the same time it
is to be noted that substantiality includes in itself both that which is the
immediacy of knowledge itself, namely, the universal, and that which is
the immediacy for knowledge, namely, Being....”67
The first of these passages gives us Hegel’s conception of the nature
and characteristics of the process of mediation; the second emphasizes
the nature of the result of the process. Taken together, the meaning of
the two seems to be this. If we define truth as substance, our definition
is so far right; both thought and being, both the particular and the uni-
versal, are included in the definition. But the inadequacy of this defini-
tion lies in the fact that It fails to explain satisfactorily the relation of
these two aspects of experiences. Thought and being are left existing
side by side, as it were, in a blank identity devoid of differences, which
identity, like Schelling’s, “is absolutely presupposed without any at-
tempt being made to show that this is the truth.”68 The attempt to show
that this is the truth inevitably leads us, Hegel thinks, to the standpoint
of subject, to the conception of identity in difference which is the central
fact of consciousness. Now the process of exhibiting this necessity is
the process of mediation, which, when the goal is once reached, appears
in its true light as the expression of the interrelation of the parts of an
organic whole which itself exists for itself. When viewed from the stand-
point of the lower stages of immediacy, mediation seems merely the
expression of an external relation among phenomena more or less inde-
pendent of each other; but when it is looked at in its real nature, when it
is viewed sub specie aeternitatis, it is seen to be the expression of the
necessary and vital interconnection of phenomena which themselves have
significance only as parts of a comprehensive unity. Summarizing, then,
we may say that the process of mediation is a development towards
greater determinateness and the progressive substitution of necessary
and vital, for seemingly accidental and arbitrary, connections among
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crete, its final goal being the concreteness of reality itself. As Hegel
himself elsewhere expresses it: “The progress of development is equiva-
lent to further determination, and this means further immersion in and a
fuller grasp of the Idea itself.”69
A glance at Hegel’s criticisms of Jacobi’s doctrine of immediacy
will give us an insight into his own doctrine of mediation It will accord-
ingly be well for us to notice this criticism before passing on. But first
let us remind ourselves of what in general are the nature and signifi-
cance of Jacobi’s doctrine.
The chief significance of Jacobi’s doctrine, for our purposes at any
rate, is its insistence that after all there is an ultimate reality with which
we must somehow come in contact. “Reason,” he. tells us, “plainly pre-
supposes the true, as the outer sense space and inner sense time, and
exists only as the faculty of this presupposition. So that where this pre-
supposition is wanting there is no reason The true must therefore be
possessed by man just as certainly as he possesses reason.”70 Reason
“affords us a knowledge of supersensible objects, that is, affords us
assurance of their reality and truth.”71 This insistence upon the ultimate
intelligibility of reality is an important point in Jacobi’s philosophy, and
Hegel does not fail to call attention to it. But, notwithstanding Hegel’s
recognition of this point, he yet criticizes Jacobi, as he does Kant, for
denying in fact that reality can be known.72 And we are compelled to
admit the justice of the criticism. For Jacobi’s only medium through
which reality can be known, though at times he calls it reason as above,
is in point of fact different from reason; it is something which lies be-
yond reason, a kind of intuition, a form of immediate knowledge from
which all mediation is excluded. From this form of knowing the catego-
ries of thought are, to some extent at least, banished as useless. Of
course, this is no place to enter into the disputed question whether, in his
conception of immediacy, Jacobi attempted to get rid entirely of the
categories of thought; to solve this problem is not necessary for our
present purpose. However the problem may be solved, there can be no
doubt that Jacobi contemned mediation in his grasp of that immediacy
which is the ultimately real, and that he arrived at his goal only by
means of a salto mortale, baldly asserting that “sometime or other ev-
ery philosophy must have recourse to a miracle.”73
Now, from Hegel’s point of view, this Jacobian position, if true,
would be the death-knell of all philosophy and would reduce us to abso-
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taking effort and diligent application are not in the least essential to the
search after truth: truth is given, is thrust upon us in immediate, intui-
tive perception. But this is a dangerous attitude, Hegel urges. It may be
that God gives to His beloved in sleep; but, so far as we can see, that
which is given in sleep is usually discovered to be simply the wares of
sleep. In less figurative language, if truth is a matter of feeling, however
high above reason the feeling may be supposed to stand, then it is rela-
tive and the search for it is useless: individual perception, immediate
intuition, or what not, is too prone to cater to individual prejudices and
prepossessions. “What has its root only in my feelings, is only for me; it
is mine, but not its own; it has no independent existence in and for
itself.”74 Hence, if ultimate reality is and can be only an object of feel-
ing, whether that feeling be called intuition, faith, immediate certainty,
or ultra-rational perception, then there is absolutely no reason why the
real should not be denied objectivity; on the contrary, there seems to be
every reason to urge that it is reduced to purely subjective terms. Hegel
makes merry over this predicament of the Jacobian philosophy, and sar-
castically exclaims: “Truth is in a bad way, when all metaphysics is
done away with, and the only philosophy acknowledged is not a phi-
losophy at all!”75
But fortunately for truth it is not in this sad predicament. In sup-
porting this position Jacobi overlooks the fact that short-cuts in philoso-
phy are as useless and hurtful as they are in any other field where as-
siduous and patient toil is an absolute requisite. Philosophy, the discov-
ery of truth, does not depend upon a miracle, as Jacobi asserts, but upon
hard work. Jacobi was led to his false position by his misconception of
the nature of thought as a mediating activity. This Hegel sees clearly
and criticizes sharply and decisively. As Jacobi conceives the matter,
the mediation of thought is merely a progression from finite to finite,
from conditioned to conditioning which is in turn conditioned.76 It is a
process of mediation among phenomena quasi-mechanically related to
each other; thus it can be nothing but a regresses ad infinitum. The end
of this infinite regress cannot be anything more than a blank abstrac-
tion, the empty absolute, a barren identity of thought and being.77 The
ultimately real must lie beyond such knowledge, since to know it would
be to limit it and a limited absolute is a contradiction in terms.78 Thus
there is an impassable gulf set between the finite and conditioned and
the infinite and unconditioned, between the realm of that which seems
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confined to the former sphere. True immediacy, therefore, that imme-
diacy which can be predicated of reality, must exclude all mediation.79
So the real task of philosophy is to leap the gulf which cannot be bridged;
and it accomplishes this miracle in order to find outside of the ken of
human knowledge that which makes human knowledge possible, namely,
the ultimately true. But, Hegel argues, this ridiculous contention is based
upon a false view of the mediating activity of thought. True mediation is
not external mediation. Instead of leading only from the conditioned to
the conditioning in an infinite regress, it transforms the conditioned into
the self-conditioning and so discloses the infinite and unconditioned just
within the realm of the finite and conditioned. Likewise, true immediacy
does not consist in transcending mediation; on the contrary, it is the
subsumption of mediation, the unity in a higher synthesis of mediated
factors.80 We may put the whole matter in Hegel’s own words: “Imme-
diate knowledge, like mediated knowledge, is entirely one-sided. What
is true is their unity, an immediate knowledge which is likewise medi-
ated, something mediated which is likewise simple in itself, which is
immediate reference to itself... Here is union, in which the difference of
those characteristics is done away with, while at the same time, being
preserved ideally, they have the higher destiny of serving as the pulse of
vitality, the impulse, movement, unrest of the spiritual as of the natural
life.”81
A brief statement of the contrast between Jacobi and Hegel on this
point will serve to put in relief Hegel’s view of the matter. Jacobi would
fully agree with Hegel that “the only content which can be held to be the
truth is one not mediated with something else, not limited by other
things.”82 And from this both would agree in drawing the conclusion
that the ultimately true must be immediate But here they would part
company; of the nature of this immediate they would have exactly anti-
thetical conceptions. By immediate Jacobi would mean that which is
given independently of all mediation whatsoever; while Hegel would
mean by it a completely mediated content, a content “mediated by itself,
where mediation and immediate reference-to-self coincide.”83 Whereas
Jacobi conceives of ultimate reality as the postulate of immediate intu-
ition, Hegel defines it as the result of mediating thought: to the one, true
immediacy is void of any trace of mediation; while to the other, it is
nothing but perfect mediation. This difference between the two thinkers
concerning immediacy, is, of course, due to the fact that their views of
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process as one of simple negation, which passes from content to content
without being any the richer for its wanderings; it forever pursues a goal
which eternally lies beyond its grasp. Hegel, on the contrary, views the
process, not as one of mere negation, but as one of determinate nega-
tion; one which “holds fast the positive in the negative,” includes its
content within itself, and passes by means of the negative into a higher
synthesis in which is preserved the truth of the mediated factors.84
And this brings us to a consideration of negation, that aspect of
thought which gives it its possibility as a mediating activity. I think it
may be justly said that an understanding of this Hegelian conception is
absolutely essential to a correct appreciation of the system. As the au-
thor himself says more than once, it is the very soul and vitality of the
dialectic; it is that by virtue of which the dialectic leads us to the con-
crete fullness of the Absolute Idea itself. Let us first try to grasp its
significance, and we shall then be in a position to see how it has been
misunderstood. It has been said that in order to understand Hegel prop-
erly one must read him backwards. This is nowhere more imperative
than in an attempt to see what he means by the negative in thought. He
tells us in the Logic, “To mediate is to take something as a beginning
and to go onward to a second thing: so that the existence of this second
thing depends on our having reached it from something else
contradistinguished from it.”85 But this is by no means all there is to the
process as Hegel defines it. He maintains further that this “development
of one thing out of another means that what appears as sequel and de-
rivative is rather the absolute prius of what it appears to be mediated
by.”86 In this statement we find set forth, it would seem, the fundamen-
tal aspect of the dialectical method: at any rate, here we find given us
the right point of view for regarding the process. That which comes first
finds its explanation in what follows; what seems to be product is really
ground; truth is a last result and not a first principle. Mediation is thus
a passage from one object to another which takes place by simply mak-
ing explicit the inner connection and the essential oneness of the objects.
This point we have already dwelt upon above.
Assuming now this point of view, we are in a position to see what
Hegel means by the significance and power of the negative in thought.
Simple relation to another is, for Hegel, negation: in so far as an object
refers beyond itself it involves negation. From this it follows that every-
thing involves negation, that is, every finite object; for by its very nature
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the dialectic. The particular points beyond itself for its explanation and
completion, it finds its ‘truth’ in the other. Taken as it is given, it is
isolated, indeterminate, abstract; but by the power of the negative inher-
ent in it, that is, because of its abstract indeterminateness, it leads on to
and passes into its context, and so becomes less indeterminate. Its other,
however, in terms of which the object finds its explanation, is in its turn
abstract and leads on to its other for its determination; and so the pro-
cess goes on. Reference beyond self, negation, is thus the power that
keeps in motion the machinery of the dialectic. This reference beyond
itself, however, is not externally imposed upon the object; it is not the
expression of a relation between itself and another essentially different
from it. Rather is this reference beyond self the very expression of the
deepest nature of the object; the other is not an indifferent other, but the
other in which the object finds its true self. The reference beyond self,
the negation inherent in the object, is just the indication of the fact that
the true self of the object lies elsewhere than in its own factual exist-
ence. Thus the negative leads us ever to concrete universality; for the
form proves to be the “indigenous becoming of the concrete content,”
and so the process is one of self-determination in which the particular
finds its universal and the universal its particular.87
But, in order to see that negation does actually lead us to such a
result, it is essential that the exact function of the negative in thought be
kept clearly in view. Hegel criticizes Jacobi very severely for neglecting
the negative in his doctrine of immediate knowledge; and the chief fault
he has to find with Condillac’s development of the categories is that in
the development the negative aspect of thought is entirely overlooked.
So it will be well for us to state explicitly and discuss the two points
upon which Hegel lays stress in his doctrine of negation. The first of
these points is that negation is negative. The second is that negation is
positive. We begin with the first of these two points.
It is necessary for us to remember, says Hegel, that thought really is
a process of negation. This is just the point which he has in mind in the
above mentioned criticism of Condillac. He grants that Condillac posits
the right point of departure, namely, immediate experience: the cardinal
error of Condillac’s procedure, he urges, is that the negative involved in
the development of the categories is completely forgotten. Perhaps it
will be well to quote the passage here: “In Condillac’s method there is
an unmistakable intention to show how the several modes of mental
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and to exhibit their necessary interconnection. But the categories em-
ployed in doing so are of a wretched sort. Their ruling principle is that
the sensible is taken (and with justice) as the prius or the initial basis,
but that the later phases that follow this starting-point present them-
selves as emerging in a solely affirmative manner, and the negative as-
pect of mental activity, by which this material is transmuted into mind
and destroyed as a sensible, is misconceived and overlooked. As the
theory of Condillac states it, the sensible is not merely the empirical
first, but is left as if it were the true and essential foundation.”88
Now what does this criticism mean? Of course we are not con-
cerned to inquire here whether it is a just criticism of Condillac’s theory.
Apart from this theory, and expressed in general terms, the criticism
means, it would seem, simply that, in the nature of the case, to think the
world is virtually to deny that its first immediate aspect is the ultimately
true. Thought is not exclusively affirmative; it is negative as well, and
its negative function is to transform the immediately given. Expressed
in Hegel’s own words: “To think the phenomenal world rather means to
recast its form and transmute it into a universal. And thus the action of
thought has also a negative effect upon its basis: and the matter of sen-
sation, when it receives the stamp of universality, at once loses its first
and phenomenal shape.”89 That is, all thinking experience is a process
of interpretation in which there is and can be no bare immediacy; for
thinking ipso facto involves the transcending of the particular and the
transformation of it into the form of the universal. Such, then, is the
negative function of thought: and all thought is negative. To think the
world is to deny its reality in the form of abstract particularity; its purely
immediate aspect is by thought negated.
But, be it noted, the particular is not merely denied; in a very impor-
tant sense it is also affirmed. And this brings us to the second point, that
thought is positive as well as negative. As an abstract particular, qua
abstract to think it is to negate it; as a universalized particular, qua
universalized, to think it is to affirm it. Reason, in short, is positive as
well as negative; and, what is more important still, is positive by virtue
of the very fact of its negativity. “To hold fast the positive in the nega-
tive is the most important aspect of rational knowledge.”90 Hegel can-
not be accused of having neglected to state very definitely what he means
by this positive significance of negation. In the introduction to the larger
Logic he tells us that what is needed to secure the dialectical movement
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contradiction does not dissolve into zero, into blank nothingness, but
only into the negation of its particular content.” And he goes on to say:
“We must realize that such negation is not total negation, but only nega-
tion of a determinate content; consequently it is determinate negation. In
other words, the result contains essentially that from which it results....
So the result, that is, the negation, being a definite negation has a con-
tent: it is a new concept or notion, but a higher, richer notion than the
preceding one which has been enriched by its own negation or opposite.
The new notion contains both the old one and its negation, and is thus at
the same time the unity of the older with its opposite.”91 This we find at
the beginning of the Logic; at the very end we find the author emphasiz-
ing exactly the same point. The negative, he there tells us, is indeed “the
negative, but of a positive which it includes. It is the other, not of some-
thing to which it is indifferent, else it would be no other.... It is the other
in itself, the other of another, and therefore it includes its other within
itself.”92 These passages are so very explicit little need be added by way
of interpretation. Their unquestionable meaning is that negation is not
to be thought of as abstract contradiction, but as affirmative negation
— concrete synthesis. Negation is not merely the tendency of the finite
category to negate itself, to pass into its abstract opposite or other; it is
not a bare denial of thesis by its antithesis. Rather is it the tendency of
the finite category to complete itself, to pass into its other where lies its
own true nature; it is a denial of the thesis, which is at the same time a
synthesis of the thesis and its formal opposite. Thus it is that the nega-
tive has a very positive import.
This is a very vital point upon which Hegel is here insisting. Real
negation must be significant negation: the infinite judgment, we must
agree with Hegel, is a ‘nonsensical curiosity’ of formal logic.93 As Mr.
Bradley has well put it: “A something that is only not something else, is
a relation that terminates in an impalpable void, a reflection thrown
upon empty space. It is a mere non-entity which can not be real.”94 All
significant negation ipso facto has a positive import; it presupposes a
system within which the negative is to fall, a unity of differences, and
within the system negation affirms, more or less explicitly, some really
significant conclusion about the unity. Bare negation simply denies iden-
tity of contents that have nothing in common, and is consequently a
mere tautology; significant negation, on the other hand, denies identity
of contents which are in some respects one, and so asserts real differ-
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may to all intents and purposes be affirmation, if only two alternatives
are possible, for example, the denial of the one is the affirmation of the
other.95 It is indeed true that negation may carry with it very little posi-
tive significance: the judgment, ‘This is not black,’ tells us practically
nothing so far as the actual color of the object under consideration is
concerned. But if the judgment is really a significant one, if it has any
meaning at all, it partially at least introduces a determination into the
universe of discourse by telling us, for example, that the subject of the
judgment is a colored object, and in so far it gives us positive knowledge
of the object of interest.96 And this negation approximates to direct af-
firmation as the differences within the system in which it falls are more
sharply defined — it is to be noted that this very definition may be the
result of negation; negative instances are always more than negative.
Ultimately, from the denial of blackness there might arise positive knowl-
edge concerning the actual color of the object of judgment.
Now in view of the above considerations we can more clearly see
what Hegel means by the constant assertion that the negative is the very
soul and vitality of thought. Thought is at once analytic and synthetic; it
does not first negate and then synthesize, but it synthesizes in its nega-
tion. It denies abstract unrelatedness, and affirms and defines complex
interrelatedness among phenomena. It rejects the unrelated particular
and the blank universal as alike indefinable and meaningless; it asserts
the necessity of identity in difference, of unity within multiplicity. Thought
as a process of mediation is thus of a two-fold nature: it is the denial of
a world of unrelated elements, and the affirmation of the world as con-
crete totality. Such is the double function of negation: it denies the ab-
stract and affirms the concrete. Because thought is negative, it drives us
from the standpoint of immediate sense experience and forces us to seek
the eternal and true elsewhere; because thought is positive in its nega-
tion, it perforce “produces the universal and seizes the particular in
it.”97 Thus, by its very nature, thought is a process of mediation which
gives as a result, not mere abstract generalization, but real determina-
tion — the concrete individual.
I know of no better summary of Hegel’s view concerning the nega-
tive in thought than the one which he himself has given in the preface to
the first edition of the larger Logic: “Reason is negative and dialectical,
in that it dissolves the determinations of the understanding into nothing;
it is positive in that it produces the universal and preserves (begreift) the
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separated from reason in general, so dialectical reason used to be taken
as something separated from positive reason. But in its true nature rea-
son is mind (Geist), which is higher than both cognitive (verständige)
reason and rational understanding. Mind is the negative, that which con-
stitutes the quality of dialectical reason as well as of the understanding.
It negates simplicity and so, like the understanding, posits determinate
difference; but it also destroys this difference and so is dialectical. Its
result, however, is not mere emptiness, but is just as much positive; thus
it returns to and establishes the first simplicity, which now is a universal
concrete in itself.”98
Our conclusion, then, concerning Hegel’s doctrine of the process of
thought as dialectical is that thought is a process of negative mediation.
As a mediating activity, thought is not limited to the finite and condi-
tioned as those who appeal to the necessity of immediate knowledge
would have us believe. On the contrary, its very mediation is the defini-
tion of reality; by relating it defines, and by negating it affirms. In other
words, the process of thought is the progressive explication of the im-
plicit, the disclosure of the essential nature of the objects of knowledge
Negation is not construed in terms of formal contradiction; it is that
function of the dialectic by virtue of which it leads ultimately to the
essence of reality. However faultily Hegel may be thought to have worked
out this conception in the Logic, its illuminating suggestiveness for any
theory of knowledge cannot be denied and should not be overlooked.99
Perhaps enough has been said about this Hegelian doctrine of nega-
tion. But, like most of Hegel’s teachings, it has not escaped miscon-
struction at the hands of the critics. So it may not be amiss, at the con-
clusion of our exposition, to add a few words in reply to some of the
most characteristic criticisms; not, indeed, for controversial purposes,
but in the hope that the attempt to set Hegel right in the eyes of his
critics will at least serve to call attention to the fact that another inter-
pretation of him is possible.
The criticisms of Haym and James seem unquestionably to rest upon
an entirely false notion of what Hegel means by negation. Haym seems
to think that Hegel absurdly contended that the essence of things con-
sists in their being contradictory; and he contrasts this supposed posi-
tion of Hegel’s with the Herbartian principle that the way to truth lies
through the elimination of contradiction.100 Such an interpretation evi-
dently takes it for granted that Hegel can mean by contradiction, nega-
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incompatibility and absolute opposition; to all appearances, the critic is
innocent of the fact that negation or contradiction, as Hegel is at great
pains to define it, is just the doing away with bare negation, abstract
opposition, and that the term embodies Hegel’s unwearied insistence
that formal contradiction has no significance when applied to reality.
Naturally the criticism is no more significant than the assumption upon
which it leans for support. The same oversight is at the basis of Profes-
sor James’s criticism of this Hegelian conception, in a characteristic
discussion “On Some Hegelisms,” in his volume of popular lectures on
philosophy entitled The Will to Believe. At a very dramatic point in this
essay Hegel is presented to us, standing amidst a jarring, jolting world
of incoherent facts, frantically lifting ‘vain hands of imprecation’ at the
wild and tumultuous scene before him. “But hark! What wondrous strain
is this that steals upon his ear? Muddle! is it anything but a peculiar sort
of transparency? Is not jolt passage? Is friction other than a kind of
lubrication? Is not a chasm a filling? — a queer kind of filling, but a
filling still. Why seek for a glue to hold things together when their very
falling apart is the only glue you need? Let all that negation which seemed
to disintegrate the universe be the mortar that combines it, and the prob-
lem stands solved.”101 These strictures are apparently supposed to be a
real criticism of Hegel, but the absurdity against which they are directed
first saw the light when they themselves were penned. It is certain that
such an absurd position as the one here criticized cannot justly be attrib-
uted to Hegel; it is a caricature of Hegel’s real position. The ‘glue’ that
binds the world together is, in Hegel’s view of the matter, not the eternal
falling apart of objects, but simply their necessary interconnectedness;
if you attempt to separate them, they will not stay put. Nor is it that
negation which disintegrates the universe that Hegel uses as the ‘mor-
tar’ to combine it; it is that negation which, because it is as much posi-
tive as negative, does actually combine it. After all, it would appear that
one is forced to admit that Hegel is more than a superficial thinker try-
ing to palm off on a long-suffering public palpable absurdities.
Trendelenburg’s criticism of Hegel on this point is more serious
and, one is inclined to say, more significant than the preceding criti-
cisms, but it seems no less fallacious. This critic triumphantly forces
Hegel into the following dilemma: “Either the negation, through which
the dialectic development to the second and third moments is mediated,
is logical negation (A, not-A) — in which case nothing determinate is
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else the opposition is a real one — in which case it cannot be attained by
logical means, and consequently the dialectic is not the dialectic of pure
thought.”102 Here it is evident that the critic is at least aware that two
kinds of opposition or negation are possible, namely, logical and real;
and in this respect his criticism differs from the preceding ones But, like
these others, Trendelenburg’s criticism rests upon an assumption the
validity of which he does not attempt to establish. The assumption in
this case is that Hegel has no right to claim that the dialectic of pure
thought can involve material opposition. This assumption is based upon
a further assumption that pure thought and formal thought (abstract
cognition) are one. If we are willing to grant this second assumption,
then the above dilemma exhausts the possibilities and so accomplishes
its purpose; in the nature of the case formal opposition or negation is not
material opposition. But if we maintain with Hegel that form and matter
are one and inseparable, and that real thought, so far from being merely
formal thought confined to the magic circle of the impotent universal,
actually does express the nature of its object, then the critic’s dilemma is
not exhaustive and so loses its significance; in this event, formal oppo-
sition becomes a mere abstraction, and dialectical negation, the nega-
tion of what Hegel calls pure thought, becomes ipso facto real opposi-
tion. So it would seem that before the critic undertook to annihilate the
dialectic with an ‘either-or’ proposition, he should have come to an
understanding with the author concerning the nature of that thought of
which the dialectic is the expression. The whole problem is whether
pure thought, as Hegel uses the term, does involve real opposition; and
this must be argued, not assumed at the beginning.
Mr. McTaggart’s contention that negation loses import as the dia-
lectic advances from the more abstract to the more concrete categories
implies the same general misconception of the nature of negation. In his
opinion negation is very prominent in the earlier categories, while in the
later categories it has almost entirely disappeared. And he seeks to es-
tablish this interpretation by investigating the movement of the dialectic
in the categories of Being, and by contrasting the movement there with
the movement in the categories of the Notion.103 It is not our present
purpose to inquire whether this is or is not a correct account of the
dialectic as it is actually worked out in the Logic. The point of interest
now is the fact that negation, as Mr. McTaggart implicitly conceives it,
is not negation as we have seen Hegel define it above. According to the
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opposed to each other in a more or less mechanical fashion and are more
or less externally joined together by means of the synthesis; but, in the
later categories, this abstract opposition is wanting. Now to go from
this fact (granting for the sake of the argument that it is a fact) to the
conclusion that negation becomes less significant as the dialectic ad-
vances is clearly to identify negation with abstract opposition The argu-
ment is this: in the categories of Being, antithesis is the logical opposite
of thesis, and so here we find negation; in the categories of the Notion,
antithesis and thesis are no longer sheer incompatibles, antithesis de-
fines thesis, and therefore the negation formerly existing between them
has disappeared. In this argument sheer incompatibility and negation
are obviously used synonymously. But, as we have already seen, this
sheer incompatibility is not Hegel’s conception of negation. From his
point of view negation does not simply negate; its nature is not exhausted
in bare opposition. On the contrary, it always presupposes a positive
ground and so is in a very important sense positive. All genuinely sig-
nificant negation carries with it a positive import; bare negation is a
meaningless tautology. Hence it follows that, if the antithesis is to be a
true negative, a dialectical negative, as Hegel says it is, then it must to a
degree at least define the thesis; and the more perfectly it does this, the
more significant a negative does it become. Thus, even accepting Mr.
McTaggart’s account of the general nature and procedure of the dialec-
tic as true, still we are forced to reject his conclusion. As Hegel con-
ceives the negative, it progressively becomes, not a less and less, but a
more and more important factor in the dialectical process; so far from
finally disappearing entirely, it ever grows more explicit and more em-
phatic. And this, one is inclined to think, is the true description of the
matter: negation gains in positive import as the universe of discourse
becomes more determinate.
Finally, Mr. Bradley’s implied criticism of Hegel on this point seems
open to the same general criticism as the above. “The law of Contradic-
tion,” he says, “has had the misfortune to be flatly denied from a certain
theory of the nature of things. So far is that law (it has been contended)
from being the truth, that in the nature of things contradiction exists.”104
Now I submit that this statement, as a criticism of the Hegelian theory,
is beside the mark. Hegel does not deny the validity of the law of contra-
diction taken in its abstract and formal sense, that is, as the statement of
the relation which exists between logical contradictories. A unitary whole
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say, as genuine a non-entity for Hegel as it is for anyone else. What
Hegel does deny, however, is that such abstract contradiction finds a
place in reality; and he is prepared to argue that when we attribute it to
reality we are guilty of attempting the impossible task of making reality
square with the principles of our abstract and formal logic. What he
insists upon is that we must define contradiction more concretely, if we
would apply the category to the real; and this more concrete definition
he gives us in his doctrine of negation. But this position does not neces-
sarily touch the validity (formal validity) of the law of contradiction at
all as Mr. Bradley himself is willing to admit. “In the object and within
the whole,” he tells us, “the truth may be that we never really do have
these disparates. We only have moments which would be incompatible
if they really were separate, but, conjoined together, have been subdued
into something within the character of the whole If we so can under-
stand the identity of opposites — and I am not sure that we may not do
so — then the law of Contradiction flourishes untouched. If, in coming
into one, the contraries as such no longer exist, then where is the contra-
diction?”105 Although it is questionable whether Mr. Bradley stands
consistently by this position in his theory of knowledge, we certainly are
justified in attributing it to Hegel. So, granting this, it would seem that,
on the critic’s own showing, Hegel is free from the charge of having
‘flatly denied’ the significance of the law of contradiction. He had no
quarrel with this principle, as a principle of formal logic; I am per-
suaded that he, as well as his critic, was fully conscious of the fact that
“it has not a tooth with which to bite any one.” He respected its toothless
estate and had no reason, and, so far as I have been able to see, no
inclination, to rob it of its legitimate claims, ‘absurdly feeble’ though
they surely are. What he was anxious to do was to make the formal
principle conscious of its absurdly feeble condition, and to rejuvenate it
by bringing it into vital touch with concrete reality. As the statement of
the blank opposition of disparates the principle is indeed abstract and
impotent; as the negative of the Notion it is the very pulse of the life of
reality itself. This, as I comprehend it, is the position of Hegel with
reference to the law of contradiction; and, if I read Mr. Bradley aright,
it differs only in terminology from his own view of the matter.
The main points which this chapter has attempted to establish are
the following. Hegel insists that immediacy and mediation are insepa-
rable, that all immediacy implies mediation, and that the immediacy of
reality involves complete mediation. But this is not to identify the imme-Thought and Reality in Hegel’s System/43
diacy of reality with the abstractions of science. For the process of me-
diation, as Hegel defines it, is a process of determinate negation which
reduces experience to an ordered and systematic whole; it affirms as
well as denies, and indeed affirms by denying. In short, it is the principle
within experience which makes of experience a cosmos and not a chaos.
A completely mediated immediacy, that is, reality, is, therefore, just
completely organized experience. This negative within thought is not
merely negative; it is a negative which annuls the false immediacy only
because it is ever leading us onwards to the true immediacy. The many
criticisms which are directed against Hegel on this point overlook this




The conclusions of the two preceding chapters have led us to a further
problem which we shall here be forced to face. If it be true that thought
does in point of fact express the nature of things, then it would seem to
follow that the science of thought is the science of things, that ontology
and epistemology coincide. In this connection two questions arise: Does
Hegel identify the two? And if so, what does he mean by the identifica-
tion and what justification is there for it? It is to the task of answering
these questions that we now address ourselves.
To the first of the above questions there can, I think, be only one
answer. Hegel does identify logic and metaphysics. In the first place, we
have his own explicit statement on the point. Since thoughts are “Objec-
tive Thoughts,” he says, “Logic therefore coincides with metaphysics,
the science of things set and held in thoughts — thoughts accredited
able to express the essential reality of things.”106 Besides such an ex-
plicit statement, one might offer as evidence the whole logical bias of
the Hegelian philosophy which is unquestionably towards this identifi-
cation. Since the categories “really are, as forms of the Notion, the vital
spirit of the actual world,”107 and since things or objects which do not
agree with them are accidental, arbitrary, and untrue phenomena;108
since the universal aspect of the object is not something subjective at-
tributed to it only when it is an object of thought, but rather belongs to
and expresses its essential nature, it follows that the science which has
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ence, of course, is logic. Logic, therefore, is metaphysics.109
For this identification of logic and metaphysics Hegel has been very
severely criticized. And this brings us to our second question: What
does Hegel mean by the identification, and can it in any way be de-
fended? Perhaps we can best answer this question by attempting to an-
swer the objections to which the identification in question has given
rise. One of the most recent and perhaps the clearest and most convinc-
ing of Hegel’s critics on this point is Professor Seth Pringle-Pattison;
consequently we shall devote ourselves to a consideration of his objec-
tions. If we succeed in answering satisfactorily his criticism, we shall
have succeeded in answering all.
But before passing to this criticism some preliminary work is neces-
sary. We must first attempt to define the exact position of the Logic with
reference to the other parts of Hegel’s system. This will clear the way
for the following discussion But in order not to anticipate that discus-
sion our attention will here be confined exclusively to the problem of the
position of the Logic in the system; the problem of the ontological sig-
nificance of the Logic will occupy us when we come to take up Profes-
sor Pringle-Pattison’s criticism. What then, we first ask, is the position
of the Logic in the system, and in what relation does it stand to the other
parts of the Encyclopedia?
The best point of departure in attempting to answer this question is
acquaintance with the specific problem that Hegel has before him in the
Logic. In order to determine the nature of this problem, however, a con-
sideration of the question concerning the presupposition of the Logic is
necessary. For it would seem that one could hardly appreciate the sig-
nificance of the dialectical development of the categories by plunging at
once into the ‘bacchic whirl.’ A preliminary discussion of what the Logic
presupposes, if, indeed, it is not absolutely necessary to an adequate
appreciation of its real problem and aim, is at least desirable.
But this problem of the presupposition of the Logic need not detain
us long. There can be no doubt, it would seem that in the author’s mind
the Logic presupposes the result of the Phenomenology. To justify this
contention it is necessary simply to let the author speak for himself. “In
the Phenomenology of Spirit,” he says in the larger Logic, “I have ex-
hibited consciousness in its progress from its first immediate opposition
of itself and its object, on to absolute knowledge. This course traverses
all the forms of the relation of consciousness to its object, and has as its
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tion here — apart from the fact that it comes out as the final result in the
Logic itself — it needs no justification here, because it got its justifica-
tion there. And it is capable of no other justification than just this pro-
duction of it by consciousness, all whose own peculiar forms are re-
solved into this conception as their truth. . .This conception of the pure
science and the deduction of it are presupposed in the present treatise, in
so far as the Phenomenology of Spirit is nothing else but such a deduc-
tion of it “110 Again, later in the same work, we read: “It has been re-
marked in the introduction that the Phenomenology of Spirit is the sci-
ence of consciousness, the exhibition of the fact that consciousness has
the conception of our science, that is, of pure knowledge as its result. To
this extent, then, the Logic has the science of the phenomenal Spirit as
its presupposition; for that science contains and displays the necessity,
and hence the proof of the truth of the standpoint of pure knowledge, as
well as the way in which that standpoint is reached.”111 In addition to
these explicit statements of the Logic, I may be permitted to quote one
other passage from the preface to the Phenomenology itself. Having
traced in a sentence or two the development of the Phenomenology from
the standpoint of sensuous consciousness to that of absolute knowledge,
where we have completely mediated being, Hegel continues: “Just here
the Phenomenology comes to an end. In it the way has been prepared
for the element of knowledge wherein the moments of Spirit have un-
folded themselves in the form of simplicity which knows its object as
itself. These moments no longer stand opposed to each other as being
and knowing, but remain in the simplicity of knowledge; they are the
true in the form of the true, and their difference is only difference of
content. Their development, which in this element is organized into a
whole, is Logic or Speculative Philosophy.”112 Comment on such plain
passages as these seems superfluous: Hegel’s meaning in them is unmis-
takable. The science of Logic assumes the conclusion of the Phenom-
enology as its starting point and its procedure and result are to be judged
only in the light of this assumption.
Without further discussion of this point, then, we pass to the main
problem before us. What is the aim of the Logic in the light of its pre-
supposition? The passage quoted last in the preceding paragraph gives
us a basis for an answer to this question. In this passage Hegel tells us
what the purpose of the Logic is, viewed from the standpoint of absolute
knowledge. The passage, translated into simpler language, amounts to
this. At the conclusion of the Phenomenology we reached the true defi-46/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
nition of knowledge; the categories no longer appear as merely subjec-
tive ideas, or concepts, opposed to objects to which they are quasi-me-
chanically related, but they show themselves to be capable of express-
ing the essential nature of objects, and so are genuinely universal and
objective. To organize these categories into a systematic whole and to
set forth in a scientific manner their interconnection is the business of
the Logic. In other words, the Phenomenology exhibits the essentially
objective and universal nature of that thought which is the subject-mat-
ter of the Logic; the problem of the Logic being to work out the connec-
tion among the categories in abstraction from their essential relation to
sensuous experience. In the Phenomenology thought has been observed
and its nature determined in its relation to the objects of time and place,
but in the Logic temporal and spatial relations are entirely ignored and
we move in the ether of pure thought: the concrete categories of the
Phenomenology are, in the Logic, to be considered for their own sake
and their inter-relations determined apart from their experientibasis. In
a sense it may be said that the Phenomenology assumes that thought is
always concrete, its procedure consisting in an exhibition of the neces-
sity of this assumption: the Logic, likewise, takes this for granted but as
a fact established by the Phenomenology and then proceeds to investi-
gate specifically thought as it is in and for itself. “To raise to knowl-
edge.... those forms of thought which act instinctively in common con-
sciousness and obtain there only an obscure and incomplete reality, to
seize them by thought, and thought alone, in their most simple, abstract,
and universal existence, to trace and comprehend them in their relations
and in their unity — such is the task of the Hegelian Logic.”113
We must guard the statement above that the purpose of the Logic is
to deal with thought in abstraction from its empirical nature. Such a
statement might be misconstrued to mean that the Logic deals only with
abstract thought. And such an opinion would certainly not be without
justification, even on the basis of Hegel’s own assertions. When we
consider his statements concerning the science of logic, all that we have
hitherto said about the concreteness of logical thought seems to have
been said falsely. For example, Hegel tells us in one place that the realm
of logic is “a kingdom of shadows, the world of simple essences, freed
from all sensuous concretion.”114 Elsewhere he says that the content of
logic is “the presentation of God as He is in His eternal essence before
the creation of Nature or of a finite mind.”115 In yet another passage we
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etry, with abstract representations of the senses, but with pure abstrac-
tions.”116 But such deliverances as these are balanced by numerous
counter-assertions concerning the concreteness of the science of logic.
For example, we meet such a passage as this: “Bare abstractions or
formal thoughts are no business of philosophy, which has to deal only
with concrete thoughts.”117 Or this: “Logic has nothing to do with an
act of thought about something that lies outside of the thought as the
ground or basis of it, or with forms that furnish mere signs or marks of
the truth. On the contrary, the necessary forms and peculiar determina-
tions of thought are the content and the highest truth itself.”118 Further-
more, we are explicitly informed119 that das begreifende Denken rather
than simply das Denken is the subject matter of logic; and, as I have
tried to show in the preceding chapters, this is to say that the thought of
the science of logic is concrete.
The question naturally arises, Do not these two sets of passages
contradict each other? Is not a ‘pure’ abstraction equivalent to a ‘bare’
abstraction, and when Hegel asserts that the science of logic has to do
with pure abstractions does he not virtually deny the validity of his
claims for its concreteness? A consideration of this essential point will
give us a clearer idea of the Logic, both as to its aim and problem and as
to its relation to the Phenomenology of Spirit.
The answer to the puzzle before us will be found in an appreciation
of the ambiguity which attaches to the terms ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete.’
Abstract may mean not concrete in the sense of not sensuous. For ex-
ample, it is sometimes said that the phenomena of the mind are abstract,
because they cannot be touched seen, heard, etc., but are objects of
thought only; objects of the world of sense-perception would, in this
meaning of the terms, be concrete. This is the signification of the terms
as common sense uses them. In this sense, Hegel’s logic is unquestion-
ably abstract, as he himself explicitly states; and when he speaks of the
abstractness of the logic he is thinking of this meaning of the terms. The
content of the Logic may be called abstract, he says, “if the name con-
crete is restricted to the concrete facts of sense or of immediate percep-
tion.”120 “If content means no more than what is palpable and obvious
to the senses, all philosophy and logic in particular must be at once
acknowledged to be void of content, that is to say, of content perceptible
to the senses.”121 Of course, all sciences which have to do with objects
not perceptible to the senses are, from this point of view, abstract But
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may be abstract in the sense of being unreal, or taken apart from its
relations; while the concrete object is the object seen in its deepest and
truest significance. The categories of mathematics, for example, may be
said to be more abstract than the categories of ethical science; and the
ideals that seriously influence our lives for weal or woe are more con-
crete than the air-castles which we build in our day-dreams. The ab-
stract in this signification, Hegel strongly insists, is not the realm of
philosophy: it is just the aim of philosophy to get rid of all abstraction
and to see the world as concrete.122
From these considerations Hegel’s answer to the charge of inconsis-
tency in his statements concerning the science of logic is plain. ‘Pure’
abstraction is not equivalent to ‘bare’ abstraction; the former is charac-
teristic of all thought, the latter only of formal thought. In that its sub-
ject matter is thought and not the immediately given of sense-percep-
tion, logic may be said to busy itself with abstractions, to move in a
realm of shades; but in this way every mental science is abstract, and
might be metaphorically described as a ‘kingdom of shadows.’ In that
its subject matter is the Notion, however, that is to say, concrete thought,
the Logic is not only not abstract, but is the most concrete of the sci-
ences.123 “The Notion is not palpable to the touch, and when we are
engaged with it, we must be dead to hearing and seeing. And yet . . the
Notion is the only true concrete; for no other reason than because it
involves Being and Essence, and the total wealth of these two spheres
with them, merged in the unity of thought.”124 We shall have to return to
this point later.
And all this shows us again the essential difference, as well as the
fundamental similarity, between the Logic and the Phenomenology. They
both deal with consciousness; they are both expositions of the essential
nature of thought. But whereas the Phenomenology is interested in con-
sciousness primarily as a subject-object relation and endeavors to work
out the significance of this relation, the Logic is interested primarily in
disclosing the organic nature of thought and so confines its attention to
the thought activity in and for itself. The one is an interpretation of
thought in its relation to its object: the other is an interpretation of the
categories as they are in themselves, temporarily held in isolation from
their empirical setting. Hegel has stated this distinction in the preface to
the first edition of the larger Logic: “In this manner” — dialectically —
”I have tried to present consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit.
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shut in in the form of externality; but the motion of the form of this
object, as the development of all natural and spiritual life, rests only
upon the nature of the pure essences that constitute the content of the
Logic. As phenomenal Spirit, which in its own manner frees itself from
its immediacy and external concretion, consciousness develops into pure
knowledge which appropriates as its subject matter those pure essences
as they are in and for themselves . . . Thus is given the relation of the
science that I have called the Phenomenology of Spirit to the Logic.”125
To sum up briefly, our conclusion so far is this. The Logic has as its
presupposition the whole development of the Phenomenology of Spirit.
The Phenomenology, as we have already seen, asserts the inseparability
of thought and reality and attempts to define for us the true nature of
thought. The Logic presupposes this conclusion, taking for granted that
thought is really as it is here defined; and in the light of this presupposi-
tion its aim is to give a more detailed account of the nature of thought, to
work out the organic unity which exists among the several categories of
thought.126
Such, then, being the relation between the Logic and the Phenom-
enology, we pass on to ask concerning the relation between the Logic
and the other parts of the Encyclopaedia. This is a much debated prob-
lem in connection with Hegel’s philosophy, and upon its solution de-
pends the integrity of the system as a system. In accordance with our
determination not to anticipate the following discussion, we shall here
confine ourselves to the formal aspect of the problem: as little as pos-
sible will be said concerning the real ontological significance of the
Logic. The question now before us is: As regards the systematic ar-
rangement of the Encyclopaedia, what is the relation of the Logic to the
Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind?
If at this juncture we turn to Hegel for light on the problem, we are
sadly disappointed; very little light is vouchsafed us. His statements on
the point are few, and those few are couched in such metaphorical terms
it is almost impossible to attach a definite meaning to them. But one fact
seems indisputable, the fact, namely, that Hegel believed necessary and
actually tried to make some kind of transition from one part of the
Encyclopaedia to another. Let us see what he has to say about this
transition.
In the second edition of his Hegelianism and Personality127 Profes-
sor Pringle-Pattison has summarized Hegel’s account of the transition
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‘still logical, still confined to the element of pure thoughts.... But inas-
much as the pure idea of knowledge is thus, so far, shut up in a species
of subjectivity, it is impelled to remove this limitation; and thus the pure
truth, the last result of the Logic, becomes also the beginning of another
sphere and science.’ The Idea, he recalls to us, has been defined as ‘the
absolute unity of the pure notion and its reality’ — ’the pure notion
which is related only to itself’; but if this is so, the two sides of this
relation are one, and they collapse, as it were, ‘into the immediacy of
Being.’ ‘The Idea as the totality in this form is Nature. This determining
of itself, however, is not a process of becoming or a transition’ such as
we have from stage to stage in the Logic. ‘The passing over is rather to
be understood thus — that the Idea freely lets itself go, being absolutely
sure of itself and at rest in itself. On account of this freedom, the form of
its determination is likewise absolutely free — namely, the externality
of space and time existing absolutely for itself without subjectivity. A
few lines lower he speaks of the ‘resolve (Entschluss) of the pure Idea to
determine itself as external Idea.’ Turning to the Encyclopaedia we find
at the end of the smaller Logic, a more concise but substantially similar
statement. ‘The Idea which exists for itself, looked at from the point of
view of this unity with itself, is Perception; and the Idea as it exists for
perception is nature . . . The absolute freedom of the Idea consists in
this, that in the absolute truth of itself (i.e., according to Hegel’s usage,
when it has attained the full perfection of the form which belongs to it),
it resolves to let the element of its particularity — the immediate idea, as
its own reflection — go forth freely from itself as Nature.’129 And in the
lecture-note which follows we read, as in the larger Logic — ’We have
now returned to the notion of the Idea with which we began. This return
to the beginning is also an advance. That with which we began was
Being, abstract Being, and now we have the Idea as Being; but this
existent Idea is Nature.’”
Such is Hegel’s account of the transition from the Logic to the Phi-
losophy of Nature. Confining our attention for the present to the aspect
of the problem before us, let us ask concerning the significance and
justification of this attempted transition. There seems to be no doubt
that Hegel believed the transition necessary and that he did attempt to
make it. The question is, Why, and with what success? One or two
preliminary considerations will lead us to an answer.
In the first place, I think we must agree with Haldane that the tran-
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arguing is true, namely, that the Notion is genuinely objective and uni-
versal, this conclusion is forced upon us: the Absolute Idea would then
include in itself the fullness of Nature. And Hegel teaches us that the
transition is only logical. For he insists that the Idea cannot be thought
of as existing anterior to or independent of Nature; and that, when it
passes into Nature, it does not come into possession of a content which
before was alien to it.131 On the contrary, we are informed that the Idea
is nothing but completed Being, the abstract immediacy of Being made
concrete.132 And so such an account of the relation between the Idea and
its manifestations as the following from Falckenberg may be dismissed
at once as at best misleading; indeed, if it means what it says, it is
ridiculously false: “The absolute or the logical Idea exists first as a
system of antemundane concepts, then it descends into the unconscious
sphere of nature, awakens to self-consciousness in man, realizes its con-
tent in social institutions, in order, finally, in art, religion, and science to
return to itself enriched and completed, i.e., to attain a higher absolute-
ness than that of the beginning.”133 As Hegel conceives the matter, the
Idea does indeed enrich itself by passing through these various stages of
its existence, or, rather, by exhibiting these differentiations of itself, but
it does so only by showing that these differentiations are essential as-
pects of itself and by disclosing itself as inherent in them from the first.
The Idea is prior, not in point of time, but solely in the logical sense.
In the second place, as Vera suggests,134 the true significance of the
problem involved in this transition, as well as the correct solution of the
problem, can be had only in the light of Hegel’s philosophy as a whole.
In a very important sense the Phenomenology of Spirit is the presuppo-
sition of the entire Encyclopedia. As has already been pointed out, the
aim of the Phenomenology is simply to show what are the implications
of knowledge, and to prove, against Kant, that in knowledge as thus
developed we have the expression of ultimate reality. Now, as I think we
must conceive the matter, the Encyclopedia simply attempts a more
detailed investigation and a more elaborate exposition of this position.
We might put it thus. In the Phenomenology we begin with all the real-
ity we know anything about, namely, experience, and we proceed to
develop its implications as regards its nature as a subject-object rela-
tion. The Logic abstracts from this concrete whole and examines one
aspect of it, which here we might call the subject-aspect; while the Phi-
losophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind deal with other aspects
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object-significance. For it must not be forgotten that, when we arrive at
the category of absolute knowledge in the Phenomenology, we have
reached, not a new kind of experience, but only a more concrete point of
view in our common everyday experience; and this point of view is
taken by the other parts of the Encyclopaedia as well as by the Logic.
Though Haym unfortunately failed to appreciate the full significance of
his words, still he is essentially right whehe says that the Phenomenol-
ogy “is really the whole system.... The later expression of the system in
its articulated totality is only a more detailed exposition and completion
that which is contained in the Phenomenology.”135 And it seems to me
that this fact about the Encyclopaedia is not to be forgotten or over-
looked, if we are truly to appreciate the relation of its several parts to
each other.
If the preceding considerations are substantially true, then we are
forced to conclude (a) that the Logic, Philosophy of Nature and Phi-
losophy of Mind are only three points of view from which one organic
whole is observed and interpreted. The first investigates the more strictly
cognitive side of experience; the second has to do with its crass objec-
tive, its sensuous aspect; while the third undertakes to interpret its spiri-
tual values. As Kuno Fischer points out, each in a sense has the same
content: the difference among them lies rather in the form which that
content assumes.136 Each has a unique sphere and claim of its own, but
neither is the whole of reality nor can it be ontologically separated from
the others. Thought does indeed, according to Hegel, include its object,
whether that object be crass matter or the other so-called functions of
the mind; but it includes by subsuming, by taking up and preserving in
itself. So other sciences besides that of pure thought have their raison
d’etre.137 But because thought does thus include its object, we must say
(b) that in a sense the Logic comprehends the other two parts of the
Encyclopaedia.138 And so Haym’s criticism loses its force and becomes
a simple statement of fact: “So muss die Logik die ganze Philosophie
sein, so muss mit ihr das System schliessen.”139 This last point will
come up for direct discussion later in the present chapter.
But it will be objected that on this score we are forced to deny the
necessity of the transition from the Logic as Hegel has attempted it. And
I have purposely courted the objection in order to emphasize my agree-
ment with it. If what has been said above is true — and its validity is
attested to by our entire discussion of Hegel’s doctrine of the nature of
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one to another part of the Encyclopaedia. Such a transition is impos-
sible were it necessary, but it is not necessary. Its necessity has been
obviated by the result of the Phenomenology; for this work has shown
that in the dialectic of the categories the object cannot be entirely ab-
sent, even though, for methodological purposes its presence be as far as
possible neglected. A dialectical transition here would in fact be incon-
sistent with the spirit of Hegel’s philosophy; it would seem to indicate
that the Idea is a mere abstraction which demands a content to make it
real, an abstract universal to be particularized. Hegel himself at times
seems to feel this difficulty, although, so far as I am aware, he never
explicitly expresses himself on the point. For example, his very frank
recognition that the transition which he attempts from the Logic to the
Philosophy of Nature is different from the transition of the subjective
notion into objectivity, or of subjective purpose into life, one would
think is not entirely without significance.140 Again elsewhere he seems
to show that he fears the transition because he takes pains to warn us
against misconceiving its real import.141 And in the larger Logic, at the
beginning of the discussion of the Absolute Idea, there occurs a passage
which is suggestive in this connection: “Since it [i.e., the Idea] contains
all determination within itself, and its essence is to return to itself through
its self-determination or particularity, it possesses different forms; and
it is the business of philosophy to trace it in these forms” — such as
nature, art, and religion.142
But whether Hegel had any such feeling as I have attributed to him
or whether he did not, the fact remains that he felt called upon to make
the leap from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature. He explicitly as-
serts that “the last result of the Logic becomes also the beginning of
another sphere and science,” which science is, of course, the Philoso-
phy of Nature. If now, as we have argued, this transition is not only not
necessary, but, what is more important, is really inconsistent with the
logical bias of the system, then the question why the author deemed it
necessary becomes a very pressing one. As a matter of fact he does
attempt the transition: what is to be said about the fact?
The answer to this question is, in my opinion, not far to seek. Hegel
was very much in earnest about this transition, and he was in earnest
about it for the reason that with it stands or falls his system as a system.
This, it seems to me, is the secret of his anxiety concerning the matter.
Like Kant, he was bound down to his system; he could not get beyond
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Philosophy of Mind had to form a triad of thesis, antithesis, and synthe-
sis, else the formal coherence and symmetry of the system would have
been lost. The scheme of the system demands a continuous linear devel-
opment from one phase of it to another — an absolutely necessary de-
velopment. If the dialectic is the absolute and universal method, why is
there not a dialectical passage from the Logic to nature? There simply
must be — and there was. Such procedure is due to the fact that Hegel
did not always raise the spirit of his system above the letter. The Method,
the unerring and absolute method of the dialectic, had to be looked out
for and its claims catered to regardless of consequences; and only too
frequently was the method seen in a false light and its claims misinter-
preted. If at all times Hegel could have identified his method with his
doctrine of begreifendes Denken, the relation of the various parts of the
Encyclopaedia to each other would have been differently conceived and
the position of the Logic in the system would have been more clearly
and intelligibly set forth.
Some commentators seem disposed to justify this leap from the Logic.
Noel, for example, goes so far as to maintain that there is a connection
between the Logic and what follows in the system analogous to the
connection among the several sections of the Logic.143 “There must be,”
he says, “a dialectical passage from the Logic to Nature. The logical
Idea must negate itself and pass into its contrary.” But there seems to be
no very good reason why the logical Idea should, just at this point,
negate itself and pass into Nature. Indeed, Noel’s position seems to over-
look Hegel’s own explicit statement, quoted above, to the effect that the
transition here in question is different from that which obtains among
the categories of the Logic. In this respect Mr. McTaggart is, perhaps,
truer to Hegel. It is true that he asserts, “Granted pure thought, we are
compelled by the necessity of the dialectic to grant the existence of some
sensuous intuition also.” But he recognizes Hegel’s statement that the
transition to the Philosophy of Nature has its own peculiar characteris-
tics.144 The fundamentals of Mr. McTaggart’s position seem to be: that
the transition is both analytic and synthetic; that it really represents the
phases of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis; and that Spirit, as the truth
and goal of the movement, is present even from the beginning. In so far
as this position insists that in the Idea both Nature and Spirit are in-
volved, one is not inclined to call it in question. But does this insistence
make the transition from the Absolute Idea to Nature dialectically nec-
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egories, are we forced to posit nature as its counterpart? If so, are we
thereby made aware of the implicit appearance of Spirit, even before it
looms on the horizon? Even if we grant, with Noel, that logic contains in
germ philosophy in its entirety, and with Mr. McTaggart that, if there
were a transition at the end of the Logic, it would necessarily be both
analytic and synthetic, still the essential point here has not been touched.
Is the transition a dialectical necessity? If so, why is it so? I confess
myself unable to see any dialectical advance from the end of the Logic
to the beginning of the Philosophy of Nature, or even from the Idea to a
matter of sensuous intuition. Is it any less reasonable to say that the first
category of the Logic should alienate itself in its other than that the last
category should do so? Is not the category of Being as likely to go forth
into its opposite as is the Absolute Idea? Certainly so, if as Mr. McTaggart
seems to suggest, the fact that the Absolute Idea is ‘pure thought’ is the
impetus of the movement; for Being is just as much ‘pure thought’ as is
the Absolute Idea. In fact, it would seem to be more reasonable to return
to the beginning of the Logic and take the sensuous ‘alienation’ of Being
as the point of departure for the Naturphilosophie: at any rate, in this
event we should have the privilege of proceeding on lines analogous to
those followed in the development of the Logic, namely, from the less to
the more determinate. But whether we put ourselves at the first category
or at the ‘last result’ of the Logic, hoping thereby to discover a begin-
ning for our new ‘sphere and science,’ we find ourselves baffled. In no
event do we find that mysterious secret power that would drive us on to
Nature. And we fail for the somewhat obvious reason that we are al-
ready at Nature and do not need to be driven to it. This so-called transi-
tion can be defended only on the basis of the Phenomenology: there it
has received the only justification which it needs and of which it is ca-
pable. But — and this is the important point — the conclusion of the
Phenomenology destroys at once the necessity and the possibility of
such a transition; and from this point of view the dialectical passage
becomes nothing more than a misguided zeal for schematization. One
must feel that neither Noel nor Mr. McTaggart has succeeded in making
the leap plausible: if they had succeeded, one is inclined to say that the
real significance of the Hegelian Logic would have been greatly dimin-
ished, if not completely destroyed.
It might be argued in support of this transition from the Logic that
Hegel is simply recognizing here, explicitly, the presupposition that has
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dialectical transition? Does it not consist simply in making explicit a
presupposition? And do we not at the end of the Logic recognize what
has been a presupposition all through, namely, the spiritual union of
thought and its object? Thus the circle is completed, the end is one with
the beginning. And with this the necessity of a more concrete treatment
is apparent — a treatment that shall take into full account the presuppo-
sition thus disclosed. And so we are brought at once into the realm of
Nature and of Spirit.
This, it must be confessed, is all that Hegel could consistently have
meant by the transition in question. It could signify nothing more than a
change in point of view, if the lesson of the Phenomenology is to hold
here. One is inclined to think that this is really the essence of the transi-
tion. But the question inevitably arises why the presupposition is pecu-
liarly forced upon us in the Absolute Idea. Is not the recognition of the
presupposition as explicit in the first categories of the Logic as it is in
the last? Does not Hegel make constant appeal to it throughout the whole
dialectical advance? Why, then, should the presupposition be forced to
the fore in the Absolute Idea as it is not in any of the other categories? It
might be answered, Because at the Absolute Idea we have a definition
of reality itself. Even so, how was this definition arrived at apart from
the phenomena of Nature and Spirit? The fact is that it was not; for the
result of the Phenomenology is recognized at every stage of the dialecti-
cal development of the categories, and this necessitates the inclusion by
the Idea of these phenomena of Nature and Spirit. So far as I can see,
the objective aspect of existence is no more clearly and necessarily evi-
dent in any one of the categories than it is in all; we are not forced to
take account of it in the Idea in a manner different from that in which it
forces itself upon us in the categories of Being and Essence. If, when
Hegel reached the end of the Logic, he had contented himself with as-
serting what the above argument would have him assert, namely, that
the time had come for us to turn to a detailed consideration of those
phenomena that had not been explicitly taken into account by the Logic,
if he had simply told us that at the Idea the Logic reached its conclusion
and that he here proposed to change his point of view, we could have
understood him: the necessity of the change and the partially abstract
nature of the Logic, had already been sufficiently explained to us in the
Phenomenology. But when he goes on to urge that the Absolute Idea
must, by a dialectical necessity, alienate itself in its Other, we begin to
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ceeded in getting from this abstract view of the world to the standpoint
of the Idea. We had thought all along that in the Idea we were at last in
touch with reality; but when this mysterious alienation begins to take
place, the earth trembles under us and we wonder if we have been de-
ceived. At this juncture the Phenomenology comes to our relief, when
we remember that its conclusion has made the transition both unneces-
sary and impossible. The argument before us does indeed state what
Hegel must have meant, if he remained true to the principles of his doc-
trine; but it hardly explains what he seems actually to have attempted.
It would seem, then, that this would-be transition from the Logic
must be given up. And, furthermore, we must agree with Professor
Pringle-Pattison that to admit so much involves a surrender of Hegel’s
system as he left it. He is systematic to a fault. Within the Logic itself
the author’s mania for system often clouds, if it does not completely
hide, the issue; the omnipotent Dialectic Method, rather than the or-
ganic development of thought, is only too frequently the object of inter-
est. And, unfortunately, even the data of nature and history are some-
times forced into this formal scheme whether they will or no. What
under other circumstances might have been a very simple change in
point of view is, as we have just seen, made incomprehensible and mis-
leading by the same absurd reverence for the triadic movement of the
‘absolute method.’ No doubt one may easily be too severely critical of
this aspect of Hegel’s philosophy, both because it is so exasperating and
because it is calculated to conceal the real import of the system. Our
zeal to remove these barriers to a true appreciation of the system, and to
gain an unprejudiced hearing for the author, might blind us to the fact
that these impedimenta find their partial explanation at least in the cir-
cumstances under which Hegel wrote. Historically speaking this transi-
tion from the Logic may claim for itself some sort of justification. Per-
haps it was important for Hegel’s influence that he set forth his system
intact; and to do this seemed to necessitate this transition. For if the
dialectic had with unerring precision led from the poor and abstract
category of Being up to the fullness of the Absolute Idea, and that, too,
apart from a direct consideration of Nature and of Spirit, then it was
incumbent upon the dialectic to lead in some way to a consideration of
these important aspects of experience; and how could this be more hap-
pily accomplished than by the assertion of at least a quasi-dialectical
connection between the Idea and these its manifestations? This ground
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and, of course, should be given the weight that is due it. But, after all,
though we may be inclined to excuse Hegel for his formality, we have no
special reason for being grateful to hi him for it; his system will be
appreciated fully only when we throw aside this formality and penetrate
to the fundamentals of the system. And the fundamentals of the system
can best be disclosed when the fruitlessness and inconsistency of this
attempted transition from the Logic are revealed.
So with no great degree of reluctance we surrender the formal ar-
rangement of Hegel’s system. But we can ill afford to miss its spirit and
the results that follow from it. One of the most marked of these results is
the position that epistemology is in a sense ontology, that logic and meta-
physics cannot be separated from each other. This brings us back to our
original question, the intervening discussion having been necessary to
clear the way for an answer. So we ask once again concerning the real
meaning and justification of this Hegelian position, that a theory of knowl-
edge cannot be separated from a theory of reality. In accordance with
our plan of discussion, we shall attempt to answer this question by ex-
amining a criticism to which the contention has been subjected.
The criticism which we shall here examine is to be found in the
fourth lecture of Professor Pringle-Pattison’s Hegelianism and Person-
ality. The criticism, we seem compelled to say, is based upon a misap-
prehension of Hegel’s real meaning and actual procedure.145 The re-
maining part of this chapter will first attempt to justify this assertion,
and then conclude with a statement of what Hegel, in consistency with
his own principles, must have meant by the identification in question.
The criticism is based upon the attempted transition from the Logic
to the Philosophy of Nature, one phase of which we have already con-
sidered. Put in a few words, the criticism seems to be that in this transi-
tion Hegel deliberately attempted to deduce nature from the logical Idea,
and that, by a copious use of metaphors, he deluded himself into think-
ing that he had successfully bridged the gulf which separates formal
thought from actual existence. To quote: “The concrete existence of the
categories (in Nature and Spirit) is to be deduced from their essence or
thought-nature; it is to be shown that they cannot not be. When we have
mounted to the Absolute Idea, it is contended, we cannot help going
further. The nisus of thought itself projects thought out of the sphere of
thought altogether into that of actual existence. In fact, strive against
the idea as we may, it seems indubitable that there is here once more
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to construct the world out of abstract thought or mere universals. The
whole form and structure of the system, and the express declarations of
its author at points of critical importance, combine to force this convic-
tion upon us. The language used can only be interpreted to mean that
thought out of its own abstract nature gives birth to the reality of
things.”146 All of which amounts to saying that Hegel has taken abstract
thought, ontologized it, and then has turned about and attempted to de-
duce concrete reality from this hypostatized abstraction
It must be admitted at once that such an accusation is not prima
facie without some justification. If we turn once more to the passages
above quoted bearing on the transition from the Logic, our first inclina-
tion is to accept Professor Pringle-Pattison’s interpretation of them. Other
passages, especially those referring to the absoluteness and finality of
the system, seem to bear out the same contention. And when in the
Encyclopaedia we run across passages which baldly assert that every-
thing is a judgment or a syllogism, we wonder whether Plato’s concep-
tion of archetypal Ideas is more removed from concrete experience. And
yet such an attempt to deduce nature from abstract thought would be a
rather remarkable undertaking on Hegel’s part: it would be inconsistent
with the entire spirit of his philosophy, the fundamental assumption of
which is, as Haldane suggests,147 that you cannot deduce the ‘that.’ Is it
possible to interpret these passages so as to make Hegel consistent with
the fundaments of his system? If so, it would seem that such an interpre-
tation should certainly be adopted.
I think it is possible to make Hegel consistent in this regard, and this
I have tried to do in the preceding pages of this chapter. I fully agree
with Professor Pringle-Pattison that the attempted transition from one
to another part of Encyclopedia must be given up; and I also agree that
with this transition we surrender the system as a system. But I cannot
agree with the reasons which the critic advances in support of his con-
clusions. It was just because his system depended upon it that Hegel
made the resolute leap, and not for the purpose of getting from abstract
thought to concrete existence. The ‘ugly broad ditch’ between thought
and reality seems to me only a shadow; and, unless indeed we are to
credit Hegel with momentary forgetfulness of the foundation of his sys-
tem, I cannot think that it was more to him. Now it would seem that this
interpretation, namely, that the transition from the Logic was attempted
for purely schematic purposes, has the advantage over such an interpre-
tation as Professor Pringle-Pattison’s, which makes of the transition an60/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
attempt to deduce existential reality from abstract universals; and the
advantage of the former interpretation lies in the fact that it does make
Hegel consistent with the basic principles of his theory. We may venture
to put the matter in the form of a disjunction. Either Hegel tried to
deduce nature from the logical categories or he did not. If he did attempt
it, then he contradicts himself; for such an attempt would presuppose
that the logical categories are merely abstract thoughts existing in the
heads of individuals and possessing no vital significance in relation to
the essence of concrete objects. But this is the very conception of thought
which we have seen Hegel object to in the systems of his predecessors
and in contradistinction to which he emphasizes his own doctrine. And
that doctrine is that thought has transcended the opposition between
itself and its and is really the expression of the essence of the object.
“Pure science presupposes liberation from the opposition of conscious-
ness. It contains thought in so far as it is just as much the object in itself,
or the object in itself in so far as it is just as much pure thought.”148
But, on the other hand, if Hegel did not attempt to deduce nature
from thought, it would seem that his statements about a transition from
the Logic must be explained away. Now the latter horn of this dilemma
is comparatively easily disposed of, as has already been pointed out in
the preceding part of the present chapter; the so-called transition is only
a change in point of view, the author’s insistence upon the necessity of
the transition being made for the sake of his system. But if we follow
Professor Pringle-Pattison in accepting the former, the most significant
aspect of Hegel’s philosophy will, to say the least, become questionable
and he himself will stand accused of the most glaring of inconsistencies.
There seems to be no doubt, then, of the conclusion to be reached here.
But leaving aside speculation as to what may or may not have been
the immediate purpose of Hegel in this transition, let us try to see what
is logically involved in it. Whether or not Hegel has here made a delib-
erate attempt to deduce nature from thought, such an attempt is cer-
tainly not logically imposed upon him.
This contention is based upon what has already been said about the
presupposition of the Encyclopedia. In the Encyclopedia we are dealing
with one whole, namely, reality: the three parts of the Encyclopedia
represent different points of view from which this totality is observed.
This conclusion follows necessarily, if our view concerning the signifi-
cance of the Phenomenology in the system be correct. For the very
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of the impossibility of dividing reality into water-tight compartments
which are so separated from each other that each may be dealt with
entirely independently of the others. Reality, this discussion has taught
us, is rather one indissoluble whole whose parts can be separated from
each other only by abstraction. The Encyclopedia, therefore, presup-
posing as it unquestionably does the result of the Phenomenology, must
have for its object the one reality, and its several parts must be simply
different points of view from which this unitary reality is observed and
investigated. Now as a corollary of this, it follows that the transition
from the Logic is as Kuno Fischer suggests,149 logically nothing more
than a change in point of view. If the Encyclopedia presents reality to us
from three different standpoints each of which involves the others, —
and let us not forget that this is the lesson of the Phenomenology — then
a transition within the Encyclopedia cannot be anything but a change in
point of view. So all that Hegel really was called upon to do in order to
get from the Logic to the Philosophy of Nature was simply to announce
that he intended to investigate his problems from a new viewpoint: the
transition, if one will call it so, had already been made in the Phenom-
enology of Spirit as we have abundantly seen.
Now it would seem that the accusation that Hegel seriously tried to
deduce existence from thought when he made the transition from the
Logic to the Philosophy of Nature fails to give the above considerations
the weight that is due them. Unless one drops them out of mind entirely,
it is difficult, not to say impossible, to catch the significance of the
following as a criticism of Hegel: “Most assuredly the Notion contains
the category of Being; so does the Ego, that is to say, the idea of the ego,
and the Idea of God, both of which are simply the Notion under another
name....
But when we ask for real bread, why put us off with a logical stone
like this? It is not the category ‘Being,’ of which we are in quest, but
that reality of which all categories are only descriptions, and which
itself can only be experienced, immediately known or lived. To such
reality or factual existence there is no logical bridge; and thoughts or
categories have meaning only if we assume, as somehow given, a real
world to which they refer.”150 Surely such a criticism could have been
written only in forgetfulness of what Hegel has said about the presuppo-
sition of the Logic and the mediated aspect of the category of Being.
Being is, indeed, a logical category; but it is more than a mere abstract
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the consciousness of the thinker who happens to possess it. It is a con-
crete thought that expresses one very general, but withal very essential,
characteristic of that which really is. In Hegel’s usage, Being, or any
other category of thought, is not a mere idea or concept; on the contrary,
it is a universal which ipso facto includes within its very nature the
particularity of existence.151
And this brings us face to face with what seems to be the fundamen-
tal error in Professor Pringle-Pattison’s charge. I refer to his neglect of
the meaning which Hegel attaches to the Notion. This is the bed-rock
upon which Hegel bases his contention that logic and ontology are es-
sentially one. It is only the Notion that “sinks itself in the facts”; it is
only the Notion that is “accredited able to express the essential reality of
things”; and only the Notion is the subject-matter of the science of logic.
The Notion, thus, is the tie that binds epistemology and metaphysics
together. For if thought comprehends reality and is capable of express-
ing it, if there is no ‘residuum’ which lies outside of thought and which
in its nature is inexpressible in terms of thought, then the science of
thought is in a very important sense the science of things. Now just this
conclusion the critic objects to; and his objection seems to rest upon a
misinterpretation of the premise.
Let us notice some of Professor Pringle-Pattison’s statements. Af-
ter quoting several passages from Hegel to the effect that Nature is the
logical Idea in its otherness, is the Spirit in alienation from itself, and so
forth, he continues: “Now I maintain that the whole problem of reality
as such is wrapped up in these metaphorical phrases — otherness, pet-
rifaction, materiature, concretion — and that by evading the question,
Hegel virtually declines to take account of anything but logical abstrac-
tions. He offers us, in a word, a logic in place of a metaphysic; and it
may be unhesitatingly asserted that such a proposal, if taken literally, is
not only untenable, it is absurd.” Nothing, we are further informed, is in
very truth a logical category. “A living dog is better than a dead lion,
and even an atom is more than a category. It at least exists as a reality,
whereas a category is an abstract ghost, which may have a meaning for
intelligent beings, but which, divorced from such real beings and their
experience, is the very type of a non-ens.” A little later he says: “Exist-
ence is one thing, knowledge is another. But the logical bias of the
Hegelian philosophy tends to make this essential di tinction disappear,
and to reduce things to mere types or ‘concretions’ of abstract formu-
lae.” “The result of Hegel’s procedure would really be to sweep ‘exis-Thought and Reality in Hegel’s System/63
tential reality’ off the board altogether, under the persuasion, appar-
ently, that a full statement of all the thought-relations that constitute our
knowledge of the thing is equivalent to the existent thing itself. On the
contrary, it may be confidently asserted that there is no more identity of
Knowing and Being with an infinity of such relations than there was
with one.”152
If I understand the import of these passages — and their meaning
seems unmistakable — there is involved in them an assumption which I
dare think is unwarranted. The assumption is that Hegel has actually
attempted to reduce sensuous experience to the universals of formal
thought, and has tried to make such universals really be the existent
things. If it be true that Hegel has attempted this, then it should be
admitted without argument that he has attempted that which is both
impossible and absurd. It may, perhaps, be rather difficult to say just in
what respect an atom is more than a category, just what other reality it
possesses besides its meaning for intelligent beings; but there can not be
any question that a living dog is better than a dead lion — an object is
indisputably more than a mere meeting-point of abstract relations. But
does Hegel deny this? Is it quite fair to him to assert that the logical bias
of his philosophy is “to reduce things to mere types or ‘concretions’ of
abstract formulae”? Does he really try to force the particularity of exist-
ence into the abstract universality of bare cognition? I have already
maintained that such an assumption is groundless and even contrary to
the real spirit of Hegel’s system; and the preceding chapters attempt to
set forth the reasons upon which such a contention rests. If I have there
failed to accomplish this, it would hardly be worth while for me to un-
dertake it here. Suffice it to reiterate that, when Hegel insists that knowl-
edge or thought and reality are conterminous, he is simply upholding the
theory that experience and reality are one: he means by thought, the
Notion, not abstract and formal cognition, but organized experience. If
such a criticism as the one with which we are here dealing is to be
established, it must first be shown that Hegel does not hold such a doc-
trine of the nature of thought as has here been attributed to him; and this
must be shown regardless of innumerable utterances to the contrary,
and in spite of the pages of the Phenomenology of Spirit.
In the last analysis, one seems safe in saying, the real difference
between Hegel and his critic turns upon the question whether thought is
an adequate expression of the real. Both have the same conception of
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true definition of the individual, namely, that it is identity in difference.153
But in answer to the question whether thought is capable of expressing
the individual, author and critic part company. The former, as we have
seen, answers in the affirmative; while the latter, though he shows a
puzzling inconsistency, finally gives a negative answer.154 So we face
the question, Is thought adequate to express the real as thus defined? Or
is it the very nature of the individual to transcend thought?
In order to answer this question we must first come to some under-
standing concerning the real nature of thought. And two conceptions of
its essential nature are possible. One doctrine of thought is that which
Mr. McTaggart attributes to Hegel and which has been defined by Lotze
thus: “Thought is everywhere but a mediating activity moving hither
and thither, bringing into connection the original intuitions of external
and internal perception, which are predetermined by fundamental ideas
and laws the origin of which cannot be shown; it develops special and
properly logical forms, peculiar to itself, only in the effort to apply the
idea of truth (which it finds in us) to the scattered multiplicity of percep-
tions, and of the consequences developed from them.”155 According to
this conception of thought, thought is a mediating activity among other
mental processes which bear to it an external relation. The other pos-
sible conception of thought is that which has been attributed to Hegel in
the present study, the nature of which Hegel expresses thus: “If we iden-
tify the Idea with thought, thought must not be taken in the sense of a
method or form, but in the sense of the self-developing totality of its
laws and peculiar terms. These laws are the work of thought itself, and
not a fact which it finds and must submit to.”156 Or thus: “In all human
perception thought is present; so too thought is the universal in all the
acts of conception and recollection; in short, in every mental activity, in
willing, wishing, and the like. All these faculties are only further spe-
cializations of thought. When it is presented in this light, thought has a
different part to play from what it has if we speak of a faculty of thought,
one among a crowd of other faculties, such as perception, conception,
and will, with which it stands on the same level.”157
Now whichever of these doctrines of thought we accept as true to
the facts of experience, our answer to the above question is fixed. If, on
the one hand, Lotze’s account be the true description of actual concrete
thought, then it is certain beyond any dispute that Being can not be
“resolved into it without leaving any residuum.” Thought which is merely
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be more than a formal method of dealing with data given independently
of it; and these data would certainly have to be accounted a part of
Being. Such thought might prove a valuable instrument for dealing with
reality — though I am not sure that I can see why it should, or, indeed,
how it could, do so — but it could at most only compare and relate
phenomena: reality would be, and would forever remain, beyond it. But,
if, on the other hand, Hegel’s account of thought is the true one, then it
would seem that we might as dogmatically assert that thought does com-
prehend and exhaust the real. Either this, or we commit ourselves to the
doctrine of the thing-in-itself which Kant has taught us, by his failure to
make it comprehensible, to fear. For if thought is conterminous only
with experience, then it is also conterminous with the real; otherwise, of
course, reality would be trans-experiential. Just how, in Hegel’s opin-
ion, such thought is capable of expressing the individuality of reality, I
have tried to indicate in the preceding chapter on the process of thought:
his doctrine is that thought is adequate to express the individual, be-
cause its categories are just such self-particularizing universals — uni-
versals obtained, not by abstraction from the particulars, but by the
interpretation of them.
It seems to me that, in the above criticism of Hegel, Professor Pringle-
Pattison confuses these two doctrines of thought, or rather, that he over-
looks Hegel’s own doctrine and tacitly attributes to him that of Lotze,
and so criticizes him for that of which he is not guilty. For if we take
Hegel’s more concrete doctrine of the nature of thought into account,
the criticism misses the mark. Perhaps I have dwelt long enough on this
point; but it is a very vital one in connection with Hegel’s system. I
submit that it is only this confusion which gives Professor Pringle-
Pattison’s criticism significance, and that the criticism falls of its own
accord when the confusion is cleared away.
Just here emerges a consideration which we may pause to empha-
size before we pass on to the concluding remarks of this chapter. And
that consideration is that the point at which to attack Hegel’s identifica-
tion of logic and metaphysicsis his doctrine concerning the nature of
that thought which is the subject-matter of the science of logic. With the
validity of this doctrine stands or falls his contention that epistemology
and ontology are essentially one. For if the categories express the nature
of ultimate reality, then the science of the categories, namely, logic, is
the science of the real. And in order to prove that Hegel has no right to
claim that thought expresses fully the real, one must show that his doc-66/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
trine of thought is false. And this, it would seem, would involve a care-
ful investigation of experience, since Hegel claims to have rooted his
doctrine in experience through the procedure of the Phenomenology. So
far as I am aware, such an enterprise has been undertaken by none of
Hegel’s critics.158
The answer to the question as to what Hegel really did mean by his
assertion that logic and metaphysics are fundamentally one is involved
in what has already been said. It remains only to set it forth and to
emphasize it. In the first place, it seems that we are forced to say that
Hegel does not mean to reduce thought and being to an abstract identity.
We have already insisted upon this point, but it will be well to empha-
size it again since it is so generally taken for granted that the contrary is
true. Critics generally seem to think that, when Hegel asserts that thought
exhausts reality, he is asserting that thought about an object actually is
the object itself and that experience is no richer than the poverty of
abstract cognition. Identity of thought and being means for them undif-
ferentiated identity; upon their interpretation the particular loses itself
in the universal, becomes vaporized, as it were, into a mere meeting-
point of abstract relations. But such abstract identity between thought
and its object Hegel simply could not teach and at the same time remain
true to his system: it is in direct contradiction of his fundamental pre-
suppositions, indeed it contradicts the very thesis he was trying to estab-
lish.159 He began by assuming a duality within and basic to experience,
namely, the subject-object relation; and certainly he did not wish to de-
stroy the very foundation on which he was building. He never denied the
existence of the concrete object, nor did he make any attempt to reduce
the object to blank universality. He did indeed reduce the object to terms
of the subject; he urged that ultimate reality must be construed as Sub-
ject and not as Substance. But he did not destroy the duality within
experience. The object was never annihilated as an object, only explained;
its alienation disappeared, but its self-identity was never lost. This idea
that Hegel tried to reduce factual existence to abstract relations should
be dismissed from our minds once for all, unless we prefer to believe
that he forgot or set about to contradict the very doctrine which he was
endeavoring to establish. Whatever one may see in the leap from the
Logic to the Philosophy of Nature, one must grant that Hegel could not
have seriously entertained the idea that abstract cognition and existen-
tial reality are identical; the inconsistency involved is too patent.160
In the second place, what Hegel really does mean by his positionThought and Reality in Hegel’s System/67
that logic and metaphysic coincide seems to be this, namely, the asser-
tion of the complete intelligibility or mediated character of reality. In-
stead of being merely subjective ideas, the categories of the Logic are
principles of ultimate reality; and ultimate reality is simply what these
principles show it to be. It is only by these instruments that experience
gets its organization; and organized experience and reality coincide. The
science of the categories is, thus, the science of the real; but being is not
deduced, it is only thoroughly rationalized and explained. Of course, we
must remember that these categories are not merely conceptions of the
Understanding, as Hegel calls it, or of what we call cognition: the cat-
egories of feeling and will are just as important as the categories of
cognition. And we must also remember that the categories of the Rea-
son are not merely universals bearing an external and mechanical rela-
tion to the particulars; they are universals which exist only in and through
the particulars subsumed under them, and in which the particulars find
their only reality.161 Such an identification of logic and ontology, Hegel
maintains, is logically involved in the system of Kant: the reason why
Kant failed to realize the fact was that he gave his categories an ‘essen-
tially subjective significance.’162 That is to say, had Kant only realized
that the realm of possible experience is the real and only real, then the
categories, which he recognized as principles of the deepest import in
experience, would have been regarded as principles of reality, would
have attained to truly objective significance; and so the science of these
principles would have become the science of the real, the Critique of
Pure Reason would have been a metaphysic as well as a treatise on
epistemology. Now Hegel argues that thought must be genuinely objec-
tive, else we have on our hands a dualism which cannot be transcended.
And thought being really objective, logic is inevitably metaphysic.
This leads us in conclusion to remark, in anticipation of a discus-
sion that will follow in the next chapter, that doubtless Hegel would
hardly find free from difficulties the epistemology of those who are in-
clined to criticize him for making logic and metaphysics coincident. He
might ask concerning the logical consequences of their position; and
more than likely he would intimate that the inevitable answer is the
Ding-an-sich of the Kantian philosophy. For what reality is it that lies
beyond thought, but a reality that is unknowable in terms of thought?
And how can that reality which is unknowable in terms of thought be
known at all? And what significance can be attached to an unknowable
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would urge that knowledge, which is incapable of expressing the nature
of the ultimately real, is impotent. “Only in so far as reflection has
reference to the Absolute is it Reason, and its activity that of real knowl-
edge.”163 He would furthermore insist that what exists apart from knowl-
edge is an abstraction. “The object as it is without thought and the No-
tion is a mere idea, a name: the forms of thought and the Notion make of
it what it is.”164 To such strictures it would seem that the critics could
reply only by admitting that the real does somehow fall within the sys-
tem of knowledge; for, ultimately, there can be no bits or nuclei of real-
ity that remain opaque to thought. As Professor Bosanquet has remarked:
“If the object-matter of reality lay genuinely outside the system of thought,
not only our analysis, but thought itself, would be unable to lay hold of
reality.”165 And such an empty conception of thought and such a hope-
less conception of reality would combine to land us in a rather barren
and forlorn subjectivism.
The conclusions of our discussion are as follows. Hegel does argue
that logic and metaphysic coincide. But the coincidence is not an ab-
stract identity. Against such a conclusion the lesson of the Phenomenol-
ogy warns us. The coincidence between the two consists in the fact that
the thought, which is the subject matter of logic, is the principle of orga-
nization of reality itself; logic, thus, is necessarily a science of reality.
The attempted transition from the Logic to the other parts of the
Encyclopaedia must be explained as the result of Hegel’s anxiety to
keep his system intact. It cannot be construed as an attempt on Hegel’s
part to deduce factual existence from one aspect of conscious experi-
ence; for such an attempt would have contradicted the doctrine which
Hegel most persistently presupposes, the doctrine, namely, that thought
is concrete, not abstract.Part II.
Chapter IV.
Reality as Individual.
In the preceding chapters of this study we have been concerned exclu-
sively with Hegel’s doctrine of the nature of thought. We have learned
that, according to his doctrine, thought is co-extensive with experience
and consequently with reality itself: it has no datum opposed to and
independent of it.166 Thus an investigation of the nature of thought was
necessary before we could arrive at a just appreciation of Hegel’s teach-
ing concerning the nature of the ultimately real. Having now completed
this investigation and having learned what Hegel has to say concerning
the thought-process, we turn to the other aspect of our general problem
and inquire about the details of Hegel’s doctrine of reality.
As we have already seen, Hegel insists that reality is the result of a
process of mediation; it is not a first principle, but a last result. This is
a contention upon which Hegel is constantly insisting. “If knowledge is
to grasp the truth,” he tells us, “it must not remain at the standpoint of
the immediately given and its determinations. On the contrary, it must
penetrate this immediate being, assuming that behind it there is some-
thing other than itself, which hidden somewhat constitutes its truth.”167
“Every immediate unity is only abstract potential truth, not real truth.”168
“Concerning the Absolute, it is to be said that it is first as a result what
it is in truth.”169 The real is not to be found in sense-perception: it is
only the result of the process of thought.170 This emphasis of the medi-
ated aspect of reality is one of the fundamental doctrines of the Hegelian
philosophy, and the author never tires of reminding us of it.171 The ulti-
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a coin from the mint. On the contrary, the real must be defined, and its
definition comes only with developing experience and the growth of
knowledge. It is only the labors of thought that can lead us to the land of
reality.
This being true, it follows at once that the form of universality is, as
Hegel views the matter, an essential aspect of the real. For, on this hy-
pothesis, reality lies exclusively within the domain of thought; and think-
ing ipso facto necessitates the form of universality.172 This implication
of his system Hegel does not overlook. In the Naturphilosophie, for
example, he urges that the universal aspect of objects is not to be con-
sidered as something foreign to them, a form which belongs to them
only when they happen to be thought about; rather, the universal is ab-
solutely essential to their reality, it is the noumenon, as it were, behind
the transitory and fleeting phenomenon.173
Reason, he tells us elsewhere, “is the certitude that its determina-
tions are just as much objective, e.g., determinations of the essence of
things, as they are subjective thoughts.”174 Again, in opposition to the
atomistic view of Locke and the empiricists to the effect that the univer-
sal does not in reality belong to objects, Hegel asserts: “To say . . . that
the universal is not the essential reality of nature . . . is tantamount to
saying that we do not know real existence.”175 And an unknowable real-
ity is, for Hegel, a contradiction in terms. Reality, then, does assume the
form of universality; this is essential to its very being.
From this we may pass at once to the conclusion that the real, as
Hegel conceives of it, cannot be the abstract particular. After what has
just been said it is hardly necessary to argue this point further. Hegel
would unhesitatingly assert that the particular, qua particular, is never
found in experience at all. This is exactly what his doctrines of the
inseparability of immediacy and mediation amounts to. The immediacy
of reality is a mediated immediacy; and since the mediating process is
that of thought which can advance only by means of universals, the
immediacy of the real must transcend bare particularity. In a word, we
may put the matter so: if knowledge is coextensive with experience, then
the possibility that a mere particular may appear within experience is
eliminated; whatever appears in knowledge must be more than a mere
particular, for the universals of thought can lay hold only of that which
somehow itself is universal. The abstract particular plays no part in
reality. Against the idea that particularity is a form adequate to the real
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too much to say that those objections are rather obvious. In the first
place, the particular seems to be absolutely nothing so far as experience
is concerned. In order that it may be a part of experience it must, as
Kant has shown us in his famous Transcendental Deduction of the cat-
egories, become universalized, must lose its abstract particularity. For
the particular which is to be experienced must remain identical with
itself through a period of time; and self-identity is universality. So the
abstract particular has no part to play in experience, is impossible, in-
deed, within experience. But, in the second place, if we should grant the
possibility of the abstract particular within experience, we should find
ourselves in the midst of some puzzling problems. And not the least
confusing is the question, What is an unrelated particular? Absolutely
nothing can be said about it, because anything can be defined only in
terms of its relations and a particular has no relations. Indeed, an ab-
stract particular is simply an indefinable absolute. Hegel puts the diffi-
culty thus: “The form of immediacy invests the particular with the char-
acter of independent or self-centered being. But such predicates contra-
dict the very essence of the particular, — which is to be referred to
something else outside. They thus invest the finite with the character of
an absolute.”176 And of course it is not easy to see how experience could
possibly be composed of a number of unrelated absolutes. But it seems
useless to stress this point further. It is plain, as Professor Pringle-Pattison
has urged, that the mere particular finds a place to exist nowhere out-
side a logic which is not wholly clear about its own procedure.177
But, granting that Hegel is not guilty of hypostatizing the abstract
particular, what are we to say about his assertions concerning the uni-
versal? Are we so sure that he does not go to the other extreme and urge
that experience consists in blank universality? Have we not seen that he
maintains that to think the world is to cast it in the form of the universal,
and is it not true that he reduces experience to terms of thought? Is he
not always insisting that the universal, the Notion, is the very quintes-
sence of the object?
It is true, as we have all along seen, that Hegel has been generally
accused of reducing the real to the form of abstract universality. This is
the view of Haym, of Trendelenburg, of Lotze, indeed of all the critics
of the Hegelian philosophy in general Even the sympathetic critics of
the system are all practically agreed in making the same assumption. It
is the very nerve of Professor Pringle-Pattison’s criticism, which we
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of the criticisms of Professor Baillie and Mr. McTaggart, which we
shall presently consider. Is Hegel really guilty of this accusation that
has been brought against him by so many students of his philosophy, or
is he not? If he is, then there can be no question that his system is as far
from concrete experience as any system well can be. If he is not, then
with the assumption fall the criticisms based upon it.
Our answer to the question is already determined, and our reasons
for it already set forth. The answer must be an unequivocal and em-
phatic negative, its justification being found in the entire first part of
this study. There it was the aim to let Hegel speak for himself; and if we
are to believe what he has said, then we are forced to admit at least that
it was not his intention to champion the position that reality is simply an
aggregate of blank universals, a ‘ballet of bloodless categories.’ He does
grant that thought is conterminous with experience, and, consequently,
with reality itself; the real for him exists only in the form of the Notion.
About this there need be no dispute. Again, he as frankly admits that
this position forces him to assume the further position that reality can be
found only in universality; for “thinking means the bringing of some-
thing into the form of universality.”178 Upon this all may agree. But the
all-important point here, the point upon which there is difference of
opinion, is the determination of Hegel’s doctrine of universality. This is
really the bone of contention. What does Hegel mean by the form of
universality which reality assumes? Does he mean by the universal of
the Notion merely formal universality? If we dare maintain our position
against the cloud of witnesses on the other side, we must hold that by his
doctrine of the universality of the Notion Hegel means, not abstract
generality, but concrete universality. This was the central thesis of our
discussion of Hegel’s doctrine of the nature of thought, which we saw
Hegel define, not as mere cognition, but as the very life of mind itself. In
this Hegelian thought are included all the categories of the mind, from
the barest, most empty sensation which only points dimly to the factual
existence of an objective world, to the fullest, most concrete expression
of the essential constitution of the world. As Hegel conceives the matter,
experience is not reduced to the bare universals of cognition: cognition
is only one aspect of the mental life, which includes within itself the
categories of feeling and volition as well. To accuse him of reducing
reality to blank universality, therefore, is to misapprehend what he means
by the form of the Notion.179
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the conclusion here advanced. These two professedly close and sympa-
thetic students of Hegel maintain that he conceives reality to be nothing
more than a process of discursive knowledge, that he reduces experi-
ence to blank universality. An examination in some detail of the grounds
upon which these critics base their opinions will perhaps serve to clear
up the problem before us.
The Phenomenology of Spirit forms the point of departure for Pro-
fessor Baillie’s criticism. According to the critic, Hegel arrives at his
fundamental position in the following manner: “All experience involves
the relation of subject to object, and all Experience is fundamentally the
life of mind; it finds its meaning and explanation in self-consciousness.
Now in the Phenomenology it was further shown that self-conscious-
ness finds its most perfect expression in Absolute Science. In other words,
that while all Experience is the realization of self-consciousness, Sci-
ence is its truest form: it is ‘the crown of the life of mind.’ Therefore . .
. the immediacy of Experience is the immediacy of Science; the media-
tion constituting and constructing Experience is the mediation of Sci-
ence. What is immediate to life in indissoluble union with environment
(in the widest sense of the term) is the same as what is ‘given’ or ‘imme-
diate’ in Knowledge. In other words, Reality in its essence is a process
of Knowledge.” In the paragraph immediately following this statement
of Hegel’s supposed procedure, the critic continues: “Now it is safe to
say that such an identification is absolutely groundless. To assert that
the whole teeming life of the world, with its boundless activity, its inex-
haustible wealth of content, is for knowledge literally ‘giver’ in its en-
tirety, and only exists as so ‘given’ — this is surely the mere perversion
of Experience in the interests of a speculative preconception.”180 Later
he gives the following as the gist of his objection: “The process of sci-
ence must not for a moment be taken to be equivalent to the fullness of
the life of Experience itself.”181
The central part of this accusation, we notice, is that Hegel identi-
fies the immediacy of experience, that immediacy which is the real, with
the immediacy of science. He is made to maintain that the richness of
reality, “the whole teeming life of the world, with its boundless activity
its inexhaustible wealth of content,” may legitimately be forced into the
abstract framework of scientific formulae. The wealth of the factual
world and the glory of it, he is supposed to have transformed into the
poverty of general principles and universal laws. Under his hands, it is
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the skeleton is left us; and such a skeleton, we are asked to believe Hegel
would have us accept for the pulsing life of concrete experience.
Now I venture to think that Hegel cannot fairly be accused of any
such absurd contention. He must have known, as well as everybody else
knows, that there is more to reality than mere thoughts about it. And he
did. This is quite evident from the emphasis that he places from time to
time upon the factual aspect of experience. Over and over again he urges
that thought is true only in so far as it sinks itself in the facts, which
certainly are more than the thoughts about them. With the reader’s per-
mission I shall quote some other passages bearing on this point, in order
to show that Hegel not only is not afraid of, but insists upon, the ‘logic
of the fact.’182 In the sixth section of the Introduction to the smaller
Logic we read: “The actuality of the rational stands opposed by the
popular fancy that Ideas and ideals are nothing but chimeras, and phi-
losophy a mere system of such phantasms. It is also opposed by the very
different fancy that Ideas and ideals are something far too excellent to
have actuality, or something too impotent to procure it for themselves.
This divorce between idea and reality is especially dear to the analytic
understanding which looks upon its own abstractions, dreams though
they are, as something true and real, and prides itself on the imperative
‘ought,’ which it takes especial pleasure in prescribing even on the field
of politics.... The object of philosophy is the Idea: and the Idea is not so
impotent as merely to have a right or obligation to exist without actually
existing.” In the twenty-fourth section we read: “If thought tries to form
a notion of things, this notion (as well as its proximate phases the judg-
ment and syllogism) cannot be composed of articles and relations which
are alien and irrelevant to the things.” And in the second lecture note:
“When we think, we renounce our selfish and particular being, sink
ourselves in the thing, allow thought to follow its own course, and, if we
add anything of our own, we think ill.” If these passages (and others of
similar import) do not mean that thought and the science of thought
have to do with factual existence, then I fail to see what they do mean.
Thought always has an objective reference, they tell us, apart from which
thought is nothing more than an abstraction; if the object is neglected, if
the thing is left out of account. thought is useless. Indeed, if the object is
neglected, thought is nothing; for it is just the expression of the essence
of the object. This would seem to be Hegel’s meaning in these passages,
and it certainly is in harmony with the spirit of his system.
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is based upon a complete misinterpretation of Hegel’s actual procedure.
In the preface to the Phenomenology Hegel does, indeed, identify the
‘element of science’ with the standpoint of absolute knowledge; and this
category, as we saw in the first chapter of this study, is the truth of
experience. Thus it is true, in a sense, that the ‘element of science’ is the
truth of experience. But — this is the vital point — Hegel does not mean
by science here what Professor Baillie seems to think he means by it,
namely, a system of abstract and general laws. On the contrary, he means
by it just that concrete point of view of the category of absolute knowl-
edge, whose nature and whose necessity as a presupposition of all expe-
rience it was the province of the Phenomenology to work out and elabo-
rate. Therefore, when Hegel maintains that we arrive at the truth of
experience only when we enter the realm of science and that in this
realm we seize reality in its essence, he certainly does not argue that
reality is nothing more than scientific laws and universal principles, nor
does he assume that the content of abstract science is ‘equivalent to the
fullness of life itself.’ Such abstract principles, he would say, have their
part to playin experience; but their part, though unquestionably impor-
tant and extremely significant for any theory of ultimate reality, is not to
assume the role of absolute and exhaustive formulae or principles. That
science which is exhaustive of reality is only ‘absolute science’; it is on
the plane not of the Understanding, but of Reason, where all ‘finite’
categories are viewed in their true light and where mere generality is
seen to be what it really is — a blank abstraction.
Hegel’s real position or. this point may perhaps be set forth by the
following considerations. The only immediacy which he would think of
equating with reality is the immediacy of what he calls ‘absolute sci-
ence.’ Now what is this immediacy? The immediacy of ‘absolute sci-
ence’ is completely mediated immediacy, or thoroughly rationalized ex-
perience. There are various forms of immediacy, such as that of com-
mon sense, of science, of religion, of philosophy, each of which, accord-
ing to Hegel, has a degree of reality attaching to it proportional to the
exhaustiveness of the mediation which it involves; the immediacy of
‘absolute science’ is the highest of these forms of immediacy, and is
absolutely concrete because it involves absolutely exhaustive media-
tion. Furthermore, each more exhaustively mediated form of immediacy
does not simply negate the lower; it negates and affirms it, and affirms
by negating. This, as we have seen, is the unique aspect of Hegel’s
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mediacy, therefore, are not opposed to, and more or less independent of
each other; on the contrary, each is involved in all and all in each. And
from this it follows that the immediacy of ‘absolute science,’ which is
the only completely mediated immediacy, ipso facto includes within it-
self all the other forms of immediacy; the truth of all finds its expression
in this form of immediacy. Thus that immediacy with which Hegel iden-
tifies reality is an immediacy which includes within itself the entire realm
of experience, in its most trivial as well as in its most momentous and
sublime reaches. For such is the immediacy of ‘absolute science.’183
So much for Professor Baillie’s misinterpretation of Hegel. I think
we have shown that his criticism is beside the mark, and that is all we
are concerned to do at present. The criticism itself implies a position the
tenability of which we shall have to call in question later on in this
chapter. We turn now to a consideration of Mr. McTaggart’s objection.
Mr. McTaggart’s criticism, though essentially the same as that of
Professor Baillie, is presented from a different point of view and so
demands separate notice. The conclusion of the Philosophy of Mind is
made the basis for this attack. There, it is asserted, Hegel explicitly
maintains that philosophy is the highest expression of Spirit, and thus is
guilty of equating reality with philosophical knowledge. But, the critic
objects, the position that in philosophy one finds the complete exposi-
tion of ultimate reality is untenable. “Philosophy itself is knowledge, it
is neither action nor feeling. And there seems nothing in Hegel’s account
of it to induce us to change the meaning of the word in this respect.... We
are thus, it would seem, bound down to the view that Hegel considered
the supreme nature of Spirit to be expressed as knowledge, and as knowl-
edge only.”184 “But knowledge,” we are further informed, “does not
exhaust the nature of Spirit. The simplest introspection will show us
that, besides knowledge, we have also volition, and the feeling of plea-
sure and pain. These are prima facie different from knowledge, and it
does not seem possible that they should ever be reduced to it.”185 There-
fore, the critic concludes, in the final standpoint of the Encyclopaedia
Hegel tried “to ignore volition, and to ignore pleasure and pain.” And,
of course, “a view of Spirit which does this is fatally one-sided.”186
The assumption involved in this criticism is quite evident. It is that
Philosophy, as Hegel defines it, has to do with purely discursive knowl-
edge, that is, with cognition as opposed to feeling and volition, and with
this alone. As the critic himself puts it:
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there seems nothing in Hegel’s account of it to induce us to change the
meaning of the word in this respect.” Now it is just this assertion that I
challenge. In the first place, as I have already argued in the somewhat
detailed discussion of Hegel’s doctrine of immediacy and mediation, the
account which Hegel gives us of philosophical knowledge not only ‘in-
duces’ us, but forces us, to define philosophy as a science of more than
mere cognition. In point of fact, philosophy, as Hegel uses the term, is
the science of experience, since it has to do with that life of mind, rea-
son, which is nothing more nor less than experience itself. In the second
place, the assumption here is the same as the assumption above, and all
we have said in answer to the latter applies equally well to the former.
The realm of philosophy Hegel identifies with the realm of ‘absolute
science’; and it must never be forgotten that the standpoint of ‘absolute
science’ is to be found in the category of absolute knowledge. Philo-
sophical knowledge, therefore, always means more than mere abstract
cognition: it is an immediacy which includes within itself the whole life
of Spirit.
Mr. McTaggart is willing to admit that the conclusion which he sees
in the last division of the Philosophy of Mind is palpably inconsistent
with the outcome of the Logic. In the Absolute Idea, he grants, volition
as well as cognition is present. Hence the Absolute Idea “must be an
idea richer and fuller than that of Cognition — richer and fuller by the
content of the idea of volition.... The Absolute Idea then contains within
itself the idea of knowledge as a transcended moment.” Thus “in giving
the abstract framework of absolute reality in the Logic,” Hegel has at
the same time given “a framework for something which, whatever it is,
is more than any form of mere cognition.”187 Now I submit that the
actual result of the Philosophy of Mind is not in the least inconsistent
with this result of the Logic. Hegel always and everywhere maintains
that philosophical knowledge includes within itself feeling, volition, cog-
nition, in short all the action and passion of the human mind; and that,
therefore, philosophy is the science of the real, if the realm of experi-
ence be the real. This position is the presupposition of the entire
Encyclopaedia, and it is just as much involved in the last part as it is in
the first. The proof of this contention has already been given in our
attempt to state Hegel’s doctrine of thought and to determine the posi-
tion of the Logic in the system.
It is suggestive and instructive to notice that, in criticising Hegel’s
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Mr. McTaggart attacks the very contention which he himself immedi-
ately afterwards champions. To see that this is true, one need only com-
pare with Hegel’s thought the critic’s ultimate synthesis of the real. In
stating the characteristics of the form of unity which he thinks would be
an adequate expression of reality, Mr. McTaggart says: “It must be
some state of conscious spirit in which the opposition of cognition and
volition is overcome — in which we neither judge our ideas by the world,
nor the world by our ideas, but are aware that inner and outer are in
such close and necessary harmony that even the thought of possible
discord has become impossible. In its unity not only cognition and voli-
tion, but feeling also, must be blended and united. In some way or other
it must have overcome the rift in discursive knowledge, and the immedi-
ate must for it be no longer the alien. It must be as direct as art, as
certain and universal as philosophy.”188 It matters not that these lines
are supposed by their author to express an idea essentially different
from what Hegel means by thought; one could not want a better sum-
mary of Hegel’s doctrine. Must feeling, volition, and cognition all be
blended in the expression of ultimate reality? This, Hegel says, is ac-
complished in that state of conscious spirit which he calls thought: “It is
present in every sensation, in cognition and knowledge, in the instincts,
and in volition in so far as these are attributes of the human mind.”189
For “in the human being there is only one reason in feeling, volition, and
thought or cognition.190 Must the rift in discursive knowledge have been
removed in this unity? This, Hegel tells us, is the characteristic peculiar
to philosophical knowledge: the sciences “are finite because their mode
of thought, as a merely formal act, derives its content from without.
Their content therefore is not known as moulded from within through
the thoughts which lie at the ground of it, and form and content do not
thoroughly interpenetrate each other. This partition disappears in phi-
losophy, and thus justifies its title of infinite knowledge.”191 Must the
immediate be no longer alien for the expression of the ultimately real?
Our demand, Hegel assures us, is satisfied in Spirit: “As Adam said to
Eve, ‘Thou art flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone,’so says the Spirit,
‘This object is spirit of my spirit, and all alienation has disappeared.’”192
Should that form of expression which exhausts the real be as direct as
art and as universal as philosophy? Such a combination Hegel thinks he
has found in philosophy itself: “The multifarious whole is reflected in it
as in a single focus, in the Notion which knows itself.”193 In short, philo-
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ments which Mr. McTaggart sees fit to make of the medium through
which reality may receive adequate expression. And it does seem rather
hard that an author should be criticized for upholding exactly the same
position (barring terminology) as his critic champions.
Further detailed discussion of this point seems superfluous. Enough
has already been said to show us not only that we are justified in con-
cluding, but that we are forced to conclude, that Hegel does not equate
reality with any process of formal knowledge. Such a position would be
contrary to his own frequent explicit assertions, as well as to the pre-
suppositions and actual procedure of his system. For his fundamental
contention, both by word and deed, is that thought is the unifying prin-
ciple of experience which includes within its diamond net the entire sphere
of the activities and interests of the human soul. It subsumes within
itself sensuous experience, moral and religious experience, scientific
experience, all experience of which man is capable; it is the all-pervad-
ing harmonizer that illumines every phase of experience and makes it
what it is. Only such thought as this, that is to say, experience, is what
Hegel claims to be an adequate expression of the ultimately real. And
with this we leave these misunderstandings and pass on to ask what
form reality does actually assume in Hegel’s system.
There occurs a passage in Professor Bosanquet’s Logic which runs
as follows: “It is important that we should dismiss the notion that the
higher degrees of knowledge are necessarily and in the nature of intelli-
gence framed out of abstractions that omit whatever has interest and
peculiarity in the real world. Nothing has been more fatal to the truth
and vitality of ideas than this prejudice.”194 It is certain that no preju-
dice has been more fatal to an appreciation of Hegel’s philosophy, and
that, too, notwithstanding the fact that the author has constantly warned
against the danger. And it would seem that the time has come when such
a prejudice should be laid aside and an unbiased effort made to see
exactly what Hegel has taught concerning the universal aspect which he
thinks every unitary experience must have. Is there any other concep-
tion of universality possible than that which sets it down to mere ab-
straction? If there is, may it not be such a universality as will offer us a
consistent explanation of experience and a satisfactory account of the
ultimately real? May it not also be just the conception of universality
that Hegel has in mind when he speaks of the ‘Notion,’ with which he
equates reality and which he ever and anon assures us “is not a mere
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An honest look at experience forces us, it would seem, to assert that
the real universal of actual thought is not that of formal logic. It is a
notorious fact that we contradict the rules of the time-honored syllogism
in our every-day thinking. Every developing science is an enigma to the
formal principles of distributed middle and negative premises; and many
of the simplest arguments of common sense cannot be forced into the
syllogistic form. We are not surprised, therefore, that man, qua man,
exists nowhere outside the texts on formal logic: not man has being in
the real world, but only men. Professors Bradley and Bosanquet, fol-
lowing the lead of Hegel, have so clearly and exhaustively exposed these
discrepancies in the procedure and presupposition of formal logic that it
would be superfluous, if not presumptuous, for me to attempt to enlarge
on them here.
It is sufficient for our present purpose simply to point out that the
fundamental difficulty with the traditional logic is that it deals with an
abstraction. It separates from each other two essentially inseparable
aspects of experience, namely, form and content, and then concerns it-
self with one, namely, form, in isolation. There should be no wonder
that its results are not applicable to concrete experience; the wonder
perhaps is that, when so applied, they do not land us in more numerous
antinomies. Of course, there is no such thing as thinking in the abstract,
as if thought were indifferent to its object; and the universals that result
from such an imaginary process can be nothing more than mere make-
believes. These universals of formal logic, as such, can have no part in
reality.196
What, then, we ask, is the nature of the universal of concrete thought?
I know of no better or clearer definition than that given by Professor
Bosanquet in the introductory chapter to his Logic.197 He there warns
us to beware of thinking of the universals as the result of the process of
selective omission of differences among phenomena; this is the error
which proves so fatal to the significance of formal logic. The true uni-
versal, the universal that actually has a place in concrete experience, is
rather the result of a synthesis of differences, the constructive analysis
of phenomena. That is to say, progression towards true universality is
simply the continuous organization and systematization of the data of
experience. So far from it being true that thought takes place in vacuity
apart from any content, thinking is nothing but the progressive organi-
zation of its content; apart from its content thought is absolutely noth-
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realized only when it is viewed in its essential relation to its correlative;
and when it is so viewed it is seen to include the content within itself.
The true universal, therefore, is thought-content. It does not have to
wait for its filling from without, for it has within it its own filling, and
lives only by virtue of the vital significance that it possesses in reference
to its content. In a word, the universal of thought is concrete, a synthesis
of particulars. It has no meaning whatever, not even the semblance of
one, in isolation from the material aspect of experience of which it is the
form.198
This change of attitude towards the syllogistic logic of the Scholas-
tics and this doctrine of the concrete universal are really the fundaments
of Hegel’s system. After the first Part of the present study this statement
hardly needs further proof. It is true that the change in view-point was
more or less unconsciously present in the epistemology of Kant and
Jacobi, as Hegel himself points out.199 But the change comes to full
consciousness of itself only in Hegel’s own work. He openly revolts
against the traditional tendency to regard the concept, judgment, and
syllogism, as if they were sharply differentiated forms of abstract thought
and not living manifestations of truth.200 Naturally this change of view
concerning the nature of thought brought with it a change of view con-
cerning the result of thought. Since thought is no longer regarded as a
process in abstraction, the universal of thought can no longer be thought
of as the result of abstraction. If thought is the vital unity of the mind,
the true universal of thought is simply the content of mind thoroughly
rationalized and exhaustively explained. If thought is the Notion, the
universal of thought is the universal of the Notion. And “the universal
of the Notion is not a mere sum of features common to several things,
confronted by a particular which enjoys an existence of its own. It is, on
the contrary, self-particularizing or self-specifying, and with undimmed
clearness finds itself at home in its antithesis.”201 That this doctrine of
thought and universality is peculiarly Hegel’s own, there seems to be no
doubt: the doctrine is the burden of his philosophy.
From these considerations we may pass at once to the conclusion
that for Hegel the ultimately real must assume the form of concrete
individuality. Neither the mere particular nor the blank universal will
suffice; the real must be the particularized universal, the universalized
particular. “Actuality is always the unity of universality and particular-
ity,” as Hegel himself puts it.202 “Everything is a Notion, the existence
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universal nature of the Notion gives itself external reality by means of
particularity, and thereby, and as a negative reflection-into-self, makes
itself an individual.”203 The following hypothetical argument seems to
sum up the matter: If it be true that thought is conterminous with expe-
rience, then certainly experience must somehow assume the form of
universality; discrete particulars are excluded from it. If, in the second
place, it be true that thought is simply the “indigenous becoming
(einheimische Werden) of the concrete content,”204 then its universality
must be concrete, that is to say, the particulars must find their place
within the sphere of the universal, which, itself, gets its meaning only by
virtue of this relation to the particulars. Therefore the form of universal-
ity which experience takes (and it must take some form of universality)
can be only that of the particularized universal, or, in a word, that of the
individual. Now the chief purpose of this study has been to show that
Hegel asserts the premises of this argument. It must be shown that this
is erroneous before one may legitimately claim that Hegel equates real-
ity either with the bare particular or with the abstract universal, or deny
that he gives to the real the form of individuality.
That this is the correct account of Hegel’s view of reality may be
shown in another way. The argument that is to be found in the Logic,
under the head of the Notion, is in direct confirmation of the conclusion
we have just reached. So we turn to this argument for further evidence
on the point.205
For our present purpose it will be sufficient to state the argument
merely in its general outline. The triadic movement Hegel expresses
under the following heads: (a) The Subjective Notion; (b) The Object;
and (c) The Idea. The development here involved may be put in the
following general manner. At the standpoint of the Subjective Notion
we have presented to us the Notion as indeterminate and formal, the
truth is given only implicitly.206 In a sense, this may be said to be the
point of view of formal logic, from which thought is looked upon as a
sort of subjective process whose end is the formation of concepts and
the manipulation of those concepts in the higher mental processes of the
judgment and the syllogism. But, as Hegel goes on to show, it is impos-
sible to rest at this point of view. It has inherent in it its own deficiency,
in that it is an inadequate expression of the real nature of the Notion.
Thought cannot be confined to subjectivity; it is objective as well. Thus
we are led on to the consideration of the Object — the second stage of
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tion, and the transition is accomplished through the syllogism of neces-
sity, that is, the disjunctive syllogism.207 But objectivity, like subjectiv-
ity, is not an adequate expression of the Notion; the Notion is neither
merely subjective nor merely objective. The content, apart from the form,
just as the form apart from the content, is an abstraction; the true view
of the matter is reached only when we see that the two are one and
inseparable. This unity of the two is the Idea, which is truth complete —
the ultimately real.
It should be observed that this whole development is nothing more
than the progressive definition of the nature of the Notion itself. As we
shall see more fully below, the thesis is simply the expression of the
form that the Notion, because of its very nature as form, assumes. The
antithesis is the ‘realization’ of the Notion; that is to say, when the No-
tion has exhaustively differentiated itself in the judgment of necessity,
the disjunctive judgment, it is seen to involve the object. The synthesis,
finally, as Hegel himself observes, is nothing but the Notion taken in its
particularity and universality. “Its ‘ideal’ content is nothing but the Notion
in its detailed terms: its ‘real’ content is only the exhibition which the
real gives itself in the form of external existence.”208 In a word, the Idea
for Hegel is simply the Notion taken in its complete nature, as, on the
one hand, a substantial somewhat, and, on the other hand, a meaning.
Since, now, the Idea is the form which ultimate reality assumes in
Hegel’s system, it follows that the real is in the form of the Notion. This
conclusion is in exact agreement with what we have been insisting on all
along in this study, and it might be supported by numerous passages
from various contexts. But this hardly seems necessary: presumably it
will not be disputed that the Hegelian philosophy has to do with the
unity of the Notion. If, then, we can here establish the claim that the
unity of the Notion is that of the individual, our contention above will
have been corroborated from another point of departure.
And it would seem that Hegel has left us in no doubt concerning his
position on this point. In the first division of his discussion of the No-
tion, referred to above, he tells us quite plainly that the ultimate form of
the Subjective Notion is individuality. The three members of the triad in
this division are Universality, Particularity, and Individuality. Individu-
ality is thus made the synthesis of the other two, and consequently must
be considered the highest expression of the Subjective Notion. And there
seems to be no particular difficulty in understanding what Hegel means
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characters of universality and particularity,”209 or determinate univer-
sality (bestimmte Allgemeinheit).210 In contradistinction to indefinite
multiplicity, it is “the particular and the universal in an identity.”211 In a
word, individuality means for Hegel what it means for others, namely,
unity within difference, harmony within diversity, a systematic whole.
The Subjective Notion, therefore, is a whole within which differences
are found and through which those differences get their significance and
reality. This seems to be a legitimate conclusion from the dialectical
movement that takes place within the Notion as Notion.
But just here an objection awaits us. This may all be true of the
Subjective Notion, but is it true of the Idea? Can we legitimately argue
that, because the ultimate expression of the Subjective Notion is indi-
viduality, the ultimate expression of the real must be individuality? Have
we not already seen that the Subjective Notion is the thesis of a triad of
which the Idea is the synthesis, and is it not therefore false reasoning to
say that the form of the Subjective Notion is adequate to the Idea? In a
word, does the fact that Hegel maintains that individuality is the con-
summation of the process of thought justify us in the inference that for
him the real is individual?
We have already answered this objection in what we said above
concerning the fact that the Idea is simply the Notion exhaustively ana-
lyzed. It is true that the Idea is the Notion completely differentiated; but
it is the Notion nevertheless. The dialectical development by means of
which we are led to the Absolute Idea indicates this; for the Absolute
Idea is the synthesis of the triadic development of the doctrine of the
Notion. Indeed, the whole dialectical development of the third part of
the Logic goes to prove that the Idea is the most perfect expression of
the Notion. The Idea and individuality thus coincide. It is true, of course,
that by passing in the Idea the Notion is enriched and intensified by all
the intervening categories; this enrichment is really the significance of
the advance. But this does not at all affect the fact that the form of the
Notion does not change in the process, and that the Idea is simply the
Notion seen in its truest light.
This is perhaps sufficient answer to the objection. But there is in-
volved in it an assumption the error of which it will be worth while to
expose. The assumption is that in the treatment of the Subjective Notion
Hegel is dealing with the formal concept of the logic of the schools. One
or two passages from the smaller Logic bearing on this point will suf-
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that the objects which form the content of our mental ideas come first
and that our subjective agency then supervenes, and by the aforesaid
operation of abstraction, and by colligating the points possessed in com-
mon by the objects, frames notions of them. Rather the Notion is the
genuine first; and things are what they are through the action of the
Notion, immanent in them, and revealing itself in them.”212 “No com-
plaint is oftener made against the Notion than that it is abstract. Of
course it is abstract, if abstract means that the medium in which the
Notion exists is thought in general and not the sensible thing in its em-
pirical concreteness. It is abstract also, because the Notion falls short of
the Idea. To this extent the Subjective Notion is still formal. This how-
ever does not mean that it ought to have or receive another content than
its own. It is itself the absolute form, and so is all specific character, but
as that character is in its truth. Although it be abstract therefore, it is the
concrete, concrete altogether, the subject as such.... What are called
notions, and in fact specific notions, such as man, house, animal, etc.,
are simply denotations and abstract representations. These abstractions
retain out of all the functions of the Notion only that of universality;
they leave particularity and individuality out of account and have no
development in these directions. By so doing they just miss the No-
tion.”213 These passages are found at the very beginning of the discus-
sion of the Subjective Notion. At the end of this discussion we read: “To
say that the Notion is subjective and subjective only, is so far quite
correct: for the Notion certainly is subjectivity itself.... But we may go a
step further. This subjectivity, with its functions of notion, judgment,
and syllogism, is not like a set of empty compartments which has to get
filled from without by separately existing objects. It would be truer to
say that it is subjectivity itself which, as dialectical, breaks through its
own barriers and opens out into objectivity by means of the syllogism.”214
The Subjective Notion, therefore, is not merely subjective; it is not a
bare concept of formal logic that has only a psychological existence in
some knowing consciousness. On the contrary, it is the life of the ob-
jects themselves, and is implicitly that which, when made explicit, be-
comes the Idea.215
If, then, we are right in arguing that the real must conform itself to
the Notion, and if the Notion is, when fully expressed, the individual, it
seems to follow that the real must assume the form of the individual.
And this appears to be Hegel’s position as we find it expressed in the
third part of the Logic. So our conclusion, which we before reached86/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
more or less indirectly, is based directly upon the dialectical develop-
ment of the Logic.
Professor Pringle-Pattison has criticised Hegel for disparaging the
individual, and that criticism must be examined here. It is based upon
the following passage from the smaller Logic: “Sensible existence has
been characterized by the attributes of individuality and mutual exclu-
sion of the members. It is well to remember that these very attributes of
sense are thoughts and general terms. . . . Language is the work of
thought: and hence all that is expressed in language must be univer-
sal.... And what cannot be uttered, feeling or sensation, far from being
the highest truth, is the most unimportant or untrue. If I say ‘the unit,’
‘this unit,’ ‘here,’ ‘now,’ all these are universal terms. Everything and
anything is an individual, a ‘this,’ or if it be sensible, is here and now.
Similarly, when I say ‘I,’ I mean my single self, to the exclusion of all
others; but what I say, viz., ‘I,’ is just every other ‘I,’ which in like
manner excludes all others from itself. .. . All other men have it in com-
mon with me to be ‘I’”216 Commenting on this passage, the critic says:
“This demonstration of the universal, or, to put it perhaps more plainly,
the abstract nature of thought, even in the case of those terms which
seem to lay most immediate hold upon reality, is both true and useful in
its own place. But the legitimate conclusion from it in the present con-
nection is not Hegel’s insinuated disparagement of the individual, but
rather that which Tredelenburg draws from the very same considerations,
that the individual, as such, is incommensurable or unapproachable by
thought.217 Or, as Mr. Bradley puts it still more roundly and trenchantly218
‘The real is inaccessible by way of ideas.... We escape from ideas, and
from mere universals, by a reference to the real which appears in per-
ception.’”
Now it seems to me unfair to charge Hegel here with disparagement
of the individual. In the passage in question he has in mind discrete parts
of experience, unorganized elements of sensuous perception; and it is
these abstract sensations and feelings that he calls ‘unimportant and
untrue.’ He does, indeed, in the same section speak of individuality as
the essential feature of sense-experience; but that he means by this noth-
ing more than that “sensible existence presents a number of mutually
exclusive units,” he himself is at pains to tell us. So it would appear that
the disparagement is of the isolated particular and not of the individual.
According to Hegel, it is not the individual which is the ‘unutterable’;
for the very form of the judgment is the individual, it is essentially ‘aThought and Reality in Hegel’s System/87
universal which is individualized.’219 The isolated, unrelated elements
of abstract sense-perception and conception, these it is to which Hegel
refuses to give any ultimate significance; for such discrete particulars
are essentially unreal. And in this position Hegel differs little from his
critic.220
The real import of the section from which the above quotation is
taken seems to be implied at least in a sentence of the passage which
Professor Pringle-Pattison fails to quote. The sentence runs thus: “It
will be shown in the Logic that thought (and the universal) is not a mere
opposite of sense: it lets nothing escape it, but, outflanking its other, is
at once that other and itself.” By this I understand Hegel to mean that he
is to show in the Logic that thought is involved in sense-perception, that
thought is a principle which, as he tells us in the very last sentence of the
paragraph from which we have quoted, runs through all “sensations,
conceptions, and states of consciousness.” And from this it would fol-
low that even sense-experience is universalized, and to regard this expe-
rience as composed of discreet units is really to regard it abstractly.
That, it would seem, is what Hegel points out in the section under dis-
cussion. It is the unrelated which is unutterable, because the universals
of thought cannot get hold of it to express it. But the unrelated is not the
individual, and one does not see how it could be the real. At all events,
Hegel seems free from the charge of disparaging the individual here,
meaning by the individual the universalized particular. It is just upon
the individual that he is laying the emphasis, as against the doctrine of
discrete particularity.
The doctrine of Hegel’s critics that the individual is unapproach-
able by way of ideas is a position which itself demands examination. In
the first place, it seems to rest upon the doctrine that ideas, or catego-
ries, can be nothing but principles of cognition, that the assertion of the
intelligibility of reality in terms of thought limits us to the mechanical
categories (the categories of the sciences which have to do with factual
existence) in our efforts to interpret reality. Now this doctrine is not
selfevidently true, and should be tested as to its validity. Of course if it
be true, we must admit at once that thought is not an adequate expres-
sion of reality; for we must all agree with Professor Royce that “indi-
viduality . . . is a category indefinable in purely theoretical terms.”221
But is it true? According to Hegel’s doctrine of thought it is not true;
Hegel’s thought includes categories of value as well as those of factual
existence, and so he insists that the individual is expressible in terms of88/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
categories, though not necessarily the categories of pure cognition.
Whether or not Hegel’s doctrine of thought is true to the facts of experi-
ence we have tried to determine in the first Part of our study.
In the second place, this position involves a mistaken epistemologi-
cal principle. Baldly stated, it is that the uniqueness of reality consists in
its transcending knowledge. Mr. Bradley puts the position thus: “It is
not by its quality, as a temporal event or phenomenon of space, that the
given is unique. It is unique, not because it has a certain character, but
because it is given.”222 The question naturally arises whether this state-
ment actually agrees with the facts. One is inclined to dispute that it
does. At any rate, the unique in this sense is certainly not synonymous
with the term as it is commonly used. Let us take one or two examples.
What is a unique invention? Popularly, it is an invention that has prop-
erties and characteristics different from others of its class. But certainly
its uniqueness is not thought of as consisting in the fact that the inven-
tion is inexplicable; if it were inexplicable, it would be simply a mystery
and not anything unique at all. Suppose it were an intricate machine,
which none but the man trained in mechanics could understand. Would
it then be truly unique for anyone save the mechanician? It would seem
that an invention is unique in terms of its peculiar properties and at-
tributes, which must be known and appreciated as such; it is of such a
known nature that it differs from all other creations of mechanical ge-
nius. And the more intelligibly one succeeds in differentiating it from
other such creations, the more clearly defined does its uniqueness be-
come. This same fact may be illustrated by the example of a unique
personality. A person is unique only in so far as he differs from others,
and he differs from others only because of certain positive characteris-
tics that make him different. The assertion, “Ben is a unique character,”
is, I dare say, a rather meaningless jumble of words; naturally, we must
know more about Ben before we can appreciate his uniqueness. But “O
rare Ben Jonson!” is an exclamation of genuine significance. What is
the difference in the two cases? Is it not simply that in the latter our
knowledge has something to attach to itself to, while in the former knowl-
edge can get no foothold? And is it not permissible to argue that the
more one knows of the characteristics of Ben Jonson, the more determi-
nate and impressive grows the uniqueness of his individuality? Doubt-
less, in the minds of his associates and companions in the Mermaid the
eccentricities of his genius were much more marked than they can be to
us, assuming, of course, that the man was more fully known by personalThought and Reality in Hegel’s System/89
contact with him. So it seems that the person, like the invention, is unique
only because he possesses positive characteristics that make him unique;
and apart from such positive characteristics uniqueness is lacking.
Now from the epistemological point of view, what does this amount
to? Simply, I think, to the conclusion that uniqueness, individuality, is to
be measured in terms of knowledge, not of ignorance. Before an object
can be unique, it certainly must be self-identical; and the more com-
pletely self-identical it becomes, the more emphasized does its individu-
ality appear. Now the vaguest self-identity implies reference beyond
self; and apart from this reference to others self-identity is impossible.
But reference beyond self is relation, and relations are categories. Thus
it would seem that the unique not only does not exclude categories, but,
on the contrary, depends upon them for its very existence. It is only
when an object is fully known to be itself, that is, when it is seen to
differ determinately from others of its class, that it may legitimately be
termed unique. Apart from universality individuality is a fiction. Thus
the individual gets its uniqueness by being defined. That is unique which
is seen to be itself, and only that which possesses attributes and qualities
peculiar to itself can be differentiated from others. Of course an object
may be negatively defined, that is, as not something else; but in order
that such a definition have significance, it must give us positive knowl-
edge of what we are negatively defining. For if the object of interest is
not some other object, then the judgment of difference is based upon
positive attributes which make its being the other object impossible;
otherwise, there would be no sense in asserting the difference. In oppo-
sition to Mr. Bradley, therefore, we must argue that the ‘given’ is unique,
not because it is given, but just because it possesses a certain character.
No brute fact is, as such, unique; it is a meaning for us, or it is nothing.
The uniqueness of reality is to be found only in its determinate charac-
ter, not in its indeterminate factual existence.223
A final objection to the position that reality is unapproachable by
thought emerges from the preceding discussion. Is it not logically im-
possible for those who maintain that the real is inaccessible by way of
ideas to assume the position that the real is individual? Are not these
two contentions contradictory? The difficulty will be apparent from the
following considerations. If the real is given us independently of thought
and apart from its activity, then one would think that it must be repre-
sented only in the form of particularity. For, as Professor Bosanquet has
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sense perception could come only as the unrelated particular; for the
essence of sense is isolation. Feeling, uncontaminated by thought, stands
on the same level with the senses in this respect.224 Hegel himself has
pointed out that what I feel is only mine, belongs peculiarly and exclu-
sively to me, and, as mere feeling, must forever remain bound down to
subjectivity, to bare particularity. But it must not be forgotten that the
individual necessarily implies some form of universality. And the ques-
tion at once arises, Whence does it get this form? If the assertion that
has just been made of the senses and the feelings be true, as experience
seems to teach that it is true, then universality cannot be produced by
them; untouched by thought, they give and can give only the particular.
But if the universal character of the individual is the gift of thought,
what justification can there be for the statement that the individual is
unapproachable by thought? The contention seems to ignore the very
process by which the result has come to be. Thus there seems to be a
fundamental difficulty in the position which argues that the real is es-
sentially beyond thought, and yet at the same time insists that the indi-
vidual, and only the individual, is the real.225
This difficulty may be accentuated by a somewhat detailed study of
the inconsistencies that appear in Professor Baillie’s criticism of Hegel
as quoted above. The digression, if it be a digression into which we shall
thus be led, will perhaps throw some light on Hegel’s position by utiliz-
ing his principles in criticism of a position antagonistic to his own.
It is quite easy to see that Professor Baillie’s criticism is vitally
bound up with the assumption that the real immediacy of experience
cannot be mediated, and, consequently, lies beyond thought.226 But it is
not easy to see just what is meant by such an immediacy. Sometimes it
is spoken of as if it were the immediacy of sense-perception: for ex-
ample, we are told that “wherever we have an object present to the
subject, there we have immediacy.” At other times, however, one is led
to believe that the immediacy of reality is the unattainable goal of thought
rather than its given point of departure. “Knowledge is not construction
but reconstruction of Experience.... Experience again, on the other hand,
is the compact and inexhaustible mine of fact to which knowledge ever
recurs, which it seeks to fathom, . . . the reproduction of which in its
immediacy may be said to be its aim.” But in either case, whether the
immediacy of reality be the first given from which thought can be only
a process of abstraction, or the ideal towards which thought is an end-
less and essentially futile process of approximation, the conclusion thatThought and Reality in Hegel’s System/91
forces itself upon us is the same. And that conclusion is that the imme-
diacy of experience, that immediacy which is reality, is of such a nature
that thought is necessarily excluded from it; it is an immediacy with
which the categories of knowledge have absolutely nothing to do. “The
immediate in Experience, that immediate which is reality, is absolutely
continuous with itself and admits of isolation in no sense whatever; the
immediacy is indissoluble, otherwise Experience simply ceases to be.
This single immediacy of Experience we simply cannot have in knowl-
edge; if so knowledge would not be knowledge but Experience.” “The
complete realization of the nature of the Absolute must remain for knowl-
edge even at its best an impossible achievement.”227
Now I venture to submit: (a) that such an immediate experience as
Professor Baillie here identifies with reality is not possible; and (b) that,
if it were possible, it could at most be but subjective and particular. Let
us begin with the first of these contentions.
(a) All that has been said above concerning the impossibility of
construing the uniqueness of the ‘given’ in terms of its merely factual
aspect is applicable here. For what is this immediate experience but
such an indeterminate ‘giver,’ whose individuality consists in the fact
that it is so given? And what is such a unique given but a contradictio in
adjecto? That which is merely given cannot possibly be unique, for it
has no relations in terms of which its uniqueness is to be defined. The
given is not in experience until it is at least recognized as a permanent
somewhat which is itself and not something else; but when it is so rec-
ognized, it is no longer a merely indeterminate given. Experience cer-
tainly involves more than bare abstract fact.
To this may be added the following considerations. The only expe-
rience about which we know anything seems to possess at least a degree
of unity. Life is at any rate livable, society does actually exist, and its
many chaotic aspects cannot blind us to the orderly character of its
being. Not even the simplest act of sense-perception, not to mention the
more complex processes of intellectual and social activity, would be
possible were there no unity within experience. But unity implies a uni-
fying principle, and the unitary whole gets its significance only as it is
construed in the light of this principle. What makes of experience a
unity? Can the organic nature of experience be explained in terms of the
senses, or the feelings, or the will? If in terms of the first, how refute the
Sophists? If in terms of the second, how refute the mystics? If in terms
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unity only by virtue of its principle of rationality; and that if any part of
experience transcends or falls without this principle, it, by that very
fact, ceases to be aus einem Stücke? The very conception of a unified
experience would seem to necessitate the assumption that in its lowest
and vaguest stages, as well as in its highest and sub limest reaches, its
universal principle is active; and what this universal principle is seems
to be a question that hardly admits of debate when once it is clearly put.
Now if such are the implications of experience, it is difficult to see what
meaning can be given to Professor Baillie’s immediate experience from
which every rational category is excluded. In point of fact, it seems to
be too immediate to be experienced and so is essentially meaningless.
Whatever is in experience unquestionably must be experienced; but how
anything can be experienced without somehow being known, that is,
without at least being recognized as itself and so being subjected to a
category, it is not easy to understand. That which by its very nature is
incapable of being represented in consciousness cannot enter into the
realm of possible experience; and to speak of an immediate experience
that cannot be experienced seems to amount to an absurdity. Therefore
it would seem that Professor Baillie’s conception of an immediate expe-
rience, beyond the categories of knowledge, must be given up; it is Noth-
ing more than a mere phantom, a contradiction in terms.228
(b) But, for the sake of the argument, let us grant the possibility of
this experience in which thought can play no part. What is the predica-
ment in which we find ourselves7 Simply, I think, confined within the
realm of abstract particularity. For in what does that experience which
lies beyond thought consist, if not in an unrelated series of meaningless
sense-perceptions, or of incoherent feelings, or of blind volitions? And
what can such a series be but a disconnected array of discrete particu-
lars? It is, of course, difficult to speculate concerning the nature of that
which does not and cannot exist. But concerning this experience with
which we are here attempting to deal, we may be sure of this, that,
whatever else may or may not be true of it, it certainly cannot be objec-
tive and universal in any intelligible sense of those words. The essence
of abstract sense is isolation and particularity, and feeling and volition,
qua abstract feeling and volition, are entirely subjective and can be ex-
perienced by no one under the sun save the subject who psychologically
possesses them. How, then, can these abstractions be called universal,
and how could an experience made up exclusively of them be, in any
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question, candidly faced, would seem to drive us to the conclusion that
an experience that lies beyond the categories of rationality must assume
the form of unrelated particularity. The prejudice, however, will not
easily down. There must be a datum of experience which is just eter-
nally there, and about which nothing more can be said. It forever eludes
our grasp when we attempt to seize it by thinking it; but no sane person
can deny its existence. Is not this datum given entirely independently of
thought’s activity? And yet can it be denied that it comes to us, no mat-
ter how, as a part of our experience? Have we not here, then, an imme-
diate experience which is more than an unrelated particular, and which,
nevertheless, is entirely beyond the categories of thought? Everybody
experiences the given, and yet its immediacy cannot appear in knowl-
edge. How does this very obvious fact square with the above assertions
concerning the inherent absurdity of an immediate experience beyond
thought?
In the first place, attention should be directed here to a question of
fact. One seems forced to point out that, as a matter of fact, there is no
fixed ‘datum’ of experience. The so-called ‘given’ differs for different
individuals and for the same individual at different times. In a very im-
portant sense that which is given depends upon the purposes and intel-
lectual attainments of the one to whom it is given; and no one can doubt
that such a basis is relative and is constantly changing. To the hardpressed
Richard on the battlefield the same horse would have been more of a
reality by far than to the lazy beggar of Mother Goose renown; and the
small boy, bent on mischief, actually sees in the stone at his feet charac-
teristics quite different from what might appear to the eyes of the trained
geologist. Other illustrations of this fact will suggest themselves. Of
course this contention will not be misconstrued to mean that any phan-
tasm that may chance to run through the mind actually does, for that
reason, have a place in existential reality, that the subject creates per-
ceptual experience. I certainly do not wish to minimize the factual as-
pect of experience. The point upon which emphasis is here intended to
be placed is that the ‘giver,’ apart from an experiencing subject, is a
blank abstraction, and that in relation to an experiencing subject it is
more than a mere ‘given.’ The confusion upon which this doctrine of the
‘given’ rests is this: the object side of experience is taken from its con-
text and then opposed to that experience as something standing over
against it and independent of it Berkeley has long since pointed out the
fallacy here. In this discussion it is necessary for us to rid our minds of94/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
this confusion. As Professor Bosanquet sums up the point: “The given
and its extension differ not absolutely but relatively; they are continu-
ous with each other, and the metaphor by which we speak of an exten-
sion conceals from us that the so-called ‘given’ is no less artificial than
that by which it is extended.”229
In the second place, this insistence upon the ‘given’ lands us in
insurmountable difficulties.. However the position is stated, so long as
the immediate experience is too immediate for the categories of thought,
it seems open to the above fatal objection that it must forever remain
particular and subjective. To say that reality is found in a pure indeter-
minate datum, an unaccountable residuum of being, is to open the way
for an influx of problems similar to those produced by Aristotle’s ab-
stract separation of form from matter, or by Kant’s differentiation be-
tween the experienced phenomenon and its reality. It matters not that the
datum is thought of as the material out of which the universals of knowl-
edge are manufactured, or in which thought somehow finds the prob-
lems that determine its activity; the difficulties still remain. How the
universals of thought are manufactured out of that which is confined to
discreet particularity is not easily discovered. Nor can one see at a glance
how that which lies beyond thought can really set a problem for thought.
If our world were such, one is inclined to think with Professor Royce
that it would be “too much of a blind problem for us even to be puzzled
by its meaningless presence.”230 Those who insist upon such an imme-
diate experience should show by what right they appeal to the individual
as the real, and by what reasoning they succeed in transcending abstract
particularity within this experience. For there is certainly a difficulty
here, and one that seems to be sufficiently weighty to cause the position
to be, if not entirely abandoned, at least essentially modified.
But Professor Baillie may possibly object that, so far as he is con-
cerned, all this is beside the mark. He may assert that he has no thought
of equating reality with an unchangeable datum of experience, or with
the abstract particular. His main contention, he may urge, is that reality
cannot be exhausted by thought; thought is about reality, but cannot
exhaust reality. The notions are not the reality of things, “for these are
individual, and a notion, however concrete, is . . . always a notion, i.e.,
a universal.”231 Reality, then, is not a chaotic state of immediacy, as has
been represented in the discussion above; on the contrary, it is a unique
whole which, on account of its very uniqueness, lies beyond the possi-
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thought abstracts, but the goal at which it aims — a goal, however,
essentially beyond it. In a word, the objector may say, not abstract
unrelatedness but an organic unity that is super-rational — such is the
immediacy of that which may be called the real.
This objection, however, does not in the least change the situation. It
makes no difference whether the ‘immediate’ is the indeterminate given of
sense-perception with which thought works, or the unattainable ideal to-
wards which thought strives; from the logical point of view the two posi-
tions are one and the same, and a justifiable criticism of the one holds of the
other also. On this point Professor Baillie stands condemned by his own
words: “If reality is in any sense beyond knowledge it is of no importance
where, in the history of knowledge, the separation is made. To make knowl-
edge bear an essentially asymptotic relation to reality is in principle pre-
cisely the same as to separate knowledge and reality absolutely from the
start. The only difference is that the former puts the separation far away at
infinity  — ’reality cannot be exhausted by thought’; the latter plants it
down at our feet — ’reality is outside knowledge.’ But this is a difference
which is unimportant and meaningless: unimportant, since in both cases
reality is beyond us, and the question of ‘when’ it becomes so does not
concern knowledge: meaningless, since in both cases we can never say
when knowledge actually has failed; the beyond is always a beyond in
either case. The position referred to” (that is, the position expressed by
Lotze, for example, when he asserts that ‘reality is richer than thought’) “is
therefore rooted in dualism, in spite of the apparent concession of the worth
of knowledge up to a certain point. For it must accept the alternative: either
knowledge does give the nature of reality, in which case the question of
amount and the time it takes to exhaust it is of no significance, since the
nature of reality is explicitly known and implicitly cognizable; or there is at
the outset a fundamental cleavage between the two, in which case at no
point does knowledge give reality.”232 And if this be true, we are reduced to
the necessity of acknowledging that the separation between knowledge and
reality, wherever the separation may appear, leads us into the difficulties of
an indeterminate immediacy of experience.
As Hegel views the matter, the way out of these difficulties is exactly
the reverse of the way in. We must define reality not as Substance but as
Subject. That is to say, the real must be conceived of not as an indefinable
somewhat about which nothing more can logically be said than that it just
eternally is but as a thoroughly comprehensible system whose nature is
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categories which are adequate to its nature may be read in terms of sense-
perception, or of blind will, or of pure cognition, or of abstract feeling, still
we must say, if we are not to talk mere nonsense, that the immediacy of the
real is the result of some sort of mediation and is intelligible by means of
certain categories which actually do express its essential nature.233 But
sense-perception, blind will, pure cognition, mere feeling, have no catego-
ries to offer us for the unification of experience: the true universal runs
through them all, and it is the one reason which is the life of experience.
Such is Hegel’s doctrine, and he insists that, if we are in earnest about
transcending the standpoint of the Critical Philosophy, that is, if we are
really in earnest when we deny the existence of a reality beyond the realm of
possible experience, we must admit that no part of experience presents the
enigmatic aspect of a mere abstract datum. For if that which is real is an
indeterminate immediacy, an indefinable somewhat that lies beyond thought,
wherein does it differ from the abstract particular or the thing-in-itself, or
what earthly connection has it with actual concrete experience? Those who
champion the position ought to take it upon themselves to remove the diffi-
culty, and to point out in what respects their solution differs from Hegel’s
own.234
We may conclude this chapter with a brief summary of its main con-
tentions. Hegel equates reality with experience, and not with abstract for-
mal knowledge as Professor Baillie and Mr. McTaggart seem to think.
When he asserts that the immediacy of reality is the immediacy of science,
or that philosophy exhausts the nature of Spirit, he simply means to say
that reality is not an insoluble mystery, but is essentially an ideal construc-
tion. an interpretation and organization of the so-called ‘given.’ The real for
him, therefore, is neither the abstract particular nor the blank universal; it is
the universal filled, the particular made significant, in a word, the indi-
vidual. And the position that the real is individual, as he conceives the
matter, necessarily involves the admission that concrete thought is no less
extensive than the realm of concrete experience. For if any part of experi-
ence lies truly beyond thought, it seems to be devoid of universal character-
istics and so differs in no intelligible sense from the abstract particular; and
it is the validity of this contention that he would ask the upholders of the
‘pure experience’ theory to challenge. That the essential nature of which
cannot be fully expressed in terms of knowledge is an incomprehensible
datum which, by virtue of that fact, never appears in concrete experience.
And experience, organized and rationalized experience, and reality are
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Chapter V.
The of the Absolute.
Hegel’s doctrine of the nature of the Absolute is a problem that is not
easy of solution. The fact that the Hegelians of the Left and of the Right,
while appealing to the authority of the master in justification of their
respective positions, reached antithetical conclusions with reference to
this problem is an indication of its difficulty. But the result that we have
already attained in the preceding chapter offers us a vantage-point in
our discussion of the problem. We have shown that the unity of reality,
according to Hegel, is a unity that includes differences, and that the
differences are essential to the unity. This point will, however, be of
more direct interest to us when we come to ask concerning the relation
of the Absolute and its differentiations. The problem immediately be-
fore us is to determine how this unity must be conceived, what more
specifically the nature of the unity is. The thesis which we shall defend
is that the Hegelian doctrine concerning this unity is that it is spiritual,
and that it exists as a self-conscious Personality.235
The point of departure for our discussion we shall find in the Abso-
lute Idea. If we can determine the essential nature of the Idea, then we
may claim to have set forth Hegel’s doctrine of the nature of the Abso-
lute, since the two terms are practically synonymous in his system.236 If
Hegel has given any direct proof at all that the Absolute is to be thought
of as personal, it must be sought in an investigation of the Idea; and, on
the other hand, if it can be shown that the Idea is a self-conscious Indi-
viduality, it must be admitted that Hegel teaches the doctrine of a per-
sonal Absolute. We ask first, then, Is the category of the Absolute Idea,
as defined for us in the Logic, equivalent to a Personality or self-con-
scious Individuality?
We have already pointed out that Hegel teaches that the Idea is
individual for it assumes the form of the Notion, and the form of the
Notion is individuality. Even a glance at the Logic will indicate this
truth: the Idea is the last category in the dialectical definition of the
Notion. But this, in itself, proves nothing more than that the Idea is a
unity of differences, and that unity and differences are equally essential.
This is a very important result, to be sure; it settles some vexed ques-
tions concerning the Absolute and the finite, as we shall see in the dis-
cussion of the relation of God to the world. But it still leaves unan-
swered the problem of the nature of the unity among the differences.
Does Hegel think of this unity as personal and self-conscious?98/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
The answer to this question is to be found in the triadic development
which Hegel has given in that part of the Doctrine of the Notion called
the Idea. The triad which we find here consists of the categories of Life,
Cognition (perhaps Consciousness would more nearly adequately con-
vey Hegel’s meaning), and the Absolute Idea. The movement, though
considerably hindered by puzzling and bothersome details, is tolerably
clear in its main features; and, fortunately, it is only the main features
with which we are here concerned. Let us follow this development.
We ask first concerning the standpoint of the thesis. Here, under the
category of Life, Hegel tells us that we have the Idea in its immediacy
but in an immediacy which is not true. By this is meant, it would seem,
that in the category of Life we get the first approximately explicit mani-
festation of the real nature of the Idea, but in a manner inadequate to
that nature. The category is approximately adequate to the Idea, be-
cause we have in it the first explicit appearance of a spiritual activity.
Its inadequacy consists in the fact that it presupposes an opposition
between subjective and objective which it never succeeds in overcom-
ing. It is, indeed, true that the dialectical process within this category
consists just in transcending this opposition: in the Kind (Gattung) the
particular living thing loses part of its immediacy and becomes, to a
degree, objective and universal. Nevertheless, its particularity and uni-
versality do not completely coincide. “Implicitly it is the universal or
Kind, and yet immediately it exists as only.”237 And just because of this
contradiction, which is essential to it, the category of Life cannot fur-
nish us with the ultimate synthesis of reality. In such a synthesis we
could have nothing more than blank identity between the particular and
the universal; the particular on this plane is not able to withstand the
universal. “The animal never getssofarin its Kind as to have a teeing of
itsown; it succumbs to the power of Kind.”238 Thus we are forced to
look for the unity of the Idea in a category other than that of Life. And
this brings us to the category which Hegel calls Cognition in general.
Before passing on to the standpoint of this category, it will be well
to pause here, and quote Hegel’s own words bearing on the defect and
the dialectical development of the category of Life as we have just at-
tempted to trace it. “The notion [of Life] and [its] reality do not thor-
oughly correspond to each other. The notion of Life is the soul, and this
notion has the body for its reality. The soul is, as it were, infused into its
corporeity; and in that way it is at first sentient only, and not yet freely
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immediacy with which it is still beset: and this process, which is itself
threefold, results in the idea under the form of judgment, i.e., the idea as
Cognition.”239
In his discussion of the category of Cognition Hegel indulges in
numerous digressions, which serve only to obscure the outlines of the
dialectical advance. But, if we neglect the confusing details, the goal at
which the author is aiming seems pretty clearly to be the category of
self-consciousness. And he reaches it in some such way as the follow-
ing. Leaving behind us the category of Life, as confessedly inadequate
to the unity of the Idea, we turn first to the level of abstract cognition
proper, and examine its claims.240 This category is at once seen to be
insufficient, and that for two reasons. In the first place, it presupposes a
somewhat as given, upon which it impresses itself in a more or less
mechanical fashion; this is the standpoint of the sciences, which busy
themselves with the discovery of laws without being able to pass judg-
ment upon their ontological significance.241 “The assimilation of the
matter, therefore, as a datum, presents itself in the light of a reception of
it into categories which at the same time remain external to it, and which
meet each other in the same style of diversity. Reason is here active, but
it is reason in the shape of the understanding. The truth which such
Cognition can reach will therefore be only finite.”242 The second defect
of abstract Cognition, which is an inevitable result of its abstractness, is
that it fails to do justice to the nature of the knowing mind; mind is
regarded from this point of view too much as an empty vessel to be
filled from without. “The finitude of Cognition lies in the presupposi-
tion of a world already in existence, and in the consequent view of the
knowing subject as a tabula rasa.”243 For these reasons, therefore, we
fail to find in Cognition proper release from the dualism in which the
category of Life left us bound; we do not get here the unity for which we
are seeking. So we turn next to volition. Can Will supply us with a
satisfactory synthesis? At first it seems that it might, since from this
point of view the objective falls together with the subjective; objectivity
is measured in terms of subjective ideals and aims. But this is just the
difficulty with the standpoint. Objectivity is too completely reduced to
subjective terms, and therefore really opposes itself to subjectivity; the
objective never, in point of fact, becomes subjective and the subjective
never really loses itself in objectivity. Thus we are reduced to the eternal
Sollen of Fichte. “While Intelligence merely proposes to take the world
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looks upon the immediate and given present not as solid being, but as
mere semblance without reality. It is here that we meet those contradic-
tions which are so bewildering from the standpoint of abstract morality.
This position in its ‘practical’ bearings is the one taken by the philoso-
phy of Kant, and even by that of Fichte. The Good, say these writers,
has to be realized: we have to work in order to produce it: and Will is
only the Good actualizing itself. If the world then were as it ought to be,
the action of Will would be at an end. The Will itself therefore requires
that its end should not be realized. In these words, a correct expression
is given to the finitude of Will.”244 So once again, we are disappointed
in our search for unity. “This Volition has, on the one hand, the certitude
of the nothingness of the presupposed object; but, on the other, as finite,
it at the same time presupposes the purposed End of the Good to be a
mere subjective idea, and the object to be independent.”245 Volition pre-
supposes a discrepancy between what is and what ought to be, a dis-
crepancy which, from the point of view of abstract volition, cannot be
eliminated; and so our unity is not yet attained.
But a way to that unity has been suggested. If we could secure a
conjunction of what is and what ought to be, if, that is to say, we could
combine the standpoints of Cognition proper and Volition in a higher
synthesis, then it would seem that we should have reached our goal. For
in such a synthesis the subjective would be genuinely objective, and the
objective would not stand over against the subjective as something for-
eign to it but would partake of its very nature. “The reconciliation is
achieved, when Will in its result returns to the pre-supposition made by
Cognition. In other words, it consists in the unity of the theoretical and
practical idea. Will knows the end to be its own, and Intelligence appre-
hends the world as the Notion actual.”246
This synthesis, according to Hegel, is found in the Absolute Idea. It
is here that we get our ultimate unity of the real. It will be well to let
Hegel speak for himself on this very vital point. “The truth of the Good
is laid down as the unity of the theoretical and practical idea in the
doctrine that the Good is radically and really achieved, that the objec-
tive world is in itself and for itself the Idea, just as it at the same time
eternally lays itself down as End, and by action brings about its actual-
ity. This Life which has returned to itself from the bias and finitude of
Cognition, and which by the activity of the Notion has become identical
with it, is the Speculative or Absolute Idea.”247 The following passage
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unity of the theoretical and the practical idea, and thus at the same time
the unity of the idea of Life with the idea of Cognition. In Cognition we
had the Idea in a biased, one-sided shape. The process of Cognition has
issued in the overthrow of this bias and the restoration of that unity,
which as unity, and in its immediacy, is in the first instance the Idea of
Life. The defect of Life lies in its being the Idea only implicit or natural:
whereas Cognition is in an equally one-sided way the merely conscious
Idea, or the Idea for itself. The unity and truth of these two is the Abso-
lute Idea which is both in itself and for itself. Hitherto we have had the
Idea in development through its various grades as our object, but now
the Idea comes to be its own object.”248
The development that we have just traced seems pretty clearly out-
lined and the goal to which it has led us appears to be very well defined.
The category of Life fails as a synthesis of reality, because it is not self-
conscious; the categories of Cognition proper and Volition fail, because
they are only one-sided representations of self-conscious life; the Abso-
lute Idea succeeds, because it transcends the defects of these lower stand-
points. And from this it seems only logical to conclude that the Idea
succeeds because it is the unity of Self-consciousness in its completion.
“This unity is consequently the absolute and all truth, the Idea which
thinks itself — and here at least as a thinking or Logical Idea.”249 One
can see no valid reason why we may not believe that Hegel is in earnest
when he says, as above, that “the Idea comes to be its own object,” and
that “its developed and genuine actuality is to be as a subject and in that
way as mind.”250 On the contrary, the dialectical development- here
seems to force us to the conclusion that the category of the Absolute
Idea is really a Self-consciousness, a knowing and willing Individual,
who ‘comes home’ to Himself from His differentiations in which He
sees Himself mirrored as it were in His eternal essence, a Personality
who exists in and for Himself and realizes His ends in the phenomenal
world. For within the unity of the Idea, Life, Cognition, and Volition are
blended harmoniously together, and the life of knowledge and the life of
activity are one. And Consciousness is the only category that gives us
such a unity.
Mr. McTaggart objects to the conclusion which we have here reached;
he denies that it is the logical outcome of Hegel’s system. He readily
grants that, according to the system, the unity of the Idea must be con-
strued in terms of spirit; and he is ready not only to admit but to main-
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of personality.251 But he contends that we have no right to infer from
these premises to the conclusion that this unity of the Idea is a personal
unity. “It might be said of a College,” he urges, “with as much truth as
it has been said of the Absolute, that it is a unity, that it is a unity of
spirit, and that none of that spirit exists except as personal.”252
This objection, however, seems to rest upon a false notion of the
nature of the unity that is defined in the Idea. Hegel himself has told us,
“The unity of God is always unity, but everything depends upon the
particular nature of this unity; this point being disregarded, that upon
which everything depends is overlooked.”253 Now it seems that Mr.
McTaggart has misconceived the unity of the Idea; and consequently his
criticism of our conclusion which is based upon this misconception is of
no significance. Let us see what can be said in justification of this state-
ment.
In the first place, it is important to notice that Mr. McTaggart thinks
of the Idea as absolutely identical with its differences: the unity, as he
conceives of it, is nothing more than its differentiations, and they are
nothing more than it. For instance, he says: “The individual has his
entire nature in the manifestation of this whole, as the whole, in turn, is
nothing else but its manifestation in individuals.”254 Again he takes for
granted that Hegel “reaches in the category of Life a result from which
he never departs in the subsequent categories — that the unity and plu-
rality are in an absolutely reciprocal relation, so that, while the plurality
is nothing but the differentiation of the unity, the unity is nothing but the
union of the plurality.”255 And with this supposedly Hegelian position is
contrasted at considerable length Lotze’s view, that “the Absolute is to
be taken as something more and deeper than the unity of its differentia-
tions.”256 Thus Mr. McTaggart’s conception of the unity of the Idea is
hardly mistakable; according to him, this unity consists in the relation
of abstract identity between the Idea and its differentiations.
A criticism of the tenability of this doctrine of identity will be un-
dertaken later on in this chapter. Our present purpose is to show that it
is not, as Mr. McTaggart assumes it is, Hegel’s account of the unity of
the Idea. But it will not be amiss, perhaps, to pause here for a moment to
point out one or two difficulties involved in this interpretation of the
critic. In the first place, if the unity and the differences of the Idea are in
exact equilibrium, it is not quite evident that any room is left anywhere
for that ‘simple and indivisible element’ which Mr. McTaggart makes
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which he bases his argument for their immortality.257 On this hypothesis
it would appear that the finite individual finds himself as sorely pressed
as does the Absolute; for the personality of the former is in just as pre-
carious a predicament as is that of the latter.258 In the second place, it is
difficult to see where such a unity as Mr. McTaggart insists upon be-
comes actual; there certainly is room to question whether it is ever actu-
alized. If its actualization is possible, it would have to be in a state of
society which yet lies in the far distant future; certainly society has not
yet attained unto it. So it would appear to be a unity that ought to be but
is not — a conception so vigorously criticized by Hegel. In the third
place and finally, the problem of the contingent, which on any idealistic
theory short of pessimism is a puzzling one, becomes doubly so on Mr.
McTaggart’s hypothesis. He seems logically bound to assert either that
the finite is perfect, or that the imperfections of the finite, qua imperfec-
tions, belong to the essential nature of the Absolute; for the Absolute, it
is to be remembered, is its differentiations.259 To sum up the whole
matter, Mr. McTaggart seems to be between the Scylla of a fictitious
unity and the Charybdis of differences that defy conjunction. His uni-
versal is one which, after it has succeeded in unifying the universe, itself
finds nowhere to lay its head; and his particulars tend either to vanish
entirely into the universal, or — this is the more imminent danger — to
fly asunder and become discrete entities. And one is inclined to think
that this is exactly the difficulty into which, as Hegel points out, Leibnitz
fell — the difficulty, namely, of resolving the contradiction between an
absolutely self-centered individual and a completely unifying universal
that swamps its differences.260
But to return from this digression, let us ask concerning the justifi-
cation of Mr. McTaggart’s interpretation of Hegel’s meaning. The exact
balance which the critic supposes between the unity of the Idea and its
manifestations is foreign to the author’s conception of the matter. In the
first place, the dialectical movement, which we have above outlined,
bears out this contention. Contrary to Mr. McTaggart’s assertion that in
the category of Life Hegel reaches a result from which he never departs,
namely, an ‘absolutely reciprocal relation’ between the unity and its
plurality, it may be argued that the development from the category of
Life to that of the Absolute Idea consists just in transcending this rela-
tion of identity, and in asserting a unity which exists for itself within its
differences. It would be hard to say in what respect the Idea is an ad-
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itself the theoretical and practical elements of the spiritual life. And
such a synthesis, as we have seen, is that of consciousness. If this is the
result to which Hegel leads us, then the unity of the Idea is more than its
differences, more than ‘the union of the plurality’; for it is inconsistent
with the nature of consciousness to be nothing more than its content.
The Idea thus seems to be something deeper than the mere conjunction
of its differentiations.
Again, Mr. McTaggart’s position on this point is contrary to the
result of our previous chapter, that the real for Hegel is the individual. If
that result be true, then the Absolute Idea must be an actual synthesis of
concrete differences, the differences existing for the synthesis and the
synthesis existing in its differences and for itself — such a synthesis as
cannot be found in any society (however closely unified) of self-con-
scious finite spirits. It belongs to the very nature of the individual that
its differences be more than the union of themselves, and that its unity
be more than the conjunction of its differentiations; in other words, ab-
stract identity of the particulars and the universal is foreign to the es-
sence of the concrete individual. If therefore we are right in our position
that Hegel’s ultimate synthesis, the Absolute Idea, must be individual in
its nature, we are also right in insisting that the synthesis is not identical
with its differences. And that we are in the right here the whole first Part
of our study bears witness.
Mr. McTaggart’s difficulty here is traceable to his failure to appre-
ciate the significance of negation in Hegel’s doctrine of thought. For the
unity of the Idea is a negative unity, and as such is different from the
unity that either destroys multiplicity or itself fails to exist. I shall let
Hegel state the matter: “As the Idea is (a) a process, it follows that such
an expression for the Absolute as unity of thought and being, of finite
and infinite, etc., is false; for unity expresses an abstract and merely
quiescent identity. As the Idea is (b) subjectivity, it follows that the
expression is equally false on another account. That unity of which it
speaks expresses a merely virtual or underlying presence of the genuine
unity. The infinite would thus seem to be merely neutralized by the fi-
nite, the subjective by the objective, thought by being. But in the nega-
tive unity of the Idea, the infinite overlaps and includes the finite, thought
overlaps being, subjectivity overlaps objectivity. The unity of the Idea is
thought, infinity, and subjectivity, and is in consequence to be essen-
tially distinguished from the Idea as substance, just as this overlapping
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sided subjectivity, one-sided thought, one-sided infinity to which it de-
scends in judging and defiling.’261 A study of this passage discloses the
fact that the unity of the Idea, which is a negative unity, is not the unity
of exact equilibrium.
Mr. McTaggart has another objection to raise against the thesis we
are here maintaining. He not only asserts that the position which we
have attributed to Hegel is not logically involved in his system, — he
does admit that the dialectic itself furnishes no positive disproof of it —
but he also contends that the position is one which Hegel himself did not
hold. He thinks that Hegel explicitly repudiates the doctrine of a per-
sonal Absolute, and he bases his contention on the conclusion of the
Philosophy of Religion.262 “It seems clear from the Philosophy of Reli-
gion,” he tells us, “that the truth of God’s nature, according to Hegel, is
to be found in the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost.... And the Kingdom of
the Holy Ghost appears to be not a person but a community.”263
Before passing on to examine the basis of this argument, I cannot
refrain from quoting a few other passages from various contexts, which
seem to be in direct refutation of the contention which the critic is trying
to establish. I shall cite only those passages which have explicit refer-
ence to the point. In the larger Logic at the beginning of the discussion
of the Absolute Idea we read: “The Notion is not only soul but free
subjective Notion, which is for itself and, therefore, has personality —
the practical objective Notion which is determined in and for itself, and
which, as person, is impenetrable atomic subjectivity.”264 A page or two
below, after having spoken of the method as an immanent form of devel-
opment, the author says: “The Method thus shows itself to be the No-
tion which knows itself, and which, as the Absolute, both subjective and
objective, has itself for its own object.”265 Again, in the smaller Logic:
“It is true that God is necessity, or, as we may also put it, that He is the
absolute Thing: He is however no less the absolute Person. That He is
the absolute Person, however, is a point which the philosophy of Spinoza
never reached; and on that side it falls short of the true notion of God
which forms the content of religious consciousness in Christianity.”266
In the Philosophy of Religion we are told that “God is himself con-
sciousness, He distinguishes Himself from Himself within Himself, and
as consciousness He gives Himself as object for what we call the side of
consciousness.”267 And later in the same work occurs a passage which
seems to have been written designedly to meet a position like that which
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of merely as a universal thought, or as something inward and having
potential existence only; the objectifying of the Divine is not to be con-
ceived of simply as the objective form it takes in all men, for in that case
it would be conceived of simply as representing the manifold forms of
the spiritual in general, and the development which the Absolute Spirit
has in itself and which has to advance till it reaches the form of what is
the form of immediacy, would not be contained in it.”268 The fourteenth
lecture on the ‘Proofs of the Existence of God’ has something to say on
the point: “That man knows God implies, in accordance with the essen-
tial idea of communion or fellowship, that there is a community of knowl-
edge; that is to say, man knows God only in so far as God Himself
knows Himself in man. This knowledge is God’s self-consciousness,
but it is at the same time a knowledge of God on the part of man, and
this knowledge of God by man is a knowledge of man by God.”269 Fi-
nally, in the Introduction to the Philosophy of History we read: “It is
One Individuality which, presented in its essence as God, is honored and
enjoyed in Religion; which is exhibited as an object of sensuous con-
templation in Art; and is apprehended as an intellectual conception in
Philosophy.”270 To these seemingly quite explicit passages others might
be added.271 But enough have been quoted to establish at least a pre-
sumption that, according to Hegel’s own statements on the point, God is
not a community of finite spirits but a Personality.
We turn now to an examination of the basis upon which Mr.
McTaggart rests his contention. Does the dialectical movement in the
Philosophy of Religion, from the Kingdom of the Father, through the
Kingdom of the Son, to the Kingdom of the Holy Ghost, justify the
conclusion that Hegel conceives of God as nothing more than a commu-
nity of finite individuals? To this question I think a negative answer
must be given. Let us follow this movement in some detail.
There is no reason why we should not agree with Mr. McTaggart
that the three stages of the Kingdoms of the Father, of the Son, and of
the Spirit form a dialectical triad. And from this, we also agree, it nec-
essarily follows that, “if God is really personal, He must be personal in
the Kingdom of Spirit.”272 But one fails to see how these premises lead
to the conclusion that the Spirit which manifests itself in the synthesis
here cannot be a Personality, an Individual. To be sure we must admit
that God, on this showing, is adequately represented only in a commu-
nity of spirits, since the Kingdom of the Spirit is conceived of as such a
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munity is, or can possibly be, a person. But it is difficult to see, so much
being granted, how we are necessarily committed to the conclusion that
in the Kingdom of the Spirit God must be impersonal, or that, when
adequately represented, He becomes absolutely identical with the spiri-
tual community in which He finds fullest expression. Such a conclusion
is forced upon us only when we assume, with the critic, that God is just
His manifestations and nothing more. And on this assumption we could
not logically confine the Absolute to any community of self-conscious
spirits, — unless, indeed, we are willing to endow all forms of nature w
ith spiritual qualities; for Hegel unquestionably maintains that Nature is
God’s manifestation of Himself. But the assumption is arbitrary and
groundless, if our position concerning the unity and individuality of the
Idea is true.
Furthermore, this triad, as interpreted by Mr. McTaggart, differs
essentially from other triads in the Logic and elsewhere. For his argu-
ment necessitates the assumption that the movement here consists in an
attempt to get away from an entirely erroneous view of God’s nature to
a true and fundamentally different view. For example, after insisting
that the triad is a genuine dialectical process and that, consequently, we
must look for an adequate expression of God’s nature only in the syn-
thesis, he continues: “If [God] were personal as manifested in the first
and second Kingdoms, but not in the third, it would mean that He was
personal when viewed inadequately, but not when viewed adequately —
i.e., that He was not really personal.”273 This is the critic’s interpreta-
tion of the actual movement and result of the triad. This interpretation,
however, makes of the triad an exception. For usually in the dialectical
triad there is a thread of connection running from thesis to synthesis; the
two are never separated by a chasm. But on Mr. McTaggart’s interpre-
tation of the triad before us, thesis and synthesis would seem to be torn
completely asunder; in the thesis, God is viewed as a Personality, while,
in the synthesis, He is defined only as the abstract unity of the Church,
and is personal in no sense whatsoever. Thus there is no connection
between thesis and synthesis: the synthesis is a mere negation of the
thesis. If the synthesis is right, therefore, the thesis must be completely
wrong, absolutely false — a fact which we have been in the habit of
thinking is not characteristic of a dialectical triad. Mr. McTaggart’s
argument seems thus to make of the present triad an extraordinary ex-
ception.
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impersonality. The dialectic does force us to say that the Spiritual Com-
munity is necessary to an adequate representation of the nature of God;
but this is very far from saying that God is the Community or that the
Community is God. The critic does not refer to any passages in which
Hegel speaks of this very significant, and withal very peculiar, turn in
the dialectic advance; and I have been able to find none. I have, how-
ever, found one in which the identification in question seems to be de-
nied, and it runs so: “This third sphere” (that is, the sphere of the King-
dom of the Spirit, the Spiritual Community) “represents the Idea in its
specific character as individuality; but, to begin with, it exhibits only
the one individuality, the divine universal individuality as it is in-and-
for-itself.... Individuality as exclusive is for others immediacy, and is
the return from the other into self. The individuality of the Divine Idea,
the Divine Idea as a person (ein Mensch), first attains to completeness
in actuality (Wirklichkeit), since at first it has the many individuals con-
fronting it, and brings these back into the unity of Spirit, into the Church
or Spiritual Community (Gemeinde), and exists here as real universal
self-consciousness.”274 If I understand what this means, it indicates that,
as Hegel himself views the matter, the third Kingdom, the Kingdom of
the Spirit, is the standpoint where God is first viewed in His true Per-
sonality; for here it is that He is seen to be in vital and actual touch with
men and things. Thus it appears that the triad is not a movement from
the conception of a personal to the conception of an impersonal God;
but rather from an inadequate to an adequate representation of God as
personal. He is not pure thought, existing behind the world as it were in
infinite space; this is the conception of the thesis. On the contrary, He is
that spiritual unity, that ‘real universal self-consciousness,’ realizing
His aims and purposes in the lives of finite self-conscious agents whose
aspirations are perfected and consummated in Him. In some such way it
seems that the movement here must be understood.
Another fact that militates against Mr. McTaggart’s position on this
point — at any rate from the point of view of the present essay — is that
the culmination of Hegel’s discussion of the Spiritual Community is the
standpoint of the Notion. The three phases within this discussion Hegel
designates as follows: (a) The conception of the Spiritual Community;
(b) The realization of the Spiritual Community; and (c) The realization
of the spiritual in universal reality (Wirklichkeit). So far as our present
purpose is concerned, the first two of these divisions may be dismissed
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learn that it “directly involves the transformation and remodelling of the
Spiritual Community.”275 It is divided into a threefold movement, which
consists in three different attitudes taken towards objectivity. Hegel states
this movement in outline thus: “Objectivity as an external immediate
world, is the heart with its interests; another form of objectivity is that
of reflection, of abstract thought, of Understanding; and the third and
true form of objectivity is the Notion. We have now to consider how
Spirit realizes itself in these three elements.”276 The development here
outlined is not easily followed in detail. But it seems to consist in tracing
the essential features of the faith of the Spiritual Community concern-
ing the nature of the objective order, and the attitudes assumed towards
such an objective order. In the first stage, the Spiritual Community has
opposed to it a worldly element, which seems to exist on its own ac-
count; there is here an opposition between the religious and the secular.
In the second stage we swing to the other extreme, in which the objec-
tive is practically disregarded and the idea of God, being emptied of
content, is reduced to an abstraction; this is that “inner self-enclosed life
which may indeed co-exist with calm, lofty, and pious aspirations, but
may as readily appear as hypocrisy or as vanity in its most extreme
form.”277 The first of these two stages Hegel calls the “servitude of
Spirit in the absolute region of freedom”; the second is “abstract subjec-
tivity, subjective freedom without content.”278 The final stage is, as we
would expect, the reconciliation of these two extremes. It discovers that
freedom, real intelligible freedom, is to be found only in the objective,
that objective and subjective, when they are adequately comprehended,
fall together. This is the standpoint of philosophy. “What we have fi-
nally to consider is that subjectivity develops the content out of itself,
but it does this in accordance with necessity — it knows and recognizes
that the content is necessary, and that it is objective and exists inand-
for-itself. This is the standpoint of philosophy, according to which the
content takes refuge in the Notion, and by means of thought gets its
restoration and justification.”279 The objective within the Community,
therefore, must be known to be in-and-for-itself before the community
has attained complete and perfect actualization; and this knowledge is
reached only when philosophic comprehension is substituted for intui-
tive faith. Thus we are once again brought to our former problem con-
cerning the real nature of the Notion and its significance in Hegel’s
system. If the form of the Notion is individuality, then it would seem
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when its unity is actualized.
It is to be noted, furthermore, that in philosophy and not in the
Spiritual Community, as such, is to be found the true realization of the
object of Absolute Religion. The Spiritual Community, “in attaining
realization in its spiritual reality,” falls into “a condition of inner disrup-
tion”; and so “its realization appears to be at the same time its disap-
pearance.”280 “For us,” however, “philosophical knowledge has harmo-
nized this discord,” and we have “rediscovered in revealed religion the
truth and the Idea.”281 And from this it seems evident that the nature of
ultimate reality is to be sought, not in the Spiritual Community, but in
the Idea. We are thus sent back to the study of the dialectic for an an-
swer to our question concerning the Absolute; and we have already seen
what answer the dialectic gives.
The foregoing considerations force us to question the validity of
Mr. McTaggart’s contention that, for Hegel, the Absolute is nothing
more than a community of self-conscious spirits. But this interpretation
of Hegel may be traversed from another point of departure. I think that
it can be shown that a community of self-conscious persons — however
close the unity that binds them together — is not, in Hegel’s opinion,
and cannot be an adequate representation of the unity of the Idea. And it
can be shown in some such way as the following.
In one place Hegel tells us that the state is “the divine Idea as it
exists on earth.”282 In another passage he speaks of the state as an ‘ac-
tual God,’ and defines it as “the march of God in the world.”283 In yet
another context he says: “It is in the organization of the state that the
Divine has passed into the sphere of actuality.”284 Looked at from the
other side, the state is conceived of by Hegel as the highest form of
human society. According to the plan which is sketched in the Philoso-
phy of Mind and elaborated at length in the Philosophy of Right, the
state is viewed as the choicest product of the moral life, it is “the self-
conscious ethical substance.”285 The very highest point that the Objec-
tive Mind can attain unto in its strivings towards divinity is the unity of
the state; this is the most truly real form of social union. If now it can be
shown that Hegel does not admit that Mr. McTaggart’s doctrine of a
community of self-conscious beings is an adequate expression of the
essential nature of the state, then we may safely conclude that he would
not admit that the total nature of reality is exhausted in such a commu-
nity.
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position is expressed unequivocally in both the Philosophy of Mind and
the Philosophy of Right, and in the latter at some length. Put in a word,
his position amounts to an insistence that the function of the prince or
monarch is absolutely essential to the ideal state, that no state is com-
plete apart from this personal expression of its unity, and that this con-
clusion is necessitated by a consideration of the idea or notion of the
state apart from accidental circumstances of time or place. The unity of
the commonwealth, he urges, must be actualized in a personality before
it becomes a real unity, or before the state is perfectly organized: the
rational articulation of the state demands this incarnation of its unity.
“We usually speak of the three functions of the state,” says Hegel, “the
legislative, executive, and judicial. The legislative corresponds to uni-
versality, and the executive to particularity; but the judicial is not the
third element of the conception.”286 This third element, we are immedi-
ately told, is to be found in the function of the prince; this is the synthe-
sis of the other two functions of the state, and in this they are brought
together in a personal unity. Apart from this expression of the will of the
state in the will of the monarch the state is not organized according to
the nature of the Notion.
This is not merely an interesting point which Hegel happens to men-
tion incidentally in his theory of the state. It is one upon which he lays
special emphasis. I shall quote some of these emphatic passages. “It is
easy for one to grasp the notion that the state is the self-determining and
completely sovereign will, whose judgment is final. It is more difficult
to apprehend this ‘I will’ as a person.... This ‘I will’ constitutes the
greatest distinction between the ancient and the modern world, and so
must have its peculiar niche in the great building of the state. It is to be
deplored that this characteristic should be viewed as something merely
external, to be set aside or used at pleasure.”287 Again: “The conception
of monarch offers great difficulty to abstract reasonings and to the re-
flective methods of the understanding. The understanding never gets
beyond isolated determinations, and ascribes merit to mere reasons, or
finite points of view and what can be derived from them. Thus the dig-
nity of the monarch is represented as something derivative not only in its
form but also in its essential character. But the conception of the mon-
arch is not derivative, but purely self-originated.”288 Once more: “Per-
sonality or subjectivity generally, as infinite and self-referring, has truth
only as a person or independent subject. This independent existence
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kind. The personality of the state is actualized only as person, the mon-
arch. . . . A so-called moral person, a society, community (Gemeinde),
or family, be it as concrete as it may, possesses personality only as an
element and abstractly. It has not reached the truth of its existence. But
the state is this very totality in which the moments of the conception
gain reality in accordance with their peculiar truth.”289 Again: “When a
people is not a patriarchal tribe, having passed from the primitive con-
dition which made the forms of aristocracy and democracy possible,
and is represented not as in a wilful and unorganized condition, but as a
self-developed truly organic totality, in such a people sovereignty is the
personality of the whole, and exists, too, in a reality which is propor-
tionate to the conception, the person of the monarch.”290 Finally: “In the
government — regarded as organic totality — the sovereign power
(principate) is subjectivity as the infinite self-unity of the Notion in its
development; — the all-sustaining, all-decreeing will of the state, its
highest peak and all-pervasive unity. In the perfect form of the state, in
which each and every element of the Notion has reached free existence,
this subjectivity is not a so-called ‘moral person,’ or a decree issuing
from a majority (forms in which the unity of the decreeing will has not
an actual existence), but an actual individual — the will of a decreeing
individual~nonarchy. The monarchical constitution is therefore the con-
stitution of developed reason: all other constitutions belong to lower
grades of the development and realization of reason.”291
Now what do all these passages mean?292 At least one strain runs
through them all; and that is, that the unity of the state, before it can
become real and rational, must be embodied in an actual form, must
find expression in an actually existent person. The state which has not
the power of uttering this ‘I will’ — it matters not how intrinsically
insignificant the ‘I will’ may be; it may mean nothing more than the
simple signing of the name  — is not a completely articulated organiza-
tion: it lacks an essential function. No merely organic whole is a rational
expression of the nature of the state; the unity must be embodied in a
personal form which has actual, concrete existence.
This being true, we have good reason to deny that Mr. McTaggart’s
conception of the unity of the ultimately real — a unity which, as we
have pointed out, never really becomes actual —  can legitimately be
attributed to Hegel. Of course argument from analogy is always danger-
ous; and no claim is made here that we should be justified in drawing
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solely on the basis of his doctrine of the unity of the state — though it is
indubitably true that the analogy is much more significant than one is
apt to think, apart from a very careful reading of the author’s statements
on the point. But it does seem justifiable to conclude that, if an actual-
ized unity is essential to the very idea of the state, the unity of ultimate
reality could not be an unrealized, and, one is inclined to say, an unreal-
izable ideal. If no community of individuals, however organically re-
lated they may be, adequately expresses the rational organization of the
state — and this thesis Hegel unquestionably maintains — we can be
practically certain that the synthesis of ultimate reality cannot be found
in any community of self-conscious spirits, however organic or super-
organic that community may be and however deep its harmony. The
argument is a simple a fortiori one. Hegel emphatically asserts that a
group of individuals is not an adequate representation of this ‘actual
God’ on earth: surely, he would be the first to deny that it is a perfect
representation of the essential nature of the Absolute Idea. At any rate,
the burden of proof seems-to be on those who deny the validity of this
conclusion. So we seem to have shown the inadequacy of Mr.
McTaggart’s interpretation of Hegel from another point of departure.293I
am forced to believe, however. that such an objection would be very
much mistaken. A careful reading of the relevant portions of the Phi-
losophy of Right will impress one with the fact that Hegel was really in
earnest when he contends, as quoted above, that “the monarchical con-
stitution is the constitution of developed reason,” and that “all other
constitutions belong to lower grades of the development and realization
of reason.” He apparently is firmly convinced that in his theory of the
state he is presenting the form that Spirit assumes in its most nearly
perfect institutional manifestation (see especially Werke, Bd. VIII, §§258,
272, and 279). His own explicit statements bear witness to his sincerity
in the matter. To those quoted above we might add such as these: “When
thinking of the idea of the state, we must not have in our mind any
particular state, or particular institution, but must rather contemplate
the idea, this actual God, by itself.” (Ibid., §258.) “In the organization
of the state, that is to say, in constitutional monarchy, we must have
before us nothing except the inner necessity of the idea. Every other
point of view must disappear. The state must be regarded as a great
architectonic building, or the hieroglyph of reason, presenting itself in
actuality. Everything referring merely to utility, externality, etc., must
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have sufficient evidence, it would seem, to justify us in asserting that
Hegel gives us the doctrine of the state which he honestly believes is
most nearly the expression of the logical implications of his system.
Even if we grant that he was prejudiced in working out this theory, as he
undoubtedly was in details, still we must admit that he bases his theory
more or less directly on the doctrine of the Idea; and admitting so much,
the above argument from analogy holds.
Let us bring together the results of our discussion. Our conclusion
is that Hegel’s Absolute is an infinite Consciousness, a Personality, who
synthesizes in His own experience the experiences of all. “An infinite
intelligence, an infinite spiritual principle, which is manifested in finite
minds though not identical with them” — such, we agree with Professor
Adamson,294 is Hegel’s doctrine of ultimate reality. And this conclusion
we have based upon the dialectic movement in the triad of Life, Cogni-
tion, and the Absolute Idea, as well as upon direct statements that Hegel
has made regarding the problem. The Hegelian Absolute, we have seen,
cannot be identified with a community of self-conscious spirits, as Mr.
McTaggart contends. There seems to be no justification for such an
interpretation of Hegel either in the final triad of the Logic or in the final
triad under Absolute Religion. In the former we pass beyond the exact
balance between the unity and its differences to the category of self-
consciousness, where the unity exists for itself in its differentiations; in
the latter we are ultimately brought back to the Idea and told to look
there for the answer to our question about the nature of God. Further-
more, such a community of spirits as Mr. McTaggart imagines we found
would not be adequate to express even the nature of the state as Hegel
defines it. Thus from another point of departure we were led to question
whether such a community could adequately represent Hegel’s synthe-
sis of ultimate reality. For it seemed that, if a personal unity is essential
to the nature of the state, we might justly conclude that the synthesis of
the real, of which the state is only an imperfect copy, could hardly be
less than a personal unity.
This conclusion that the Absolute is a self-conscious Individuality,
leads us to a further problem that we must here face. And that problem
is concerning the relation between such an Absolute and the world of
finite existence. Granting that the Absolute is a self-conscious Personal-
ity, in what relation must we say that He stands to our own finite world?
The remaining portion of this chapter will be taken up with an attempt
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A first glance at the problem might lead one to conclude that only
two solutions of it are possible, and that either solution is fatal to the
doctrine of the personality of the Absolute. For it would seem that we
must admit either that there is or that there is not an Other to the Abso-
lute. And with this admission we find ourselves in a dilemma. For, on
the one hand, if there be in the universe something besides the Absolute,
an Other that has the least degree of reality in its own right, then it
apparently follows that the Absolute is limited by this Other, is, in other
words, not the Absolute. “The slightest suspicion of pluralism, the
minusest wiggle of independence of any one of its parts from the control
of the totality would ruin it. Absolute unity brooks no degrees, — as
well might you claim absolute purity for a glass of water because it
contains but a single little cholera-germ. The independence, however
infinitesimal, of a part, however small, would be to the Absolute as fatal
as a cholera-germ.”295 On the other hand, if there be no Other to the
Absolute, if there be nothing in the universe that can claim reality on its
own account apart from its relation to the Absolute, then pantheism is
our only conclusion. Evidently, if our theory merges everything into the
Absolute, it is nothing short of pantheism. So it would seem that the
doctrine of a personal Absolute leaves us either in contradiction with
ourselves or in a pantheistic metaphysics; and from this dilemma there
seems to be no way of escape.
Perhaps it is hardly necessary to say that Hegel wastes no words in
arguing for a limited Absolute; he does not fall into self-contradiction
on this point. For him the Absolute is the only true reality; all else has its
reality, not in itself, but in the Absolute. Concerning Hegel’s position
here there can, presumably, be no question. On the other hand, there
need be no hesitancy whatsoever in asserting that, in Hegel’s own mind
at any rate, his system is not pantheistic. Pantheism he often denounces
as a mistaken theory of reality; he constantly urges that to conceive of
the Absolute as the One Reality in which all particularity loses its sig-
nificance is completely erroneous. Whatever may be the relation that he
teaches exists between the Absolute and the finite world, it certainly is
not the relation of identity, which, in his opinion, exists between the
Spinozistic Substance and its Accidents: indeed, it is just in contradis-
tinction to this doctrine of Spinoza that Hegel is at pains to define his
own. As Hegel views the matter, then, neither pantheism nor a finite
God is the conclusion to be drawn in answer to our problem.
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Philosophy of Religion and the Philosophy of Mind, Hegel tells us that
he is not unaware that his theory may be misconstrued as pantheistic;
and he is careful to point out the oversight on which the misconstruction
rests. The point he makes is this: the interpretation overlooks the dis-
tinction between the Absolute as Substance and the Absolute as Sub-
ject. “Those who say that speculative philosophy is pantheism generally
know nothing of this distinction; they overlook the main point, as they
always do, and they disparage philosophy by representing it as different
from what it really is.”296 This distinction being forgotten, unity is con-
strued to mean only abstract identity. “In accordance with that superfi-
ciality with which the polemic against philosophy is carried on, it is
added, moreover, that philosophy is a system of Identity.... But those
who speak of the philosophy of Identity mean abstract unity, unity in
general, and pay no attention to that upon which alone all depends;
namely, the essential nature of this unity, and whether it is defined as
Substance or Spirit.... What is of importance is the difference in the
character of the unity. The unity of God is always unity, but everything
depends upon the particular nature of the unity; this point being disre-
garded, that upon which everything depends is overlooked.”297 It is,
then, in the nature of the unity that Hegel expects to find a way out of
the difficulty.
Of course the unity which Hegel is here emphasizing is the unity of
the Notion. This unity of the Notion it is which he thinks satisfactorily
explains the relation of the Absolute to the world of particularity. This
is evident from a glance at the Logic. For it is this unity of the Notion
that is the culmination of the dialectical development of the categories
and receives complete expression in the category of categories, the Ab-
solute Idea. This unity it is, therefore, that is the ultimate expression of
reality, the final statement of the relation between God and the world.
What, now, is this unity of the Notion? If the interpretation of Hegel
given in the present study is not fundamentally false and all of our argu-
ments up to this point totally vicious, it seems that we are forced to say
that the unity of the Notion is the category of self-consciousness.
This is the conclusion that is forced upon us by the Phenomenology
of Spirit; the Notion is the life of mind. Likewise, the Logic teaches us
the same lesson: since the Absolute Idea is the ultimate expression of the
unity of the Notion, it follows, if the Absolute Idea is a self-conscious
Individual, that the unity of the Notion, that unity which explains the
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just the point that Hegel has in mind, in numerous passages in the His-
tory of Philosophy, the Philosophy of Religion, the Philosophy of Mind,
and elsewhere, in which he draws a distinction, as he does in the pas-
sages cited above, between the definition of the Absolute as Substance
and his own conception of the Absolute as Spirit, or Subject, and urges
that the latter definition offers the only way of escape from pantheism in
our metaphysics. It is in the category of self-consciousness, therefore,
that we are to look for an exemplification of the unity of the Notion.
Let us try to see how this category aids us in our present problem.
In attempting to do this, we shall first briefly analyze self-consciousness
to discover its fundamental characteristics; and then we shall, on the
basis of this analysis, see what must be our conclusions concerning an
Absolute Consciousness. For it seems certain that, if we are to argue at
all concerning a personal Absolute, we must rest the discussion on an
analysis of finite consciousness; there is no other basis of discussion. At
any rate, this is what Hegel does, as the Phenomenology shows; and we
are interested primarily in setting forth his doctrines and their justifica-
tion.
Whatever other characteristics finite self-consciousness may have,
there are three which can hardly be called in question. The first of these
is that consciousness always has a content. By that I mean that there is
always something other than the consciousness itself, which exists as
the object of it. Apart from this objective reference consciousness is the
veriest abstraction.298
The second characteristic of consciousness is that it always includes
its content as something essentially its own. The content is not received
by consciousness as if it were a stranger to be momentarily entertained
and then lost forever: on the contrary, the content is the very life of the
consciousness that possesses it. As Hegel would say, spirit finds the
object to be bone of its bone and flesh of its flesh, and so all alienation
between the two has disappeared. This characteristic of the conscious
life needs some emphasis; we have so formed the habit of thinking that
the content is an element foreign to consciousness, that we are prone to
forget the abstraction that is responsible for the habit. It requires only a
little reflection, however, to bring to light the vital unity that exists be-
tween consciousness and its content —  a unity that is absolutely funda-
mental to the integrity of each. The last characteristic of consciousness
that I would call attention to is this: consciousness is never identical
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the fact that the content is always received by consciousness as its very
own, as its other self in fact, still there is a distinction between the two
that never disappears; consciousness and its content never fall together
in an undifferentiated identity.
The fundamental importance of these three characteristics of con-
sciousness, as well as their vital interconnectedness, may be empha-
sized by a brief analysis of self-consciousness. It is evident that as a
self-conscious being I am of a two-fold nature. In the first place, I am a
bundle of sensations, feelings, impulses, desires, volitions, and ideas.
This is the object-self. And from this point of view I am eternally chang-
ing. At any moment of my existence I am never what I have been, or
shall be, at any other moment. At one instant I am a center of impulses
and passions; at another, a centre of ideas and ideals. To-day I am a self
of pleasures; tomorrow, a self of pains. An everlasting panorama of
change, a veritable Heracleitean flux — this is what the objectself really
is. But there is another fact about this self-consciousness that must be
taken into account; so far we have considered only one side of it. It is
true that I am eternally changing, that I am not what I have been hereto-
fore, and that I shall never be again just what I am now. And yet, para-
doxical as it may sound, what I have been I am, and what I am I shall be.
Underlying the panorama of change, deeper than the self that is in a
never-ceasing process of transformation, is another self that gives unity
and coherence to the process. This is the subject-self. And this it is that
makes education, spiritual development in general, possible; without it
our experience would be at best but a chaos of meaningless sensations
and incoherent desires. These two aspects or phases seem to be present
in all self-consciousness. Take a cross-section of consciousness at any
moment, and you will discover that it is of this two-fold nature. Even in
our moments of most intense introspection, when we enter as intimately
as possible into ourselves, we find that this duality is present; indeed,
one is inclined to say, it is then that its presence is most strongly im-
pressed upon us.
It is to be noticed, moreover, that the duality is absolutely essential
to self-consciousness. Not only do we find it actually present in self-
consciousness; the implication of experience is that it must exist so long
as consciousness itself exists. For selfconsciousness is just this duality:
the subject-self and the objectself exist only as they co-exist. This fact
may be illustrated by the consciousness that we possess just as we are
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consciousness sink away; and it rapidly returns when the attention be-
comes fixed upon some object and the duality, unknown and unexperi-
enced in the land of dreams, is restored. And normal waking conscious-
ness illustrates the same truth. He is most truly self-conscious who sinks
himself, as we say, in the object that occupies the focus of conscious-
ness; this is the ethical import of the doctrine of self-abnegation.299 But
this sinking of the self in the object attended to does not destroy the
difference between the self and the object; rather does it intensify the
duality. For the object absorbs attention only in proportion as it harmo-
nizes with a set of purposes and interests that are themselves clearly
defined. To take a concrete case, let us suppose that I am intensely inter-
ested in a botanical specimen. Here there is evidently a unity of subject
and object; indeed, it would be difficult to differentiate the two, and the
difficulty would increase with the increase of my interest in the speci-
men. And yet, clearly, there is a difference. The specimen grasps my
interest only as it makes its appeal to a self whose centre of being is
more or less clearly defined; and the more significant the hold of the
specimen on my attention, the deeper and more significant must have
been my training in the science of botany. If I am a mere tyro in botani-
cal investigations, the specimen would not make the same appeal as it
would were I thoroughly versed in the subject; and the difference is that
in the former case the appeal would be made to a less thoroughly devel-
oped self. The unity, and consequently the duality, is not as clearly de-
fined in the former case as in the latter. The very unity of consciousness
thus seems to be organically bound up with this dual relation of subject
and object.
And from this follows immediately a further result. Since this dual-
ity is essential to consciousness, these two phases of subject and object
cannot fall into identity with each other. Take any case of consciousness
that you please, whether it be consciousness of objects in the mental or
in the physical world. Do you find there a coincidence between subject
and object? Certainly not. The object is never its own consciousness;
there is, and can be, no identity between them. It is inconsistent with the
very nature of consciousness that these two phases collapse into iden-
tity. As Professor Royce says, “When we are aware only of unity, it
appears that we then become aware of nothing at all.”300 The presuppo-
sition of consciousness is that there shall be something, an object in the
physical world, an object in the mental world, something other than the
consciousness itself, of which the consciousness shall be. The two can-120/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
not be identical with each other.
But this essential duality within consciousness must not be miscon-
strued as a dualism. In his famous deduction of the categories, Kant
unfortunately speaks too much as if the subjectself were superimposed
on the object-self as something essentially foreign to it. But the real
lesson he has to teach us in that deduction is a deeper one. And that
lesson is that the unity and the differences within conscious experience
are really one, that there is no chasm between them. It is true that the
data which constitute the object-self seem to be facts drawn from a
world external to that self, or, at any rate, external to the synthetic unity
that binds these data into a unitary and organic whole. But both of these
positions fall before criticism, for the data are vitally concerned in their
own organization. We must admit that Kant has once for all shown us,
at least by implication if not explicitly, that the object-self is not foreign
to the subject-self: the data of the Sensibility and the categories of the
Understanding are common expressions of one fundamental principle.
And this implication of the Kantian philosophy becomes explicit in Hegel.
The burden of the Phenomenology, as we saw in our first chapter, is
that these two selves are organically bound up with each other, and that,
if we are to speak accurately, we must call them, not two selves, but
only two points of view from which we look at the one self — subject-
object. And it seems that we are forced to say that this is the verdict of
experience. Consequently, to view these two phases of consciousness in
isolation is to view them abstractly. Of course, this abstraction is per-
fectly justifiable, indeed, necessary from the standpoint of the particular
sciences; but it is dangerous for metaphysics. Whether the emphasis is
placed upon the subject or the object is a matter of indifference so far as
the metaphysical difficulty involved in their separation is concerned;
metaphysically, they are not separable. The data of the object-self get
their reality only when organized by the categories of the subject-self;
and, on the other hand, the categories are essentially those data, other-
wise it is incomprehensible how the organization could possibly take
place. Thus the separation between the two is overreached and the two
fall together. They are different, and yet they are one such seems to be
the paradoxical relation existing between the two sides of conscious-
ness.
The results of our analysis of finite self-consciousness are these.
The characteristics of consciousness are that it has a content, that it
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over, each of these is a condition that must be met, if consciousness is to
exist at all. If the content is removed, then of course consciousness is
destroyed, because there is nothing of which the consciousness could
be. Likewise, if consciousness and its content are identified, conscious-
ness ceases, for the identification simply amounts to the removal of the
content; and here again the essential duality is done away with. Finally,
if a chasm is made between consciousness and its content, conscious-
ness again is made impossible; when an impassable barrier is erected
between the two, the duality upon which consciousness depends is once
more removed.301 This three-fold condition is the presupposition of all
finite consciousness.
Now it would seem that, on the basis of this analysis of finite con-
sciousness, we should be justified in making the following assertions
concerning an Absolute Consciousness. In the first place, such a Con-
sciousness would necessarily have a content; that is, there would have
to be an Other of which the Absolute is conscious. In the second place,
this Other would not be regarded by the Absolute as something foreign
or external, in the sense that it lay genuinely outside of the Absolute;
rather would it be possessed as an essential element within the Abso-
lute. And, lastly, the Absolute would necessarily differentiate this Other
from itself in such a way as to preserve the duality that we have found to
be essential to the conscious life. And our justification for making these
assertions concerning an Absolute Consciousness is simply that these
characteristics which we have attributed to the Absolute are those that
experience shows us to be fundamental to all consciousness as we know
it; and unless we are to reduce our discussions to meaningless logomachy,
we must test them by concrete experience. Certainly it seems that we
must assume that the conditions prerequisite to finite consciousness must
be fulfilled in an Absolute Consciousness.
What now must be our answer to the dilemma with which we began
our discussion? In the first place, it would seem that we have found a
way of escape from pantheism in our doctrine of the Absolute. For so
long as we maintain the self-consciousness of the Absolute, we are forced
to maintain also that the Absolute and the world are differentiated from
each other. Really, pantheism is logically possible only to the metaphy-
sician who denies the self-consciousness of the Absolute. For panthe-
ism, if it means anything, means identity between the Absolute and the
world of finite existence; whatever form the theory may take, it ulti-
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with the all-inclusive One. But, if the Absolute be regarded as a self-
conscious Individual, this abstract identity becomes impossible; because,
as our analysis of the category has disclosed, consciousness always de-
mands a content from which it is differentiated. Destruction of this du-
ality is the destruction of the possibility of consciousness. Therefore no
theory that maintains that the Absolute is Self-Consciousness can legiti-
mately be accused of pantheism so long as it is consistent.302
But have we escaped the other horn of our dilemma? Our own argu-
ment has forced us to admit that an Other to the Absolute is essential;
indeed, it is this fact that relieves us from any fears concerning panthe-
ism as the outcome of our doctrine. And have we not virtually limited
the Absolute by positing this Other, which our analysis of conscious-
ness has compelled us to assume is necessary? The answer to this objec-
tion is involved in what we have just been saying about the fact that the
two extremes of the equation of consciousness are not foreign to each
other; and it might perhaps be sufficient simply to point to this fact in
meeting the objection. But, since this criticism against the doctrine of
the personality of the Absolute is so general, and that, too, amongst
Idealists of a certain type, it seems well in concluding this discussion to
devote some attention to it.
I have chosen Mr. McTaggart as the representative of this type of
criticism, because his objections are advanced immediately in connec-
tion with a study of Hegel’s system.303 His views can best be expressed
in his own words: “The Absolute is a unity of system, and not a unity of
centre, and the element of unity in it cannot be a simple and indivisible
point, like that of the finite self. For if the unity is of this sort, then, by
virtue of its simplicity and indivisibility, it excludes its differentiation
from itself in one sense, while including them in another. But the Abso-
lute cannot exclude its differentiations from itself in any sense.... There
is nothing outside of the Absolute. And it would therefore be impossible
for it to exclude its differentiations from itself in any sense. For in as far
as they are not in it, they are absolutely wrong.304
In order to evaluate this objection, we must again look at conscious-
ness and ask concerning its real nature. As we have already pointed out,
consciousness always demands a content with which it is never identi-
cal; without such a content consciousness is nothing but an empty ab-
straction. Consciousness presupposes differentiations, and in some sense
it is true that these differentiations are excluded from it. But this is not
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cannot afford to overlook. Consciousness not only excludes its differen-
tiations, it also includes them. The exclusion is never absolute; the con-
tent is a vital part of the consciousness; in a very important sense it is
the consciousness. Consciousness overreaches the distinction between
itself and its content and takes the content up into itself, so that the
content, though different from, yet is one with the consciousness. As
Edward Caird aptly puts it, “The self can be conscious of itself as so
distinguished and related, only in so far as it overreaches the distinction
between itself and its object.”305 Thus it is that the self or consciousness
may be said both to include and exclude its object; and the fact of inclu-
sion is complementary to the fact of exclusion. Inclusion does not mean
the abstract identity of subject-self and object-self; nor, on the other
hand, does exclusion mean their abstract opposition. Consciousness in-
cludes its various differentiations, because they are its differentiations;
it excludes them, because they are its differentiations. Inclusion and
exclusion are only different names for the same fact, just as are the
concave and convex sides of a curved line.
If, now, we are to argue on the basis of finite consciousness con-
cerning the nature of Absolute Consciousness — and, I repeat, I know
of no other basis on which to argue — it would seem that we are forced
to conclude that such a Consciousness, granting its existence, would
necessarily at once include and exclude its differentiations. Every object
in the world would be included in such a Consciousness, because every
object in the world would be an object for such a Consciousness. But
the inclusion would not, could not, be that of identity. For every object
in the world would have to be excluded from such a Consciousness,
since no object in the world would actually be that Consciousness.306
And the exclusion could not be abstract opposition; the differentiations
would still be differentiations of the consciousness for which they exist.
The Absolute Consciousness, like all other consciousness, would be
confined to the circle of its own differentiations: this we seem forced to
admit. But the differentiations of the Absolute, like the differentiations
of finite consciousness, would be differentiations still: this also we seemed
forced to admit. And with this we have admitted the inclusion and the
exclusion of the differentiations of an absolute Consciousness. As Hegel
remarks, “God is Himself consciousness, He distinguishes Himself from
Himself within Himself, and as consciousness He gives Himself as ob-
ject for what we call the side of consciousness.”307 This is exactly what
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object, distinguishes itself from itself within itself, and is at once knower
and known, possessor and possessed, subject and object. Such seems to
be the paradox of consciousness as such; there is nothing inherently
contradictory or absurd about it — unless, indeed, consciousness itself
is an absurdity.
Thus we are forced to say that Mr. McTaggart’s objection to the
doctrine of a personal Absolute rests upon a misconstruction of the true
import of the category of self-consciousness. The objection stands or
falls with the contention that, if the Absolute were to exclude its differ-
entiations from itself, those differentiations would either cease to be real
or stand as a limitation to the Absolute. Now this contention holds only
on the condition that the Absolute is forced to oppose to itself its differ-
entiations as something entirely beyond and foreign to it. But it is the
very nature of consciousness not to do this, if our analysis has been
correct. For as we have repeatedly seen, perhaps to the point of weari-
ness, consciousness is a duality within unity; and if you destroy either
the unity or the duality, you utterly annihilate the conscious life. And it
seems evident that, if you construct a chasm between consciousness and
its differentiations, you do irreparable violence to the unity between the
two. At your touch both consciousness and its differentiations vanish
into nothingness. There is no meaning in talking about the exclusion of
something by consciousness, unless that something is included in con-
sciousness; for consciousness excludes its differentiations just by virtue
of the fact that it includes them. To argue, therefore, that an Absolute
Consciousness is impossible because it cannot abstractly oppose itself
to its differentiations is exactly as convincing as it would be to argue
that finite consciousness is impossible because it cannot do the same.
You could argue either way indifferently and with equal success in both
cases; for your demand sins against the presupposition of all conscious-
ness. Of course an Absolute Consciousness is impossible, provided it is
so by definition; but why define it so? It seems to be no more inherently
absurd than finite consciousness, and there can be no question that fi-
nite consciousness is an actuality.
It is interesting to notice that this objection of Mr. McTaggart is
inconsistent with his own analysis of finite consciousness. Speaking in
another context of the finite self, which he grants is ‘sufficiently para-
doxical,’ he says: “What does it included Everything of which it is con-
scious. What does it exclude? Equally — everything of which it is con-
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outside it? A single abstraction. And any attempt to remove the paradox
destroys the self. For the two sides are inevitably connected. If we try to
make it a distinct individual by separating it from all other things, it
loses all content of which it can be conscious, and so loses the very
individuality which we started by trying to preserve. If, on the other
hand, we try to save its content by emphasizing the inclusion at the
expense of the exclusion, then the consciousness vanishes, and, since
the self has no contents but the objects of which it is conscious, the
content vanishes also.”308 Now I submit that, if Mr. McTaggart stands
consistently by the position here stated he cannot argue that conscious-
ness, whether finite or absolute, can exclude its differentiations in any
sense in which it does not at the same time and ipso facto include them.
And this is the ground upon which his objection against the doctrine of
a personal Absolute, as I comprehend it, rests. To say that the finite self
excludes its differentiations in a manner that would be impossible to the
Absolute assumes the very point at issue, and so begs the whole ques-
tion. Does the finite self exclude its differentiations in a manner impos-
sible for the Absolute? Certainly not, if we are willing to accept Mr.
McTaggart’s analysis of finite consciousness. The finite self, he tells us,
includes everything of which it is conscious, and it excludes everything
that it includes. But, be it noted, it does not cease to include because it
excludes: inclusion and exclusion, we are told, are ‘inevitably connected.’
If, now, finite consciousness at once includes and excludes its differen-
tiations, is there anything absurd in the position that Absolute Con-
sciousness may do the same? If the finite consciousness is a differentia-
tion of the Absolute just because of its paradoxical nature — and this,
we must remember, is the basis upon which Mr. McTaggart rests his
argument for the immortality of the individual — may it not be that the
Absolute itself embodies this paradox par excellence? If inclusion and
exclusion by consciousness are correlative terms, why is it impossible
for a perfect Consciousness to include everything in the universe and
yet at the same time and just for that reason exclude it? Why, in short,
would it be necessary for the infinite and perfect self to fail just in that
respect which constitutes the very essence of the finite and imperfect
self? Arguing in this vein appears to be an approach to absurdity; and
yet this seems to be the position into which Mr. McTaggart is forced by
his own analysis of consciousness.309
The whole difficulty with Mr. McTaggart’s position may be put in
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we began: either pantheism or a finite God, either abstract identity be-
tween the absolute and its differentiations or a limited Absolute. But
this disjunction depends upon an abstract view of the nature of con-
sciousness. For it implies that consciousness must be either identical
with or abstractly opposed to its differentiations, that the Absolute ei-
ther is the world or must regard the world as something essentially for-
eign to itself. This disjunction, however, plainly flies in the face of expe-
rience. As we have tried to show, and as Mr. McTaggart himself has
pointed out, consciousness and its differentiations are neither identical
nor yet opposed to each other: they are ‘inevitably connected,’ and each
lives in the life of the other. And when we make a violent separation
between them, or assume a position that implies this separation, we
should not forget the fact that the possibility of finite consciousness, as
well as the possibility of an Absolute Consciousness is thereby denied
— simply because we then have done away with the presupposition of
all consciousness. And this suggests to us that it would be well to inves-
tigate experience further, before we commit ourselves to a position that
leads to such singularly disastrous results. This essential unity of the
Absolute and its Other Hegel emphasizes in his exposition of the philo-
sophical import of the Christian dogma of the Incarnation.310 In this
dogma we have expressed in religious terms the philosophical truth that
“the divine and human natures are not implicitly different.” In Jesus
Christ is manifested the Universal, God; the contingent and accidental
circumstances of temporal life are disregarded by Him. “Who is my
mother and my brother?” “Let the dead bury their dead.” But Christ is
not only God; he is also the Son of Man, the Man of Sorrows. In his
death we have evidence of the fact that He shares the common fate of all
human beings; indeed, “in Him humanity was carried to its furthest
point,” since he died the aggravated death of the evil-doer. This Person-
ality, which reaches to the glories of the Infinite, touches also, by virtue
of its divinity, the lowest abyss of the finite. The true lesson of the Incar-
nation, Hegel would seem to say, is that God is not high and lifted up
beyond the world of time and place; but that He is also here, and that it
is only here that He finds full and complete expression. God’s Other is
His own very Self, and not an existence beyond Him.
In conclusion, then, we may say that, as Hegel views the matter, the
puzzle of God’s relation to the world is to a considerable extent one of
our own making. By a process of abstraction we separate God from the
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again; we destroy their essential interconnectedness, and then raise the
cry that their relation to each other is to us incomprehensible. Conse-
quently, we must either take refuge in an impotent faith or be content to
remain sceptics and agnostics. “The ‘reflective’ understanding begins
by rejecting all systems and modes of conception, which, whether they
spring from heart, imagination, or speculation, express the interconnec-
tion of God and the world: and in order to have God pure in faith or
consciousness, he is as essence parted from appearance, as infinite from
the finite. But, after this partition, the conviction arises also that the
appearance has a relation to the essence, the finite to the infinite, and so
on: and thus arises the question of reflection as to the nature of this
relation. It is in the reflective form that the whole difficulty of the affair
lies, and that causes this relation to be called incomprehensible by the
agnostic.”311 Hegel’s own solution of the problem, which he proceeds to
outline for us in the paragraph from which this passage is taken, is to be
found on a plane which transcends the point of view of the ‘reflective
understanding’; and his solution consists really in pointing out that the
separation that gives rise to the problem is the result of abstract think-
ing. This more concrete standpoint he calls the Notion of the speculative
Reason, which is, in the last analysis, the category of self-conscious-
ness.
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with significant judgments. This so-called judgment sins against the
presupposition of all judgment, and consequently is really no judg-
ment. From the standpoint of epistemology, the infinite judgment does
not exist.
97 Werke, Bd. III, p. 7.
98 Ibid.
99 In this connection see Professor G. H. Sabine, “The Concreteness of
Thought,” The Philosophical Review, Vol. XVI, pp. 154–169.132/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
100 Cf. Hegel und seine Zeit, p. 331.
101 Will to Believe, p. 273.
102 Logische Undersuchungen, Bd. I, p. 56. I translate from the third
edition.
103 Cf. Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, §§8, 9, 109, 117, etc.
104 Principles of Logic, p. 138.
105 Ibid., p. 140.
106 Enc., §24.
107 Ibid., §162.
108 Cf. Werke, bd. V, p. 231. Notice also Hegel’s frequent statements
concerning the contingent.
109 A word should be said here to prevent a possible misconception.
This coincidence of logic and metaphysics must not be construed to
mean that the logical categories, as universals, destroy the particu-
larity of being. The identification is not supposed to deny the reality
of the factual side of existence; it does not do away with ‘existential
reality.’ That this is Hegel’s position will be developed below, when
he come to ask concerning the relation that Hegel conceives to exist
between these two phases of experience. One should never forget
that, in Hegel’s view of the matter, the Logic has to be supplemented
by the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind.
110 Werke, Bd. III, pp. 31–32.
111 Ibid., p. 57. These two quotations from the Logic are given by
Professor McGilvary in his admirable discussion on “The Presuppo-
sition Question in Hegel’s Logic,” The Philosophical Review, Vol.
VI, pp. 497 ff. This discussion seems to me to put the question be-
yond dispute. If the reader is interested in this problem and desires an
exhaustive discussion of it, he could not do better than to turn up
those pages.
112 Werke,. Bd. II. pp. 28–29. In this connection the following passage
from the Philosophische Propaedeutik is significant: “Science pre-
supposes that the separation of itself from the realm of truth has been
done away with, that Spirit no longer belongs to mere phenomena, as
is the case in the doctrine of consciousness . . . Science does not seek
the truth; it is in the truth, indeed, it is the truth itself” (Werke, Bd.
XVIII, p. 94). And this presupposition we have seen to be the actual
result of the Phenomenology.
113 Vera, Introduction a la Philosophie de Hegel, pp. 179–180.
114 Werke, Bd. III, p. 44.Thought and Reality in Hegel’s System/133
115 Ibid., p. 33.
116 Enc., §19.
117 Ibid., §82.
118 Werke, Bd. III, pp. 33–34.
119 Cf. ibid., pp. 24–25; see also Enc., §160.
120 Enc., §160: also §164.
121 Enc., §133, lecture-note.
122 Cf. Werke, Bd. II, p. 35; also Enc., §82.
123 See in this connection Caird, Hegel, p. 157; Wallace, Prolegomena
to Hegel’s Logic, pp. 302 ff.; and McGilvary, op. cit., pp. 504–507.
124 Enc., §160. See also §43, lecture-note.
125 Werke, Bd. III, pp. 7–8.
126 There are two further points in connection with the Logic, which,
though they are hardly relevant to our present purpose, should not be
passed over in silence. I refer to the problems concerning the begin-
ning of the Logic and its empirical basis. One or two general remarks
here will have to suffice.
Concerning the beginning of the Logic, it may be said without
fear of successful contradiction that the first of the categories is not a
lineal descendant from the conclusion of the Phenomenology the Phe-
nomenology is not the presupposition of the Logic in this sense. To
be sure, the category of Being must be viewed in the light of the
Phenomenology for without the development of the Phenomenology
Being would hardly be possible as a concrete category. And in this
respect the beginning of the Logic is a mediated immediacy, as Hegel
himself suggests. (Cf. Werke, Bd. III, pp. 58, 59 ) But when we turn
from the Phenomenology and look upon the development of the logi-
cal categories as such, Being becomes very abstract. Thus viewed, it
is not on a level with absolute knowledge, but rather, one is inclined
to say. with the beginning of the Phenomenology: in the realm of the
Logic, Being is what Sensuous Consciousness is in the Phenomenol-
ogy  — the most abstract and unmediated standpoint. In a word,
then, we may say that the beginning of the Logic, viewed as such, is
abstract and immediate; but that it must be regarded as in a sense
mediated, since it presupposes the entire development of the Phe-
nomenology. (For further discussion of this problem see Professor
McGilvary and Mr. McTaggart. Mr. McTaggart’s position entirely
ignores the Phenomenology, and so does not take account of the me-
diated aspect of Being.134/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
It has been objected that Hegel illogically smuggles experience
into the Logic as the basis of its development. (Cf. Trendelenburg,
op. cit., pp. 36 ff.; and Haym, op. cit., pp. 318 ff.) This objection
seems to be groundless. Of course the basis of the Logic is experi-
ence, but Hegel is not inconsistent in making it so. As we have pointed
out above, the presupposition of the Logic is concrete experience; for
it is with concrete experience that the Phenomenology has to do. To
assert, therefore, that the Logic deals with blank universals, and that
it gets its only plausibility by dragging experience in at the back door
after having ostentatiously kicked it out at the front, is to show plainly
that the real problem and presupposition of the Logic have been mis-
conceived. The objection is an admirable illustration of the danger
involved in an attempt to criticize the Logic taken apart from its con-
text in the system. And so far as one can see, Mr. McTaggart’s an-
swer to Trendelenburg’s objection illustrates the same danger. (Cf.
op. cit., §§30–43 ) If one were compelled to confine oneself to the
smaller Logic for data on the problem —  as Mr. McTaggart does —
one feels that the verdict would have to be in favor of Trendelenburg’s
position. It seems more than doubtful whether Mr. McTaggart’s ar-
gument is adequate to meet the objection against which it is advanced,
simply because it fails to take the right point of departure. Person-
ally, I cannot see that the argument has at all succeeded in establish-
ing the point at issue; and, striking in where it does, it seems to me to
be hopelessly defective. In point of fact, however, both objector and
defender are beating the air. For both the objection and the defense
fail to take any account of the author’s real position, which can be
seen only in the light of the Phenomenology.
127 Pp.111–113.
128 Werke, Bd. V, pp.342–343.
129 Enc., §244.
130 Cf. The Pathway to Reality, Vol. II, pp. 68–69.
131 Cf. Werke, Bd. VIl, i. pp. 25 ff.’ Werke, Bd. V, p. 44; Enc., §43,
lecture-note.
132 Cf. Werke, Bd. V, p. 341. See also Enc., §244, lecture-note.
133 History of Modern Philosophy, trans., p. 489.
134 See op. cit., p. 181.
135 Hegel und seine Zeit, p. 255.
136 Cf. Gesch. d. n. Philosophie, Bd. VIII, i, p. 574.
137 This point should never be forgotten in connection with Hegel’sThought and Reality in Hegel’s System/135
system. He never denied the necessity of a science of nature and a
science of social values.
138 Hegel tells us that “the other philosophical sciences, the Philoso-
phy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind, take the place, as it were,
of an Applied Logic, and that Logic is the soul which animates them
both” (Enc. §24. lecture-note (2)).
139 Op. cit., p. 305.
140 Cf. Werke, Bd. V. p. 342.
141 Enc., §43.
142 Werke, Bd. V, p. 318.
143 Cf. La Logique de Hegel, pp. 116 ff.
144 Op. cit.. §27.
145 Doubtless Professor Pringle-Pattison would object here, as he teas
objected elsewhere, that it is time to leave off trying to defend Hegel
against adverse criticism by complaining that he has been misunder-
stood. And there is ground for the objection — though one is inclined
to doubt whether it has been the misfortune of any other philosopher
to be more universally misunderstood. The assertion unsupported by
evidence, however, is puerile. My only excuse for reasserting it here
is that, if this study has not erred from the beginning, the statement
loses its dogmatic character and assumes for itself a basis of justifi-
cation. For it is my purpose to establish the assertion in the light of
the conclusions we have already reached, and to maintain that its
justification rests upon the validity of those conclusions.
146 Pp, 117–118. I quote from the second edition.
147 Op. cit., Vol. I, p. 121.
148 Werke, Bd. III, p. 33.
149 Cf. op. cit.. pp. 573–576.
150 Hegelianism and Personality, pp. 126–127.
151 It should be noted that Hegel’s frequent ‘snort of contempt’ is re-
served exclusively for the category of Being which presumes to ex-
haust the nature of ultimate reality.
152 For the quotations here given, see op. cit., pp. 128–134.
153 For justification of this assertion concerning Hegel, I refer the reader
to the following chapter of this study. There can be no question con-
cerning Professor Pringle-Pattison’s position. In the Scottish Philoso-
phy (p. 170) he very emphatically tells us that “the particular as
particular — the mere self-identical unqualified particular — no-
where exists; it is the abstraction of a logic not wholly clear about its136/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
own procedure. And the thing-in-itself is simply the fallacy of the
mere particular in another form. The mere particular and the mere
universal are alike abstractions of the mind; what exists is the indi-
vidual.” And when we inquire further as to what we are to under-
stand by the individual, we are informed that it is “a particular that is
also universal, or, from the other side, it is a universal — a set of
universals — particularized.” Or, in other words, it is “identity through
difference,” “difference subsumed into identity.” I shall point out later
that this is exactly Hegel’s conception of the real, namely, a universal
particularized, or, as he himself puts it (´Enc., §167), “a universal
which is individualized.” As regards the ultimate nature of the sys-
tem of reality, Hegel and his critic may disagree; but they are in full
accord that that which is real can be neither an abstract particular-
nor a blank universal, but must be a particularized universal.
154 A word concerning Professor Pringle-Pattison’s inconsistency on
this point may not be amiss. In From Kant to Hegel, by way of criti-
cism of Fichte’s implicit assumption that the object is something more
than its manifestations, we read: “The noumenon is always a fuller
knowledge as yet unreached by us, and so each category has its own
validity and function. But it is not an unattainable reality, and to
exalt this useful distinction of thought into a barrier which thought is
unable to surmount is simply to fall down and worship our own ab-
stractions. A philosophy which remains entangled in this opposition
must inevitably end in the paradox that the real is what cannot be
known” (pp. 46–47). A passage of similar import occurs in the Scot-
tish Philosophy, pp. 173–174. One is at a loss to know how to recon-
cile these passages with the one in Hegelianism and Personality (pp.
137–138), in which the opinions of Trendelenburg and Mr. Bradley,
to the effect that the real is inaccessible by way of ideas, are quoted
with approval. Perhaps the inconsistency here is due to a change of
view on the part of the author. I have presumed to call attention to it,
because it concerns such a vital epistemological problem.
155 Microcosmos, Book VIII, Chapter 1, §8. The quotation is from the
translation of the fourth edition.
156 Enc., §19. See the lecture-note also.
157 Enc., §24. lecture-note (l). The doctrine of thought upheld by Hegel
is discussed throughout this entire chapter on the ‘Preliminary No-
tion.’
158 The writer has no desire to defend the letter of Hegel’s system; theThought and Reality in Hegel’s System/137
preceding discussion simply aims to be faithful to the spirit of his
system. It is true that the time has come to leave off trying to defend
Hegel by complaining that he has been misunderstood. But it is also
true that the time has come when the critics of Hegel’s doctrines should
penetrate beneath the formality of his philosophy and bring to the
surface its basic principles. Were this done. there would be much less
useless and valueless criticism than one finds at present. In many
instances criticisms stand self-refuted, if only their presuppositions
are disclosed.
159 See in this connection Hegel’s own words quoted above (Chapter
1) from the Encyclopaedia, section 573. There Hegel states as plainly
as possible that there is a marked difference between abstract identity
and his doctrine of the unity of the Notion. And upon this difference
he rests his case.
160 Abstractness of thought and the attempt to deduce existence from
it were early repulsive to Hegel. Cf. ´Werke, Bd. 1. pp. 119 ff.; also
Kuno Fischer, op. cit., pp. 267–268.
161 Cf. Werke, Bd. VlI. i, pp. 16–17.
162 Werke, Bd. III, p. 35.
163 Werke, Bd. 1, p. 178.
164 Werke, Bd. V, p. 329.
165 Logic, Vol. I, pp. 2–3.
166  In the present chapter I use the terms experience and reality inter-
changeably. This, I think, is true to the spirit of Hegel’s system.
167 Werke, Bd. IV, p. 3.
168 Werke, Bd. VII, I, p. 15.
169 Werke, Bd. II, p. 15.
170 Werke, Bd. V, p. 20.
171 Cf. Enc., §§22, 112, etc.; also the preface to the Phenomenology.
172 Readers will bear in mind that the term thought is used throughout
this discussion in the meaning attached to it by Hegel.
173 Cf. Werke, Bd. VII, I, pp. 16–17.
174 Werke, Bd. XVIII, p. 90.
175 Werke, Bd. xv, p. 389 (History of Philosophy, trans, Vol. III, p.
309).
176 Enc., §74.
177 I may be permitted in this connection to record my feeling that the
indeterminate act of will upon which free-willists of a certain type
are wont to insist in their arguments for freedom is nothing but such138/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
an abstract particular. It matters not that they try to make their posi-
tion plausible by splitting the world into a medley of meaningless
possibilities in order to find a haven for the would-be category of
‘chance’; the difficulties still remain. For is it possible to attach any
meaning to this notion of ‘chance’? Is it anything more than an ex-
pression of ignorance? Of course, the indeterminist will answer that
it means mere negativity. But to the question as to what is here meant
by negativity nothing more satisfactory than a tautological answer is
given. And even granting that, as Professor James asserts, chance “is
a purely negative and relative term, giving us no information about
that of which it is predicated, except that it happens to be discon-
nected with something else” (Will to Believe, pp. 151–154), and grant-
ing further that a meaning can be attached to the term as thus defined,
what about the event of volition that is supposed to be made possible
by it? Can it be anything more than an event which has absolutely no
relation to the series in which it occurs, and so an event that is only an
abstract unrelated particular? It would seem to be an event in time
that, apparently, takes place with other events and yet possesses no
real, intelligible relation to them. What such an event could possibly
be one is at a loss to conceive. It presents the rather odd appearance
of being one among other unrelated absolutes — since every volun-
tary act is presumably the result of ‘chance’ — within the limits of a
finite experience; and it would be difficult to think of a bigger nest of
contradictions than is revealed by such an unsightly state of affairs.
178 Werke, Bd. XIII, p. 112 (History of Philosophy, trans., Vol. I, p.
95).
179 An appreciation of the difference between the universal of cogni-
tion, the formal concept. and the Hegelian doctrine of universality,
the Notion, is absolutely fundamental to an understanding of the
present justification of Hegel. It is unfortunate that we have no terms
in English to express, explicitly. this difference.
180 Hegel’s Logic, pp. 339 ff.
181 Ibid., p. 373.
182 See in this connection the entire twelfth section of the smaller Logic.
There Hegel points out how thought cannot rest in its ‘unrealized
universality’ apart from the facts.
183 See E. H. Hollands, “The Relation of Science to Concrete Experi-
ence.” The Philosophical Review, Vol. XV, pp. 614–626.





189 Werke, Bd. IX, p. 12.
190 Enc §471.
191 Enc., §133, lecture note.
192 Werke, Bd. VIII, p. 34 (Philosophy of Right, trans., p. II).
193 Werke, Bd. XIII, p. 68 (History of Philosophy, trans., Vol. I, p.
54).
194 Logic, Vol. I, pp. 62–63.
195 Enc., §163.
196 The above is not intended as a criticism of the disciplinary value of
formal logic as a course of study. The criticism is directed at formal
logic as a theory of knowledge. Undoubtedly. formal logic has a dis-
ciplinary value; but there can be no question about its abstractness.
197 Cf. Vol. I, pp. 63 ff.
198 For an elaboration of this doctrine of the concreteness or thought,
see the article by Professor Sabine, already referred to. (The Philo-
sophical Review, Vol. XVI, pp. 154–169.)
199 Cf. Werke, Bd. XVII, p 30.
200 Cf. Werke, Bd. v.; also Enc., I. 150 ff.
201 Enc., §163, lecture-note (I).
202 Werke, Bd. VIII., §270 (Philosophy of Right, trans.. p. 270).
203 Enc., §181.
204 See the preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit.
205 Cf. Enc., §160 ff.; also Werke, Bd. V.
206 Cf. Werke, Bd. V, p. 31.
207 Cf. Enc., §193.
208 Ibid., §213.
209 Ibid., §163.
210 Werke, Bd. V, p. 58.
211 Enc., §171.
212 Ibid., §163, lecture-note (2).
213 Ibid., §164.
214 Ibid., §192, lecture-note.
215 “Transition into something else is the dialectical process within the
range of Being: reflection (bringing something else into light), in the
range of Essence. The movement of the Notion is development: by140/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
which that only is explicit which is already implicitly present.” (Enc.,
§161, lecture-note.)
216 Enc., §20. Quoted in Hegelianism and Personality. p. 137.
217 Logische Untersuchungen, Bd. II, p. 230.
218 Principles of Logic, pp. 63, 69.
219 Enc., §167.
220 See Professor Pringle-Pattison’s emphatic words on this point in
Scottish Philosophy, p. 170.
221 Conception of God, p. 258.
222 Principles of Logic, p. 64.
223 As I understand Hegel, this is just the principle upon which he is
insisting when he makes immediacy and mediation conterminous. For
him there is no ‘given’: a bare fact, or datum, is as pure an abstrac-
tion as is the unrelated particular with which he would identify it. See
here Professor Sabine, “The Concreteness of Thought,” The Philo-
sophical Review, Vol. XVI, pp. 155–156.
224 Mr. McTaggart looks for the synthesis in emotion as opposed to
feeling (Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, §§282 ff.). But this seems
hardly to meet the difficulty —  that is, if you abstract emotion from
its rational principle of unity; for such abstract emotion could hardly
furnish us with the synthesis for which we are seeking.
225 It might be well for those who uphold the doctrine that is here
objected to if they would study more carefully the Transcendental
Deduction of the Categories in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant’s
one lesson there is that the categories are essential to immediate ex-
perience.
226 Cf. Hegel’s Logic, pp. 340 ff. for the criticism and the passages
here cited.
227 Ibid.. p. 373.
228 Students of Kant will see here simply an attempt to apply the les-
son of the Transcendental Deduction.
229 Logic, Vol. I, p. 77.
230 The World and the Individual. first series, pp. 55–56.
231 Hegel’s Logic, p. 348.
232 An Idealistic Construction of Exprience, pp. 67–68. It will be
noticed that this passage is a very telling criticism of the point of
view advocated in the entire last chapter of Hegel’s Logic; and, if the
one is true, it would seem that the other must be false. So far as I am
aware, the author has passed over this contradiction in silence.Thought and Reality in Hegel’s System/141
233 Is not the search for an adequate representation of the nature of
such a comprehensible whole the task of philosophy? And if such a
task is inherently impossible, is, indeed, absurd, then is philosophy
worth the pains? Seeking an ideal which is essentially unattainable.
but which, were it miraculously attained, would annihilate us, seems
on the face of it to be a rather profitless, or it may be dangerous,
business; chasing the rainbow for the bag of gold at its end would
appeal more strongly to the timorous. Hegel humorously remarks
that, on this theory, “thought is capable of comprehending one thing
only, its incapacity to grasp the truth and see into it, and of proving to
itself its own nothingness, with the result that suicide is its highest
vocation.” (Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol. III. p. 161.)
234 See Mr. Bradley’s statements on this point in Appearance and
Reality, pp. 167 ff. Mr. Bradley and Hegel have practically the same
ideas on the problem, the difference being that Mr. Bradley insists on
narrowing the term thought to what Hegel would call ‘finite’ thought.
Hegel would seem to have the advantage over Mr. Bradley in this
respect at least, namely, that he does give us an intelligible unity of
reality whereas Mr. Bradley leaves his Absolute in a rather confused
and chaotic condition. And one is inclined to suspect that Hegel’s
advantage emerges from this difference in doctrine concerning the
nature of thought.
235 I use the term ‘personality’ as synonymous with selfhood or self-
consciousness.
236 It may be said that in a sense Hegel makes a distinction between the
terms Idea and God, giving to the latter a religious coloring. But he
insists over and over again that the object of philosophy and the ob-
ject of religion do not differ from each other, but are essentially the
same. For speculative reason the terms Idea, God. and the Absolute
are synonymous. (Cf. Leighton, The Philosophical Review, Vol. V,
pp. 609–610. Cf. Hegel Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol. 1, p. 19;
Vol. II, p. 348.)
237 Enc. §221, lecture-note.
238 Ibid.
239 Enc. §216, lecture-note.
240  This standpoint will not be confused with the more comprehensive
one also called Cognition in the translation — of which it is simply
the first stage. Volition being the second.
241 At present the particular sciences make no claim to this ability;142/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
generally speaking, they see quite clearly that ontological problems
do not fall within their sphere. But this has not always been true.
242 Enc., §226.
243 Ibid., lecture-note.
244 Enc., §234, lecture-note.
245 Enc., §233.
246 Enc., §234, lecture note.
247 Enc.. §235.
248 Enc., §236, lecture note.
249 Ibid.
250 Enc., §213.
251 Cf. Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, Chapter II; also Chapter III,
§63.
252 Ibid., §63.
253 Werke, Bd. XI, p. 97 (Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol. I, p.
100).
254 Studies in Hegelian Dialectic, §186.
255 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, §35.
256 Ibid. This idea is expressed in §§51, 63, etc.
257 Cf. ibid., §§85 ff.
258 Mr. McTaggart escapes this difficulty by inconsistently making
the finite individual more than a mere manifestation of the whole;
there is something unique about the individual, after all, that falls
outside the unity that binds him to others.
259 It is only fair to mention that Mr. McTaggart anticipates this charge
and denies its justice (§§38–39). In spite of this, however, I urge it
because it seems to me that it becomes unwarranted only when the
conception of an absolutely reciprocal relation between the Absolute
and its differentiations is definitely abandoned.
260 Enc., §194.
261 Enc., §215.
262 Cf. Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, §§214–218.
263 Ibid., §63.
264 Werke, Bd. V, pp. 317–318.
265 Ibid., p. 320; see also p. 339.
266 Enc., §151, lecture note.
267 Werke, Bd. XII, p. 192 (trans., Vol. II, p. 329).
268 Ibid., p. 284 (trans., Vol. III, p. 74).
269 Ibid., p. 496 (trans., Vol. III, p. 303). Curiously enough Mr.Thought and Reality in Hegel’s System/143
McTaggart cites this passage in support of his interpretation (Cos-
mology, §224).
270 Werke, Bd. IX, p. 66 (trans., p. 55).
271 See especially the Introduction to the third volume of the larger
Logic.
272 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology. §216.
273 Ibid.
274 Werke, Bd. XII, p. 309 (Philosophy of Religion. trans., Vol. III,
pp. 100–101).
275 Ibid., p. 340 (trans., ibid., p. 134).
276 Ibid., p. 341 (trans., ibid., p. 135).
277 Ibid., p. 346 (trans., ibid. p., 141).
278 Ibid., p. 350 (trans. Ibid., p. 145).
279 Ibid.
280 Ibid., p. 354 (trans., ibid., p. 149).
281 Ibid., p. 355 (trans., ibid., p. 151).
282 Philosophy of History, trans., p. 41.
283 Werke, Bd. VIII, §258 (Philosophy of Right, trans., p. 247).
284 Werke Bd. XII, p. 343 (Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol. III, p.
138).
285 Enc. §535.
286 Werke, Bd. VIII, §272 (Philosophy of Right, trans., p. 277).
287 Ibid. §279 (trans., pp. 290–291).
288 Ibid. (trans., pp. 287–288).
289 Ibid., (trans., p. 287).
290 Ibid., (trans., p. 289).
291 Enc. §542.
292 Of course, no attempt is made here either to give an exhaustive
account of Hegel’s conception of the state or to defend his theory.
What we are interested in is simply to point out his insistence on the
rational necessity of a personal ruler.
293 It may be objected that all this talk about the unity of the state is
beside the issue. In developing this doctrine of the state, it may be
said, Hegel was only trying to justify the then existing government of
his own country; his elaborate arguments were wrought out prima-
rily in the interests of the Prussian monarchy, and not from the objec-
tive point of view of the Idea. Therefore, it may be concluded, these
arguments have absolutely nothing to do with the logic of Hegel’s
system, and any interpretation that takes serious account of them is144/Gustavus Watts Cunningham
useless.
294 Development of Modern Philosophy, Vol. 1, p. 281.
295 James, Pragmatism, p. 160.
296 Werke, Bd. XI, p. 93 (Philosophy of Religion, trans., Vol. I, p. 96).
297 Ibid., p. 97 (trans., ibid., pp. 99–100).
298 I use the terms ‘content, and ‘objective reference’ as synonymous.
An objection might be raised to this use of the terms. But perhaps the
objection would rest upon a misconception of my meaning. What I
have in mind when I say ‘content’ of consciousness is simply that
object, or group of objects, whatever it may be, to which the con-
sciousness refers. And this I take to be practically what one would
mean by the ‘objective reference’ of consciousness. If my meaning is
clear, I do not care to dispute about the use of words.
299 It seems to me false psychology and vicious logic to identity self-
consciousness and the feeling of self as opposed to a not-self as Pro-
fessor Taylor does in his argument against the selfhood of the Abso-
lute (Elements of Metaphysics, pp. 336. 343–345). Awareness of
self as contrasted with a not-self, so far as I can see, is not at all
essential to self-consciousness. It is a matter of common speech that
a man is most truly his own self when he is least conscious of a more
or less disconcerting not-self. The logical problem of selfhood, or
self-consciousness, is one thing; the psychological problem of the
origin of the sense of self as opposed to an other is another thing.
300 Outlines of Psychology, p. 90.
301 It appears to me that the ‘wandering adjective’ theory of idealists
of Mr. Bradley’s type approaches dangerously near this catastrophe.
302 This, I should say. is sufficient answer to all such criticism as that
which Professor James is persistently making of what he cells ‘abso-
lutism.’ Over and over again throughout his works he takes it for
granted that the ‘absolutist’ must reduce the entire world of finite
existence into an undifferentiated identity with the Absolute; and his
objections to the position all rest on the simple assertion that such a
reduction cannot take place, since the perseity of the finite is more
than a state of consciousness for the Absolute. But this is not the
position of the ‘absolutist’ who upholds the doctrine of a self-con-
scious Absolute. Indeed, such a position is impossible for him. For
his argument that the Absolute is self-conscious precludes an effort
(even if he had any intention of making one) to reduce the finite world
to an identity with the Absolute.Thought and Reality in Hegel’s System/145
303 Professor Taylor has advanced practically the same objections as
those of Mr. McTaggart. See Elements of Metaphysics, pp. 343 ff.
304 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, §86; see also §66.
305 Hegel, p. 182.
306 What would constitute individuality, or thing-ness, from the stand-
point of the Absolute is a problem that demands separate discussion.
I have no intention of solving it off hand by the use of the term ‘ob-
ject’ here.
307 Werke, Bd. XIII. p. 192 (Philosophy of Religion. trans., Vol. II, p.
329).
308 Op. cit., §27.
309 One is led to suspect that the inconsistency in Mr. McTaggart’s
position here is due primarily to a confusion that arises from his
terms ‘inclusion’ and ‘exclusion.’ Apparently, he does not always
succeed in divesting the terms of their spatial reference. When he
enlarges on the impossibility of the Absolute’s ‘excluding’ its differ-
entiations from itself, he seems to think of the latter as existentially
distinct from the former and as being in contrast with it as a limiting
other. This confusion may be due to the fact that Mr. McTaggart
hardly gets beyond the category of substance in his theory of the
ultimately real: individuality he is inclined to define in terms of a bit
of being that is individual solely by virtue of its factual existence.
310 Cf. the third part of the Philosophy of Religion, especially the last
of the second general division of the discussion. In these passages
Hegel treats of the essential nature of man and shows us that man’s
essential nature is to be found in his community with God.
311 Enc., §573.